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# Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

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Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

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## Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

The purpose of the Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences is to publish reports of original research, reviews, and articles of importance to the peoples of the Caucasus region and to the people who has interest, and who work on this region. The CJSS should stimulate, communicate research, critical thinking, and develop modern trends in social sciences. The CJSS should raise issues that have not been covered yet and need to be analyzed from the scientific point of view.

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Articles selected for preliminary consideration by the Editor will be sent to subject matter experts for review. Names of authors and reviewers are kept confidential.

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## The Question of Ideological Domination and the Georgian Printed Media in 1990-1991

Khatuna Maisashvili  
Ilia Chavchavadze State University

*Based on quantitative research methods, descriptive statistics and factor analysis, the article aims to show the extent of the question of the ideological domination in the Georgian media of the early 1990s after their coming out from Soviet censorship, after passing through the glasnost period and having pretension to be free in Independent Georgian nation-state.*

### იდეოლოგიური დომინაციის საკითხი და ქართული ბეჭდური მედია. 1990-1991 წლები

ხათუნა მაისაშვილი  
ილია ჭავჭავაძის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი

**კ**ვლევის რაოდენობრივ მეთოდებზე, - აღწერით სტატისტიკასა და ფაქტორულ ანალიზზე, - დაყრდნობით, წინამდებარე სტატია მიზნად ისახავს, წარმოაჩინოს იდეოლოგიური დომინაციის საკითხის ჩარჩოები საბჭოთა ცენზურისგან თავდაღწეულ, გლასნოსტგამოვლილ 1990-იანი წლების დასაწყისის ქართულ ბეჭდურ მედიაში, რომელიც თავისუფლებაზე აცხადებდა პრეტენზიას დამოუკიდებელ ქართულ ერ-სახელმწიფოში.

*The Conceptual Changes in the Georgian Media during the 1990s*

The main question to be investigated is an attribution of the Post-Soviet Georgian media to ideological domination. It is widely known that with the gradual collapse of the Soviet-Communist system, the functioning model of the media started to be changed some years earlier prior to the official abolishing of the USSR. In 1987-1990, by the admission of the Soviet Government, the control of media content for political and cultural reasons changed its nature. This change is known under the name of *glasnost*. For the phenomenon of *glasnost*, it was characteristic to maintain the main features of the Soviet-Communist model of press. That model was characterized by a large-scale society, an atomized public, a centralized media, one-way transmission. Moreover, there was a top down perception that the receivers depend on media for identity. Media was used for manipulation and control. *Glasnost* partly solved the problem of the lack of coverage of tabooed themes in the late Soviet media. This circumstance (being planned or unplanned by the initiators of *glasnost*, under their control or out of it) changed the impression about the receiver and attitude towards him. The receiver was less considered as an individual unable to act or to make a decision independently.

*In light of the question of ideological domination it is very important to underline that the Georgian media of the early 1990s existed in parallel to Soviet media which played an important role in the whole post-Soviet society and which provided anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist discourses.* This paradoxical ideological characteristic of the media highlighted the conflict between the name (Soviet) and its context, valence and directionality of the media activities (anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist).

Approximately a year earlier prior to state independence, i.e. during the period of *glasnost* (1989), the space of the Georgian media changed. It narrowed down, from the scale of the Soviet space to the new nation-state Georgia. The 'Soviet homeland' was divided into different components in the Georgian public conscience and reflected in identical duality, *here* and *there*, *ours* and *theirs*. The media had to create the definition of a nation and nationality, the definition of nationalism as an ideology and as an identical phenomenon for its readers.<sup>1</sup> Besides the traditional Soviet newspapers, legal printing bodies of the political parties and societies involved in the National Liberation Movement of Georgia appeared. The titles of the most of them contained the terms and elements of national identity and references to freedom. For example: *Sakartvelo* (which means 'Georgia,' was a printing body of the Popular Front of Georgia), *Mamuli* ('Fatherland,' was a body of Rustaveli Society), 'Iveria' (the ancient name of Georgia, was a body of the Ilia Chavchavadze Soci-

ety), *Tavisupali Sakartvelo* ('Free Georgia,' was a body of the political block 'Round Table – Free Georgia'), etc. The similar practice was common not only for the Post-Soviet but for the whole Post-Communist space. As Slovenian researcher Zala Volcic wrote, 'As in any other nation-state, the national media in Slovenia provide a very powerful basis for the processes by which members of a nation 'unite' and 'homogenise'... As such, media ideology can be understood as the 'glue' of the social world, binding people to the concrete practices of daily life that reproduce a shared sense of national identity'.<sup>2</sup>

After the elections of 28 October 1990, which resulted in the nationalist forces coming to power, the official bodies of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League of Georgia, *Komunisti* and *Akhalgazrda Komunisti* changed their names into *Sakartvelos Respublika* and *Akhalgazrda Iverieli*. The change of names highlighted not only the changes in the social categories of identity - from partial solidarity to national solidarity, but it reflected a shift in dominant ideology.

As some Georgian scholars mentioned, in 1990 nationalist themes and issues were those topics in frames of which the whole Georgian media were acting, replacing Marxist-Leninist ideology with highly nationalist ideology, and this unavoidable conjuncture reflected new shifting inside quasi-culture (Andronikashvili, Z., Maisuradze, G. (2007). But some scholars (Surguladze, R., Iberi, E. (2003), Maisashvili, K. (2008)) argued that if one ideology was replaced with the other, for the media it might mean only facade change rather than structural innovation. In this reference the most important item was whether media did free itself from ideological domination, or just replaced one ideology with the other. The same scholars argued that all the attributions to freedom of press, such as themes and issues, dosage of freedom, questions for discussions, type of sources, privileged communicators, were admitted by the ideological conjuncture of transitional period. This conjuncture is evident in emphasis on creation of master-identity for the members of the society - to be a Georgian. Despite the importance of the individual identity for the Post-totalitarian society, creation and evolution of the *collective identity* was one of the challenges of the Georgian media in 1990.

To refer to the media practices of other Post-Communist countries, in Georgia, like in other Post-Communist nation-states, the 'nationalization of discourse' was aimed at reducing different scales of individual identity to mostly national or ethnic belonging (Volcic, 2005. p. 293).

In the early 1990s, the entire Post-Soviet space was marked with the growth of newspaper circulation and with the gradually growing impact of printed media. The quality, influence and freedom of the printed press made

it the unconditional leader in the media. It was characterized by trust of the readers, creative innovations, and the craving and efforts to overcome Soviet inertia. It was in the printed media where new media leaders were formed. By the Census of 1989, the literacy rate in Georgia was higher than 90%. As the rating researches and polls in the field of media conducted in 1990-1992 showed, the only state-owned television (1<sup>st</sup> channel of the Georgia television) was not able to compete with the printing press upon the degree of in-depth analysis, by freedom and diversity.<sup>3</sup>

*What are the New Roles and Functions of the Georgian Media of 1990. The Theoretical Arguments.*

I posit that: a) the presence or the absence of the ideological domination in media would be highlighted in examination of the perception by the new Georgian media leaders of that period of the roles and functions of the media, and b) the presence of ideological domination affirms the perspective of the relationship of media and society to be media-centric than society-centric.

Under the construct 'new media roles and functions' are unified the following: new principles of agenda-setting and new communication effects. The issues of the ideological domination of media can be best examined exactly through examination of these principles because of its high internal and external validity. The signification 'new' distinguishes between Soviet and Post-Soviet practices. As for the need for ideological domination, I assume that for the Georgians nationalist leaders and the nationalist intelligentsia in Post-Soviet Georgia, the intervention in the sphere of media production was so crucial as for the Georgian Communist leaders and nomenclature intelligentsia who relied on the media as a provider of state propaganda.

As for the term 'media-centric' I use it in the meaning of the classic theory of mass communication according to which media-centric approach sees mass media as a primary mover in social changes <sup>4</sup>.

*The Hypotheses*

Based on the above analyzed theoretical arguments, concepts and constructs, I guide two hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1. The examination of perception by the new Georgian media leaders their new roles and functions is more likely to affirm the presence of ideological domination in media than to affirm existence of free (from ideology) media.*

*Hypothesis 2. In case of affirming ideological domination in media the model of media-society relationship is more likely to be media-centric than society-centric.*

### *The method*

The research method was collapsed into three techniques: descriptive statistics, chi-square and factor analysis.

The number of respondents: 18

Volume of the questionnaire: 6 questions.

Type of questionnaire: half structured questionnaire

The structure of the questionnaire: 2 blocks.

1) New roles and functions of Georgian media during period of 1990-1991 in light of presence of ideological domination; the editorial policy of a publication and its main principles;

2) Media-centric or society-centric perspectives and views of the interrelations between media and society;

The respondents were chosen with mixed principle in order to represent all the hierarchical levels and competencies in the most widely circulated, popular and influential Georgian publications of the early 1990s: editor-in-chief (2), editor (1), deputy editor-in-chief/deputy editor (2), co-editor (2), publisher/ member of the board of the publishing body (2), head of department (3), reporter (6).

Publications with different communication structures are represented: *Kommunisti* (an official body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia); *Sakartvelos Respublika* (an official body of the Supreme Council of Georgia), *Tbilisi* (a municipal evening daily newspaper), *Sakartvelo* (a printing body of Popular Front of Georgia), *Mamuli* (a bi-weekly publication of the Rustaveli Society), *7 Dghe* (a body of the Independent Union of Journalists of Georgia), *Droni*, a private publication, *Tavisupali Sakartvelo* (a body of the political block 'The Round Table – Free Georgia'), *Sarbieli*, a private publication.

The research collected data via face-to-face interviews. Data were analyzed according to descriptive statistics methods.

With the purpose to test hypothesis 1, on the second stage of analysis the same respondents were asked to classify the results of the block 'New roles and functions of Georgian media' by the criterion of presence in the responses the ideological dominative meanings (evident or latent). The data of descriptive statistics were passed through chi-square to calculate the probability of deviation.

With the purpose to test hypothesis 2, on the third stage of analysis, in order of sub-gradation of data, an additional standardized questionnaire (including 18 questions) was suggested to the same respondents. The respondents had to evaluate on a 7-point scale the new media roles and functions according to the responses indicated by themselves to the questionnaire (18 references) on the first stage of the research. The data of this block were analyzed by scaling and factor analysis methods.

### *Results*

#### Descriptive Analysis and Factor Analysis For Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2

1. What factors determined motivation of maintenance of the ideological domination in the media? (because the respondents could choose more than one, per cents are calculated beyond 100)

	In per cent
Professional education principles	27,8%
Political and historical moment	55,6%
Ideological domination – the only possibility for impact on society	33,3%

2. How do You characterize dimensions of media-society interrelatedness

	In per cent
Media-centric	27,8%
Society-centric	72,2%

## 3. The new functions and roles of the Georgian media of 1990s

	In per cent
Destroying of the principles of Communist press	8,7%
Pluralism, objectivity	21,7%
Coverage of National Liberation Movement's activities	4,3%
Full commitment in practical politics	4,3%
Supporting the creation of free society	4,3%
Supporting the construction of new state ideology	4,3%
Indefinite and unclear. Only the destiny and founding principles were changed	8,7%
Comprehension of national identity	4,3%
Independency of a journalist from the political elite	4,3%
Nomination (signification) of social phenomena	4,3%
Spreading of knowledge and education	4,3%
Social-political movement	4,3%
Critical views up events	4,3%
Reinforcing of public opinion	8,7%
Stage for political struggle	8,7%

## 4. What kind of factors does provide freedom of press?

	In per cent
Ownership structure	25%
Editorial policy	25%
Journalists elite	11,1%
State policy	11,1%
Public opinion	22,2%
Law	5,6%

## 5. Founding principles of editorial policy

	In per cent
Restoration of national values, reinforcing national kernel	11,1%
Professionalism	5,6%
Non-partisan press, objectivity, truth	16,7%
Freedom of speech	5,6%
Pluralism	5,6%
Collective nature of management	5,6%
Support for state policy	5,6%
Distribution of knowledge and analytical texts	16,7%
Managing and manipulating with public opinion	16,7%
Coverage of social problems	5,6%
Flexible policy	5,6%

## 6. In which way did the editorial policies support the ideological domination in media?

	In per cent
Conceptually conceived	66,7%
Spontaneous	16,7%
Intuitive	16,7%
Reactive	5,6%

As it is seen from descriptive statistics, the maintenance of the ideological domination is affirmed by the respondents by the following reasons: a) according to their opinion, the professional education principles of the Soviet journalists were based on the ideological domination; b) the political moment of transitional period required journalism to be a kind of ideological labor; c) presence of ideological domination in the media was considered as the only possibility for impact on the society. As we discussed in the introduction of the article, the leading ideological discourse as in the society so in the media was the nationalist discourse. So, the respondents posited that only ideologically affirming journalism could be effective in that political moment. More than 66% of the respondents pointed out that this ideological labor was done 'conceptually conceived' by the media leaders.

Upon completing descriptive analysis the respondents were asked to classify by nominal level of measurement the new roles and functions of the Georgian media in 1990-1991 according to the criterion of presence in their responses ideologically dominative meanings (clear and hidden).

Table 1. Clear and hidden ideological domination in the structure of the new media roles and functions.

<i>Clear ideological dominative roles and functions</i>	In per cent
Destroying of the principles of Communist Press	8,7%
Coverage of National Liberation Movement	4,3%
Full commitment in practical policy	4,3%
Supporting the construction of the new state ideology	4,3%
Comprehension of national identity	4,3%
Social-political movement	4,3%
Stage for the political struggle	8,7%
<i>Hidden ideological roles and functions</i>	In per cent
Pluralism, objectivity	21,7%
Reinforcing of public opinion	8,7%
Spreading of knowledge and education	4,3%

Table 2.

The presence /absence of ideology domination in the new media roles and functions

Ideology-affirming (clear/ hidden) roles and functions	73.6%(38.9%/34.7%)	n=13(7/6)
Roles and functions free from ideological domination	17,2%	n=3
Unclear and indefinite	8,7%	n=2
X <sup>2</sup> =1.9, df=1, p<0.01		

If clear signs of the ideological domination are beyond of explanation, the roles and functions recognized as hidden attribution to the ideological domination in the media need some more comments. The comments of the respondents can be generalized as follow: a) the terms ‘pluralism’ and ‘objectivity’ were the ideology- carrier terms brought by glasnost ideology and directed to mask quasi-democratic processes in the late Soviet media; b) spreading of knowledge and education by the media was also the specific glasnost and post-glasnost project, when the learning from the newspapers concerned the knowledge with the widest sense of the term: signification and explanation of the social, political and historical phenomena, inter-replacement of the false (official, Soviet, Stalinist) history with the its ‘true’ (unofficial) versions; creation of definitions if ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’, ‘homeland’ and ‘state’, ‘democracy’ and ‘independence’, etc.; c) *knowledge* was an crucial *factor* that provided re-enforcing the public opinion.

*Calculating chi-square and probability coefficient proves that hypothesis 1 is accepted.*

As for hypothesis 2, the descriptive analysis doesn’t affirm the assumption about media-centric nature of the Georgian media in 1990-1991. Saying more exactly, the descriptive analysis doesn’t accept the causal and determinative links between ideological domination and media-centrism. In descriptive statistics only five respondents from 18 appreciated the nature of relations between media and society in the plane of coverage limitation as media-centric, 13 respondents considered it as society-centric. But while taking into account that presence of any form of ideological domination, as a rule, created media-centric, or quasi-society-centric perspective in relations between media and society, in the case of each respondent was hypothetically assumed a probability of deviation between the spontaneous choice for

media-centric or society-centric perspectives (Q.2) and comprehensively determined roles and functions of the new Georgian media (Q.3). This hypothetical deviation was conditioned by the assumed conflict between the respondents' Soviet experience and their glasnost and post-glasnost media practices. This deviation would be examined by factor analysis for testing hypothesis 2 and its statistical significance.

A standardized questionnaire was formed, in which the respondents had to evaluate on 7-pointed scale new media roles and functions identified by themselves in the previous questionnaire. Point 1 was considered as the lowest, point 7 as the highest. The questionnaire included 18 categories for evaluation.

The media's function and role in:

1. Political struggle (F1);
2. Strengthening new societal thinking (F2);
3. Establishing free society (F3);
4. Distributing education and knowledge (F4);
5. Creating and maintaining national identity (F5);
6. Establishing pluralism (F6);
7. Establishing liberal principles and values (F7);
8. Creating a press antagonistic to the Communist press (F8);
9. Reflecting social changes (F9);
10. Calling for social changes (F10);
11. Reminding about national identity (F11);
12. Restricting writing with exaggerated nationalistic pathos (F12);
13. Writing about society without compromise (F13);
14. Reflecting ideas and messages of National Liberation Movement (F14);
15. Writing the 'true' history (F15);
16. Mobilizing and unifying society (F16);
17. Reinforcing public opinion (F17);
18. Creating 'the hero of new times' (F18).

Output 1. Descriptive Statistics of variables

	f1	f2	F3	F4	F5	f6	f7	f8	f9	f10	f11	f12	f13	f14	f15	f16	f17	f18
Mean	6,11	5,00	4,06	4,61	5,89	4,28	3,17	6,22	5,50	5,50	6,00	2,11	3,56	6,39	5,28	3,33	4,56	4,56
Std. Deviation	0,758	1,328	1,514	1,243	1,451	1,074	1,581	1,003	1,295	1,383	1,414	1,079	1,790	1,195	1,364	1,645	1,790	1,617
Analysis N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

Output 2. Correlation Matrix (R matrix)

Correlation	f1	f2	F3	f4	f5	f6	f7	f8	f9	f10	f11	f12	f13	F14	f15	f16	f17	f18
f1	1,000	-,117	,046	-,263	-,042	,032	-,114	,430	-,120	-,112	-,274	-,376	-,265	-,310	-,202	-,503	-,352	-,197
f2	-,117	1,000	,790	,712	,397	,660	,420	,000	,513	,416	-,031	,205	,742	,000	-,065	,431	,569	,055
f3	,046	,790	1,000	,637	,244	,605	,488	-,047	,435	,520	-,192	,320	,748	-,208	,049	,488	,422	,131
f4	-,263	,712	,637	1,000	,464	,702	,484	,121	,713	,701	,067	,297	,605	-,090	-,037	,326	,605	,114
f5	-,042	,397	,244	,464	1,000	,247	-,043	,665	,501	,323	,373	-,142	,138	,026	,135	,263	,388	-,098
f6	,032	,660	,605	,702	,247	1,000	,768	,103	,444	,574	-,155	,073	,527	-,318	-,377	-,089	,313	-,094
f7	-,114	,420	,488	,484	-,043	,768	1,000	-,321	,101	,471	-,368	,230	,464	-,503	-,487	-,023	,173	-,268
f8	,430	,000	-,047	,121	,665	,103	-,321	1,000	,408	,127	,290	-,568	-,138	-,027	,081	-,190	,025	,028
f9	-,120	,513	,435	,713	,501	,444	,101	,408	1,000	,772	,225	,000	,457	-,019	,117	,276	,533	,309
f10	-,112	,416	,520	,701	,323	,574	,471	,127	,772	1,000	,211	,276	,452	-,196	-,109	,259	,475	,184
f11	-,274	-,031	,192	,067	,373	-,155	-,368	,290	,225	,211	1,000	,193	-,232	,696	,458	,430	,535	,592
f12	-,376	,205	,320	,297	-,142	,073	,230	-,568	,000	,276	,193	1,000	,210	,147	,138	,442	,423	,232
f13	-,265	,742	,748	,605	,138	,527	,464	-,138	,457	,452	-,232	,210	1,000	-,217	-,091	,453	,394	,131
f14	-,310	,000	-,208	-,090	,026	-,318	-,503	-,027	-,019	-,196	,696	,147	-,217	1,000	,760	,439	,526	,612
f15	-,202	-,065	,049	-,037	,135	-,377	-,487	,081	,117	-,109	,458	,138	-,091	,760	1,000	,559	,463	,593
f16	-,503	,431	,488	,326	,263	-,089	-,023	-,190	,276	,259	,430	,442	,453	,439	,559	1,000	,693	,568
f17	-,352	,569	,422	,605	,388	,313	,173	,025	,533	,475	,535	,423	,394	,526	,463	,693	1,000	,538
f18	-,197	,055	,131	,114	-,098	-,094	-,268	,028	,309	,184	,592	,232	,131	,612	,593	,568	,538	1,000

It is clear from the correlation matrix that we have high correlation among the following factors:

1. F2 (function and role in strengthening new societal thinking) is correlated with the following factors:
  - F3 (function and role in establishing free society)
  - F4 (function and role in distributing education and knowledge)
  - F13 (function and role in writing about society without compromise).
2. F3 is correlated F2, F13.
3. F4 is correlated with following factors:
  - F2 and F6 (function and role in establishing pluralism)
  - F9 (function and role in reflecting of social changes)
  - F10 (function and role in calling for social changes).
4. F6 is in correlation with factors F4 and F7 (function and role in establishing liberal principles and values).
5. F7 is correlated with F6.
6. F9 is in correlation with F4 and F10.
7. F10 is correlated with F4 and F9.
8. F13 is correlated with factors F2 and F3.
9. F14 (function and role in reflecting ideas and messages of National Liberation Movement) is in correlation with F15 (function and role in writing the 'true' history).
10. F15 is correlated with F14.

Thus, we have five groups of correlation: the first – among F2, F3, F4, F13, the second – among F2, F6, F9, F10, the third – among F4, F6, F7, the fourth – among F4 and F10; the fifth – among F14 and F15.

Factor 4 (function and role in distributing education and knowledge) from the point of view of correlation ability and correlation breadth is the most active factor.

One more notable and interesting aspect is that each factor in each group is highly correlated with other factors of its own group and with certain tests of other groups. Thus, the factor reflected by these groups is not completely independent. The interpretation of this pattern of correlations in the R matrix indicates that each factor group does not depend on one dimension, and it involves the main trends reflected in factors of another groups.

## Output 3. Modified table of statistics of the extracted components


Component	Initial Eigen values		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	6,026	33,480	33,480
2	4,233	23,515	56,995
3	2,553	14,182	71,177
4	1,155	6,415	77,593
5	0,953	5,296	82,889
6	0,755	4,197	87,086
7	0,676	3,754	90,840
8	0,434	2,410	93,250
9	0,395	2,193	95,443
10	0,260	1,445	96,888
11	0,194	1,075	97,963
12	0,154	0,854	98,817
13	0,109	0,606	99,423
14	0,048	0,265	99,689
15	0,030	0,166	99,855
16	0,018	0,099	99,954
17	0,008	0,046	100,000
18	0,000	0,000	100,000

*Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis*

The initial total Eigenvalues include the characteristic features of the correlation matrix and determine which factors stay in the matrix. The factors Eigenvalues of less than 1 will be extracted. The Eigenvalue is the number of variance of the whole questionnaire determined by each factor, where the total variance of each test is represented as 100%. The percentage of variance supplies information about responsibility of concrete factor for the certain percentage of variance. Thus, the first three factors are represented as having more responsibility.

Here is graphically represented the meaning of each extracted factor. The variance conditioned by the factors sharply skewed with extraction of each of them. We are interested in which point the curve becomes a straight line. In this case this is the space between the third and the fourth factors. Notably, the fourth factor meaningfully is more importance than the first, so it would be involved in factor analysis discussion.

Figure 1. Graph of the results of factor analysis



Output 4. The meanings of rested tests on four extracted factors.

Component Matrix (a)

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
f1	-0,315	-0,342	0,463	0,370
f2	0,825	-0,188	-0,005	0,300
f3	0,789	-0,256	-0,110	0,442
f4	0,880	-0,170	0,107	-0,148
f5	0,457	0,097	0,669	-0,052
f6	0,669	-0,546	0,103	-0,134
f7	0,480	-0,648	-0,323	-0,227
f8	0,040	0,053	0,963	0,064
f9	0,734	0,034	0,444	-0,109
f10	0,754	-0,159	0,159	-0,372
f11	0,209	0,773	0,257	-0,389
f12	0,393	0,196	-0,637	-0,241
f13	0,749	-0,264	-0,214	0,339
f14	0,051	0,893	-0,049	0,026
f15	0,121	0,827	0,018	0,303
f16	0,605	0,568	-0,277	0,235
f17	0,779	0,470	-0,022	-0,070
f18	0,322	0,706	-0,064	0,084

*Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a 4 components extracted*

Vertically placed factors which are not in correlation with each other represent correlation coefficients between the variables and factors. Thus, how much high is an absolute value of meaning (which cannot be more than 1), so much valuable is the contribution of factor in variance of points of the variable. As it has been shown in the correlation matrix factor analysis, four factors have been extracted.

Output 7. The matrix of rotated components.  
Rotated Component Matrix(a)

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
f1	-0,290	0,024	-0,174	-0,673
f2	0,049	0,812	0,378	0,039
f3	0,006	0,918	0,224	0,045
f4	-0,020	0,536	0,721	0,175
f5	0,192	0,117	0,665	-0,418
f6	-0,417	0,507	0,580	0,088
f7	-0,586	0,433	0,295	0,435
f8	0,104	-0,141	0,476	-0,824
f9	0,166	0,334	0,768	-0,142
f10	-0,082	0,292	0,788	0,210
f11	0,700	-0,376	0,467	0,092
f12	0,189	0,189	0,068	0,762
f13	-0,037	0,848	0,202	0,171
f14	0,867	-0,192	-0,025	0,123
f15	0,881	0,039	-0,098	-0,055
f16	0,704	0,460	0,116	0,317
f17	0,584	0,361	0,531	0,281
f18	0,754	0,088	0,118	0,156

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 9 iterations

The aim of rotation is to achieve a new position for an axis (factor) in order to interpret more easily from a psychological point of view. This matrix makes it possible to indicate which factors have high correlation (near to 1) with the first four factors. Besides F2, F3 and F4 which were extracted, these factors are:

- F8 - function and roles of the press antagonistic to the Communist press
- F9 - function and role in reflecting social changes
- F10 - function and role in calling for social changes
- F11 - function and role in reminding about national identity
- F12 - function and role in restricting writing with exaggerated nationalistic pathos

F14 - function and role in reflecting ideas and messages of the National Liberation Movement

F15 - function and role in writing the 'true' history.

### *Discussion*

*The descriptive analysis, chi-square procedure and factor analysis affirmed the hypothesis 1: the perception by the new Georgian media leaders of their new roles and functions was more likely to highlight the presence of ideological domination rather than to affirm the existence of free media. The four factors extracted in a result of the factor analysis: 1) political campaign and propaganda (political struggle), 2) establishing free society, 3) strengthening free societal thinking, and 4) distributing knowledge and education, from the perspective of relations between the media and society, are more media-centric than society-centric. So, the hypothesis 2 is also accepted.*

The activeness of the factor 'distributing of education and knowledge' (F4) can be explained from the *general* and *particular* perspectives. The general perspective can be traced back to the classical theory of mass communication, according to which 'a central presupposition relating to questions both of society and of culture, is that the media institution is essentially concerned with the production and distribution of *knowledge* in the widest sense of the word.'<sup>5</sup> The particular perspective concerns this factor as a *specific project of the transitional period*. In that period when the old system (the Communist system) codes were broken, the media created anew definitions of the political, social and cultural phenomena. Spreading of knowledge, as a factor of the new Georgian media roles and functions, as a factor of construing the new media policy, captured in other correlated factors. For example, the meanings and importance of the following factors, such as making the press antagonistic towards the Communist press principles, reminding about nationalism as an ideology and identity, hypothetically assumed as having a certain importance in the new media roles and functions, were highlighted only in the rotated component matrix as having correlation (near to 1) with the extracted factors.

The results of factor analysis make it possible to retrace the impact of glasnost on opinions of the Georgian media leaders of the 1990s. The extracted factors are characteristic of the glasnost policy, having imposed on the media features of media theory of social changes and development.<sup>6</sup> The media were considered an 'engine for change' in the context of development.

Despite that glasnost did not aim to awaken national self-consciousness, 'the engine of social change' made national ideology work as one of the main

themes of media under the umbrella of declared principles. For example, in the 1990s coverage of messages, ideas and activities of new political forces and movements and of political campaigns and propaganda was not possible without reinforcing nationalistic thinking. Writing about establishing free society was not possible without considering ethnic and citizenry aspects of human rights. The distribution of education and knowledge was not possible without considering the inter-replacement of official and unofficial histories, etc.

### Conclusion

The conclusion captures the overall argument of this article: the Georgian printed press served as a transmitter of 'knowledge and truth' for the Georgian society, kept the ideology-affirming nature and media-centric perspective. Replacement one ideology with the other, for the media didn't mean conceptual and structural innovation.

With simply replacing one ideology with other, the totalitarian principles of structuring of media space were preserved.

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#### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> Maisashvili, Khatuna. (2008). 'Homeland's Soil and State Territory in Media Representations', in *'Sitkva' (5)*. p. 75-95

<sup>2</sup> Volcic, Zala (2005) 'The Macihne that Creates Slovenians': The Role of Slovenian Public Broadcasting in Re-affirming and Re-inventing the Slovenian National Identity', in 'National Identities', Vol.7, No. 3, September, pp. 287-308

<sup>3</sup> Sources: media rating of the TV program 'Meotkhe' (1991-1992); 'Survey on the issues of freedom of press in 1990-1995' (1997) 'Open Society – Georgian Foundation'

<sup>4</sup> McQuail, D. (2005).p.12

<sup>5</sup> McQuail, Denis (2005). p. 81

<sup>6</sup> McQuail, Denis (2005). p. 92

## New Research in Forecasting

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**A**ll institutions in Georgia are changing. Decision-makers in Government agencies and private organizations need the best available data and analyses to meet the challenges of changing times. Evidence-based forecasting can help officials to predict the likely outcomes of their decisions. This paper reports on work being done by THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ and The University of Georgia Forecasting Center to identify and apply modern methods to Georgia's most pressing issues. These methods include statistical techniques, such as time series and regression, and judgmental adjustments, such as Delphi, surveys of consumers and producers, and scenario scripting. One recent application studied in this research project, forecasting tourism in Georgia, is an example of how modern methods may improve decision-making by those who make public policy, allocate resources, and make business decisions.

Statistical forecasting techniques assume that the near future will look substantially like the recent past. We can, therefore, use data from recent history to make predictions about the near future. The longer the horizon, the weaker the assumption. Two general classes of statistical forecasts are (1) Causal and (2) Non-Causal. The most common causal model is regression: the variable to be determined ( $Y$ ) is related to one or more predictor variables ( $X_j$ ). For example, the quantity demanded of a good ( $Q_d$ ) may be estimated from the price of that good ( $P$ ) and other factors, such as income, relative prices of substitute and complementary goods, weather, etc. Time series models are non-causal. We may not know why a variable of interest rises or falls, but we can detect patterns from the recent past, such as trend, seasonality, and cycles.

Judgmental methods assume some degree of knowledge that may not be reflected in the statistics. These may include, among others, a Delphi panel of experts, survey of consumers and producers, game theory, and scenario scripting.

Because of the high degree of uncertainty in the Georgian economic, political, and social environment, the use of one model is unlikely to yield reliable forecasts. Therefore, THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ and The University of Georgia Forecasting Center use a combination of methods and continually evaluate the performance of their forecasts. This paper uses the case of forecasting tourism to demonstrate these techniques.

## ახალი კვლევა პროგნოზირების სფეროში

ელუარდ რაუპი

ბათუმის საერთაშორისო უნივერსიტეტი

ნატო აფხაზავა

საქართველოს უნივერსიტეტი

**ყ**ველა ორგანო გარკვეულ ცვლილებას განიცდის საქართველოში. საჯარო და კერძო სექტორის პასუხისმგებელ პირებს სჭირდებათ საუკეთესოდ დამუშავებული და გაანალიზებული ინფორმაცია, რომ დროის გამოწვევას შესაბამისად უპასუხონ. ფაქტებზე დაფუძნებული პროგნოზი საშუალებას მისცემს პასუხისმგებელ პირებს, მათ მიერ მიღებული გადაწყვეტილებების სავარაუდო შედეგებზე წინასწარ იქონიონ წარმოდგენა. ნაშრომი ეხება THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ და საქართველოს უნივერსიტეტის პროგნოზირების ცენტრის მიერ განხორციელებულ სამუშაოს, საქართველოში, ამჟამად აქტუალურ საკითხებზე, მეთოდების განსაზღვრისა და გამოყენების მიმართულებით. მეთოდებში იგულისხმება სტატისტიკური მექანიზმები და პროფესიული პროგნოზის რეგულირება. კვლევით პროექტში, შესწავლის ერთ-ერთი უახლესი მიმართულება არის ტურიზმის პროგნოზირება და ანალიზი საქართველოში. აღნიშნული სფერო საუკეთესო მაგალითია, იმისა თუ როგორ შეიძლება თანამედროვე მეთოდების გამოყენებამ გაზარდოს მიღებული გადაწყვეტილებების სისწორის ალბათობა. სტატისტიკური პროგნოზირების მიხედვით უახლოესი მომავალი ფაქტიურად იგივე სურათს გვაძლევს, რა სურათიც გვქონდა უახლოეს წარსულში. ძველ ინფორმაციაზე დაყრდნობით შესაძლებელია გარკვეული სამომავლო გათვლების გაკეთება. არსებობს სტატისტიკური პროგნოზირების 2 ზოგადი კლასი: 1) მიზეზობრივი და 2) არა მიზეზობრივი. ყველაზე გავრცელებული მიზეზობრივი მოდელია რეგრესი, ხოლო არა მიზეზობრივი — დროის ღერძის მოდელი. პროფესიული პროგნოზირების მეთოდები სტატისტიკის ცოდნის გარდა სხვა სახის ცოდნასაც მოითხოვს. საქართველოს ეკონომიკაში, პოლიტიკასა და საზოგადოებაში არსებული გაურკვევლობების გამო, მხოლოდ ერთი მოდელის გამოყენება არასაკმარისია ობიექტური პროგნოზირებისთვის. თუმცა THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ და საქართველოს უნივერსიტეტის პროგნოზირების ცენტრი რამდენიმე მეთოდს იყენებს და სისტემატურად აფასებს მის მიერ წარმოებულ საქმიანობას. ზემოხსენებული მექანიზმები ნაშრომში განხილულია ტურიზმის სფეროს პროგნოზირების მაგალითზე.

All institutions in Georgia are changing. Decision-makers in government agencies and private organizations need the best available data and analyses to meet the challenges of changing times. Evidence-based forecasting can help officials to predict the likely outcomes of their decisions (Armstrong, 2006). This paper reports on work being done by THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ and The University of Georgia Forecasting Center to identify and apply modern methods to Georgia's most pressing issues.

These methods include statistical techniques, such as time series and regression, and judgmental techniques, such as Delphi, surveys of consumers and producers, and scenario scripting. One recent application studied in this research project, forecasting tourism in Georgia, is an example of how modern methods may improve decision-making by those who make public policy, allocate resources, and make business decisions (Raupp & Apkhazava, 2009).

Makridakis and Hibon (1979) note that, "The ultimate test of any forecast is whether or not it is capable of predicting future events accurately." Statistical forecasting techniques assume that the near future will look substantially like the recent past. We can, therefore, use data from recent history to make predictions about the near future. The longer the horizon, however, the weaker the assumption. Two general classes of statistical forecasts are (1) causal and (2) non-causal. The most common causal model is regression: the variable to be determined ( $Y$ ) is related to one or more predictor variables ( $X_j$ ). For example, the quantity demanded of a good ( $Q_d$ ) may be estimated from the price of that good ( $P$ ) and other factors, such as income, relative prices of substitute and complementary goods, weather, etc. Time series models are non-causal; we may not know why a variable of interest rises or falls, but we can detect patterns from the recent past, such as trend, seasonality, and cycles.

Judgmental methods assume some degree of knowledge that may not be reflected in past data. These may include, among others, a Delphi panel of experts, survey of consumers and producers, game theory, and scenario scripting.

Because of the high degree of uncertainty in the Georgian economic, political, and social environment, the use of one model is unlikely to yield reliable forecasts. Therefore, THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ and The University of Georgia Forecasting Center use a combination of methods and continually evaluate the performance of their forecasts. This paper uses the case of forecasting the tourism sector of the Georgian economy to demonstrate these techniques.

### *Problem*

The study on which this paper is based investigated the problem of forecasting under conditions of a high degree of uncertainty (Raupp & Apkhazava, 2009). Specifically, that study aimed to forecast tourism in post-Soviet Georgia, acknowledging the uncertainty caused by a volatile global economy, belligerent domestic opposition, and threat of recurring armed invasion from the Russian Federation.

### *Background*

Forecasting under the best of conditions is characterized by uncertainty. Traditional forecasting methods make a critical assumption, i.e., that conditions in the near future will look very much like conditions in the recent past. All other things being equal, the assumption may be useful for the task of forecasting in the relatively near future, perhaps up to a few years. However, it is seldom the case that all things in the future will look like all things in the past. It is necessary, therefore, to use non-traditional methods to forecast such highly uncertain variables as tourism in post-Soviet Georgia.

### *Methods*

Recognizing the weakness of traditional methods alone in forecasting under conditions of a high degree of uncertainty, Raupp and Apkhazava (2009) used a mix of statistical and judgmental methods. Each of these is described below.

### *Statistical Methods*

*Causal models* relate the variable to be forecasted to one or more predictor variables. Perhaps the best known is what economists call “the law of demand” and “the law of supply.” As the price of a good rises the quantity demanded of that good falls; and as the price of a good rises, the quantity supplied of that good also rises. Each of these is a simple regression model. We know, however, that other factors determine the quantities of a good demanded or supplied, e.g., as income rises the quantity demanded also rises, and as a drought produces lower yields, the quantity supplied falls. These are examples of a multiple regression model, and each asserts a causal relationship.

*Non-causal models* make no claims that changes in the variable to be forecasted are known to be caused by changes in any other variable. The most common non-causal model is *time series*. In this case, we do not know from the data why the variable changes, but we discern several elements in the series: trend, seasonality, cycles, and unexplained factors. One of the most accurate computer programs available on the market today to deal with time series is ForecastPro (Stellwagen & Goodrich, 2008), which is used extensively by THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ and The University of Georgia Forecasting Center.

### *Judgmental Methods*

In seeking the most accurate forecast, it is sometimes helpful to adjust the statistical forecast using one or more judgmental methods. Perhaps the forecaster knows something about the past or the future that may not be reflected in the data.

*Analogies* include examples of past situations that may be similar in key respects to the situation today. The tourism study used the Bali bombings, Assisi earthquakes, and Kauai hurricane Iniki to gain insights into what happens to tourism after a disaster. The study concluded that tourism falls sharply in the short term but may recover given investments in infrastructure and marketing.

*Delphi* uses a panel of experts to collect data in areas where clear statistical evidence is not available (Armstrong, 1999). Experts provide their judgments anonymously, receive feedback on what other experts are saying, and have a chance in a second or third round to adjust their estimates.

*Surveys* are useful to collect data on opinions in the surveyed population. They have been used by THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ (Raupp, 2009) since 2007 to calculate a Consumer Confidence Index and a Producer Confidence Index. Surveys are conducted in Gori, Tbilisi, Batumi, and Kutaisi.

*Game theory* is a powerful tool in decision-making when there are only two or a few actors, e.g., in oligopolies. This method was not used in the tourism study, but it is used by THE GEORGIA FORECAST™ in other studies.

### *Combining Methods*

Given results of statistical forecasts and various judgmental methods, the forecaster may decide to combine the forecasts. Combining forecasts is a subject of considerable discussion and research among forecasting professionals (e.g., see Armstrong, 1989). When forecasters adjust statistical fore-

casts by using judgmental factors, they must explain in detail what was done and why, and they must document the process. A set of rules should be established in advance.

The tourism study uses a “6-8-10” rule with respect to its monthly nation-wide confidence survey. There are two classes of subjects (consumers and producers) in each of four cities, resulting in a 2-by-4 matrix of 8 cells. If 6 of the 8 cells are in agreement (either above or below 1.0), then adjust the statistical forecast by 10 percent; if, however, the trend in those 6 cells is opposite of the ratio, make no adjustment, as the results are ambiguous.

*Scenario scripting* is the final step in creating forecasts under conditions of a high degree of uncertainty. The reality is that a single point forecast is not feasible. We simply do not know what will happen to the global economy. Nor do we know what civil disturbances may break out. And we cannot know the mind of Vladimir Putin. Therefore, if we cannot predict, then we can prepare (see Taleb, 2007).

The tourism study scripted nine scenarios, as shown below. Three basic scenarios are Best Case (B), Middle Case (status quo) (M), and Worst Case (W). Each was analyzed using three forces: Macroeconomic Forces ( $V_1$ ), Domestic Forces ( $V_2$ ), and Russian Forces ( $V_3$ ). An expected value matrix was calculated based on expert judgment. In the Best Case scenario, Georgia could expect a substantial increase in tourism, while in the Worst Case scenario, tourism would essentially vanish.

Figure 1. Summary of scenario scripts.

	Best Case (B)	Middle Case (M)	Worst Case (W)
Macroeconomic Forces ( $V_1$ )	B <sub>1</sub> More tourists can afford to travel to Georgia. Improved infrastructure soon.	M <sub>1</sub> Some tourists can afford to travel to Georgia. Improved infrastructure later.	W <sub>1</sub> Few tourists can afford to travel to Georgia. Little work on infrastructure.
Domestic Forces ( $V_2$ )	B <sub>2</sub> Tourists are not put off by civil unrest.	M <sub>2</sub> Some tourists are discouraged by civil unrest.	W <sub>2</sub> Most tourists are discouraged by civil unrest.
Russian Forces ( $V_3$ )	B <sub>3</sub> Tourists are not afraid of armed conflict.	M <sub>3</sub> Some tourists fear Russian invasion.	W <sub>3</sub> Tourists do not travel to war-torn Georgia.

Results

Figure 2 shows the output of ForecastPro for expenditures in restaurants and hotels (RH).





Figure 2. Restaurant and Hotel expenditures, historical and forecasted.

Another estimator for tourism is the number of non-residents at Georgia’s borders. The history of this series and a 5-year forecast is shown below. The growth rate exceeds that of RH expenditures.

Figure 3. Non-resident arrivals at Georgia’s borders, historical and forecasted.



Alternative scenario forecasts for tourism in Georgia are shown here for 2013.

	Best Case (B)	Middle Case (M)	Worst Case (W)
Expected Value Factor	1.20	1.00	0.07
Statistical Forecast RH (mil GEL)		524	
Adjusted Forecast RH (mil GEL)	891	524	37
Statistical Forecast B (000 persons)		2,226	
Adjusted Forecast B (000 persons)	2,671	2,226	156

### *Conclusion*

The tourism study, as well as the current literature, strongly suggest that judgmental methods may improve the accuracy of forecasts when combined in an orderly way with statistical forecasts. Scenario scripting is an effective way to forecast under conditions of a high degree of uncertainty.

#### Recommendations for Further Research

Continuing research is needed in the application of forecasting methodologies in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

In light of skepticism regarding the reliability of data provided by governments of nations in transition, more research is needed in verifying the reliability of sources.

Further research is needed in forecasting under the conditions of great uncertainty that prevail in economies affected by unstable relations with near neighbors and internal opposition.

The "Tourist Trauma Trough" should be studied in greater detail in order to understand the depth and duration of periods of lost income in a variety of situations.

More research is needed in combining both methods of forecasting and results from different sources using the same method. Combining statistical and judgmental forecasts, in particular, needs more attention.

Forecasting accuracy in economies and sectors in post-Soviet states needs to be monitored and analyzed over time.

Further research in tourism demand forecasting is needed in nations in transition from authoritarian systems to open societies. Narayan (2003), however, concludes his extensive literature review with the comment that "...the tourism demand literature must be viewed with caution..." (p. 377).

There is an almost complete absence of research in the area of return-on-investment in tourism in the post-Soviet space. This is a most fertile area for further study.

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## **Energy Security Aftermath of Russo-Georgian War: Implications for South Caucasus**

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PHD in Politics

*Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus has become the focus of considerable international attention, primary because it is one of the oldest and potentially richest oil and gas producing areas in the world. The August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and the unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia fundamentally changed the situation in the region. The war has created a new strategic situation.*

*And the question is now how to handle this delicate situation in a strategically and geopolitically important region. So by controlling Georgia (in case Russia reaches abovementioned aims), Russia actually will be able to cut off Central Asia and Caspian resources. It means Russia would be able to isolate and cut off Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries and it will significantly strengthen its energy monopoly over Europe with all results out coming from that fact. So it's about a major shift in the energy policy and a major shift in geopolitics based on this energy policy and Russian energy monopoly. The August war in Georgia demonstrated some risks associated with the functioning of the transit energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. It also demonstrated the need for broader security guarantees for a region that is vital to European and global energy security. This paper deals with economic damage inflicted by the Russo-Georgian war in South Caucasus and its implications for regional security.*

**ენერგო უსაფრთხოების საკითხები რუსულ-ქართული  
ომის შემდეგ და მისი მნიშვნელობა სამხრეთ კავკასიის  
რეგიონალური სტაბილურობისთვის**

კორნელი კაკაჩია

პოლიტიკის მეცნიერებათა დოქტორი

**ს**აბჭოთა კავშირის დაშლის შემდეგ კასპიის ზღვა და სამხრეთ კავკასია საერთაშორისო საზოგადოების ყურადღების ცენტრში მოექცა. ამ ყურადღების ერთ-ერთი ძირითადი მიზეზი კი ისაა, რომ რეგიონი გლობალური მასშტაბებით უმდიდრესი ნავთობისა და გაზის მოპოვების წყაროა. 2008 წელს რუსეთის აგრესიამ საქართველოში და აფხაზეთისა და სამხრეთ ოსეთის დამოუკიდებლობის ცალმხრივად აღარებამ რეგიონის მდგომარეობა ძირფესვიანად შეცვალა უარესობისკენ. ომმა შექმნა ახალი სტრატეგიული სიტუაცია, რომელიც მოითხოვს დროულ გადაწყვეტას. საქართველოს დასუსტებით (იმ შემთხვევაში თუკი რუსეთი მიაღწევს ზემოთხსენებულ მიზნებს) რუსეთი ფაქტობრივად შეძლებს ცენტრალური აზიისა და კასპიის რესურსების მონიპოლიზირებას. ეს კი თავისთავად იმის ნიშანია, რომ რუსეთი იზოლაციაში მოაქცევს აზერბაიჯანსა და ცენტრალური აზიის ქვეყნებს და ამით შეძლებს ევროპაში თავისი ენერგო მონოპოლიის მნიშვნელოვან გაძლიერებას. 2008 წლის აგვისტოს ომმა საქართველოში გამოააშკარაა ის საფრთხეები, რომლებიც სამხრეთ კავკასიაში ტრანზიტული ენერგო კორიდორის არსებობას უკავშირდება. ომმა ასევე ცხადყო უფრო ძლიერი უსაფრთხოების გარანტიების აუცილებლობა რეგიონისათვის, რომელიც სასიცოცხლო მნიშვნელობისაა ევროპისა და გლობალური ენერგო უსაფრთხოებისათვის. ნაშრომში ასევე განხილულია ის ეკონომიკური ზიანი, რომელიც რუსეთ-საქართველოს ომმა სამხრეთ კავკასიას მიაყენა და გაანალიზირებულია ამ ომის შედეგად გამოწვეული რეგიონული უსაფრთხოების პრობლემები.

Since the industrial revolution the geopolitics of energy – who supplies it, and securing reliable access to those supplies – have been a driving factor in global prosperity and security. Over the coming decades, energy politics will determine the survival of the planet. The political nature of energy, linked to the sources of supply and demand, comes to public attention at moments of crisis, particularly when unstable oil markets drive up prices and politicians hear constituent protests (Pascual, 2008).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus region has become the focus of considerable international attention, primarily because it is one of the oldest and potentially richest oil and gas producing areas in the world. Surrounded by the three regional powers - Iran, Russia, and Turkey - and located on the crossroads of Europe and Asia, the South Caucasus has also been at the center of post-cold war geopolitical rivalries.

To a considerable extent, the significant oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea, specifically in the Azerbaijani sector, have also amplified regional rivalries for political and economic influence in the region. Despite physical isolation, the region sits at the very heart of one of the world's geopolitically most significant and sensitive areas. Thus, a large number of world powers see the resources as important, making the South Caucasus the subject of a second "great game.

The August 2008 Russian invasion of the Georgia and the unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia fundamentally changed the situation in the region. The war has created a new strategic situation. By sending forces over its borders for the first time since the 1979–89 Soviet–Afghan War and forcibly redefining the border with Georgia, Moscow has aroused concern among other newly independent countries about its future intentions.

Whereas invasion of Georgia was justly seen as part of Moscow's plan to reassemble its former empire or at least exert enough control of its border to deny Western access to critical energy supplies without the Kremlin's approval, the invasion was in part a reaction to the expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia proper along with consideration for membership of both Georgia and Ukraine. One of the Russian targets in Georgia was the pipeline carrying oil from the Caspian Sea to the West

### *Economic Damage of Russo- Georgian War*

The five-day clash between Russian and Georgian forces in August inflicted serious damage on Georgia's economy both in casualties and in wors-

ening the prospects for development and investment. The material damage has initially been estimated at some 1 billion dollars or about 8% of forecast 2008 GDP. The damage was mainly confined to military targets — bases, military airfields, anti-aircraft systems. There was no great damage to civilian targets, including industrial or agricultural assets, with the factory producing military aircraft in Tbilisi a rare exception.

Major communications routes have remained mostly intact. The only exception here was the blowing up by Russian soldiers of a railway bridge 40 kilometers east of Tbilisi on August 16, after the ceasefire. This disrupted rail communication between eastern and western parts of the country, causing problems not only for Georgia, but also for Azerbaijan and Armenia, for which this railway is an important route. Georgia suffered lost revenue from the confrontation: In 2007 Baku-Tbilisi-Cheihan fees generated \$25.4 million in transit revenues, and before hostilities erupted Saakashvili's government had estimated BTC transit payments for 2008 at about \$45 million.

In addition seeking an alternative route, British Petroleum switched to the recently reopened 550-mile, 140,000-bpd Western Route Export Pipeline, better known as the Baku-Supsa line, which opened in 1999 and was running at about 90,000 british pound. Because of the worsening military conflict, on August 12 BP announced that it was suspending shipments through Baku-Supsa, as well as the South Caucasus Pipeline, which transports natural gas from Baku to Turkey via Tbilisi.

Completing the lock-in of Azeri oil exports, the fighting caused authorities to suspend seaborne shipments from Georgia's Black Sea ports of Batumi (200,000 bpd) and Poti (100,000 bpd), both supplied by rail. Poti was closed Aug. 8 following reported Russian airstrikes. Adding to the grim picture, authorities also ceased exports from Kulevi, Georgia's third Black Sea oil terminus, which opened in 2007 and is capable of shipping 200,000 bpd.

But probably the most painful loss for Georgia was the damage to its reputation as a safe venue for investment and a secure corridor for fuel transportation. As early as May, 2008 Standard and Poor's lowered its outlook for the sovereign credit rating of the government of Georgia from 'positive' to 'stable', explaining it by the deterioration in relations with Russia and the reinforcement of Russian forces in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia ("S&p revises georgia's," 2008). During the August war, the agency expressed concern that investors may become even more cautious in making investment decisions in Georgia ("Georgia: war costs," 2008). In particular, the future of the EU's Nabucco gas pipeline project for supplying EU member states with gas from Azerbaijan and Central Asia may have been endangered.

Added to these concerns is the growing risk associated with infrastructure investments in Southern Caucasus in the aftermath of the war. Al-

though Russian bombers did not target any energy facilities, the coincidence of an explosion in the Turkish section of the BTC close to the Georgian border a few days prior to the military operations raised some concern about the possible targeting of the pipelines (Coskun , & Yevgrashina, 2008). The war also demonstrated that the Western guarantees for Georgia lacked substance, and the integrity of the oil and gas corridor depended simply on Russian good will (Blagov , 2008).

A clear sign of this came from the BP decision to temporarily stop the oil flows through Georgia to divert part of them through the Russian facilities, while Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov ordered KazMunajGaz to study whether the domestic market could absorb the exports envisaged for transit via Georgia. Even the Azerbaijani company SOCAR re-directed a portion of its exports, normally sent through the Georgian terminal of Kulevi, towards the Iranian port of Neka during August and September 2008 (IEA, 2008).

The military confrontation inflicted significant fiscal “collateral damage” on Azeri oil exports, as all its westward export routes were closed. The war did not spill across the border into Azerbaijan, but its economic repercussions have. Foreign investment has been imperiled by the geopolitical instability laid bare by the brief war and the continuing uncertainty about the present peace (Ismailzade, 2008). For Azerbaijan the conflict was an unmitigated financial disaster, as the country’s oil sector receipts account for almost half of all government revenues, with oil exports generating around 90 percent of total export revenues. Between the BTC explosion and the military clash, Azerbaijan had been blocked from shipping approximately 17 million barrels of crude, while the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that Azerbaijan’s final cost for the lost shipments surpassed \$1 billion.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, as well as the Azeri state oil company’s recent purchase of the Kulevi oil terminal on the Black Sea, had begun to enhance the importance of the region as a major East-West energy corridor. Azerbaijan and Georgia have agreed, in partnership with Turkey, to build the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway, connecting the rail systems of the three countries. The project would create a much shorter and faster rail corridor between Europe and Asia than the current one through Russia, making Georgia and Azerbaijan the key hubs for the Eurasian transport network. However, the war has shrouded the future of these achievements in doubt and undermined the Azeri grand vision of turning the south Caucasus into the primary transit hub to central Asia. The conflict froze the operations of the East-West energy corridor.

On Aug. 5, 2008, two days before the outbreak of hostilities between Georgia and Russia, there was an as yet unexplained explosion on the BTC segment at Yurtbasi village in eastern Turkey. The cause of the explosion re-

mains unclear, although Ankara initially suspected that it might have been a terrorist attack by the Kurdish separatist *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*, or *Kurdistan Workers' Party*. BTC operator BP declared force majeure, and the pipeline only resumed operations on August. 25.

Following this unrelated attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in Turkey, the violence brought air and rail traffic to a sudden halt, closed the Kulevi port of Georgia and forced the evacuation of Azeri personnel. As a result, Azerbaijan and its Western oil company partners were forced to suspend operations in the Caspian oil and gas fields and energy contracts had to be re-negotiated. Kazakhstan has backed off the plan to build a \$1 billion oil refinery in Batumi, a \$10 million grain terminal in Poti, and to export oil products and other goods through the territory of Georgia. The export of Turkmen gas through the south Caucasus has been similarly affected.

The Georgia-Russia war has placed Armenia, which is hemmed in on all sides by closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, in a bind as well. The war, and its complicated aftermath, has thus inflicted a considerable amount of damage on the Armenian economy. One of the consequences of this action was that some 107 train cars of wheat, 10 fuel containers and 50 additional train cars with miscellaneous goods were left in limbo. The unloading of ships with goods meant for Armenia reportedly resumed only on September 1, according to the information of Armenian government ("Translations from Yerevan Newspapers", 2008).

The delays were stoking concern about a possible wheat shortage in Yerevan. Armenian companies were attempting to import the wheat via Iran. Gasoline has been another problem. Until late August, many gas stations country-wide posted "No gas" notices. Although the government declared that gas reserves were sufficient to withstand a temporary shortfall, drivers who were forced to wait in long lines to buy gas scoffed at the assurances.

The stand-off has reminded Armenians that their country's economy is too dependent on Georgia for its own good. Only in August last year, when the war interrupted Armenia's export trade, the country lost 600-700 million US dollars ("Russia-georgia tensions harm," 2009). At the moment, 70-80 per cent of Armenian exports travel to Russia, leaving the Georgian port of Poti for Bulgaria, then shipped to Novorossiisk on Russia's southern coast. The whole journey can take eight or ten days, whereas the road through the mountains and Upper Lars is relatively quick. This quickly drove Yerevan to intensify its dialogue with Turkey over prospects for opening their common border that has been closed for decades, and, like Belarus, to join the EU's Eastern Partnership.

While the consequences of the conflict will be felt for a long time throughout the region, the balance of power in the Caucasus has shifted.

Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been influenced and the conflict might also have an impact on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia was left with no military ground transit from Russia, and the country is now essentially cut off from any possibility of obtaining effective help from its ally and has decided to respond quickly to Turkey's proposal to normalize relations and open the border. The very idea that Turkey would go through with the border talks without attaching any conditions on Karabakh has provoked anger in Azerbaijan, especially since Turkey sealed the border in 1993 in response to the Armenian occupation of the regions, a reality which has clearly not changed.

Due to this delicate issues significant challenge for regional security issues is ongoing Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, which could considerably change security environment in South Caucasus. On October 10, 2009 the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Armenia met in Zurich and signed accords aimed at establishing diplomatic relations and opening their closed border. They also agreed to a series of consultations and confidence-building measures to resolve longstanding disputes and foster closer cooperation. These protocols still need to be ratified in Ankara and Yerevan, and implementation is very far from certain. But these new accords - finalized after some critical last-minute diplomacy by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton - could prove transforming for regional stability around the South Caucasus and beyond.

#### *Geopolitical interest of Regional players and balance of Power*

The European Union has long sought alternate supply routes, including the prospective Nabucco pipeline that would carry Caspian and Central Asian gas to Europe but skirt Russia. The EU also risks continued energy dependency on Russia and a sharp rise in natural gas prices unless it backs alternative non-Russian projects similar to White Stream. The White Stream Pipeline aims to bring Caspian gas through Azerbaijan and Georgia and across the Black Sea to Ukraine and Romania, from where it will travel farther into Europe. The pipeline would reduce the impact on the EU of any future Russian gas cut-offs and complicate Russian plans to put gas prices on a higher footing for the long-term.

Having seen that BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Cheihan) and BTE (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) are aiding its efforts toward energy diversification, the European Union representatives are debating various new energy-import projects. This in turn is leading potential supplier and transit countries to line up to get in on what promise to be very lucrative deals (Pannier, 2009). But by diversification, Europe also means finding routes that do not go through Russia.

In order to meet this challenge this summer (2009), EU backed consortium of energy companies from Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria that have joined together to build the \$11 billion Nabucco natural gas pipeline. Such an energy strategy, pundits say, is urgently needed to stop Moscow's "divide-and-conquer politics." Nabucco would bring gas from Middle Eastern and Caspian fields across Turkey's Anatolian plateau, and north into Europe. The pipeline is backed and partly funded by the EU and is strongly supported by the United States. Perhaps most importantly, Nabucco would completely bypass Russia. But the real question that will determine Nabucco's future — a question vividly on display in every country the pipeline will touch — is whether Europe has the stomach to fight as hard for its interests as Russia does for its own (Freifeld, 2009).

However, Russia's aggressive behavior versus Russia's neighbors and outright aggression against Georgia, that led to effective annexation of two Georgian territories- Abkhazia and South Ossetia, creation of the Russian military bases and deployment of regular Russian forces makes the role and security of current or future pipelines running through that country an issue that weighs heavily on the minds of many in the EU.

Similarly, whilst Russia sees the economic value of the energy security issues, this is secondary to its geopolitical value as a means of maintaining control over it's so called "near abroad" and ensuring only nominal independence for the countries of the region. This policy is most clearly evidenced in their intervention in the internal affairs of these countries. Moreover, Russia seems unable to control the political development in the region and has moved to dominate region including through military means.

Though officially Russia does not object to the construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline and as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said after the signing of South Stream documents with European partners "will not create any impediments", it has attempted to block alternative energy routes other than its own encouraging crisis between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh and destabilizing and publicly invading Georgia. Moreover, like Iran Russia envisages resources of the Caspian Sea into the energy hub of non-Western energy zone (Sinker, 2001. p. 54).

Moscow has sought to gain control of the energy transport and distribution networks in neighboring states for long-term economic gain and leverage over their policies, and to ensure that the energy producers among them export through Russia. Russia has also aggressively pursued blocking potential natural gas export competitors from entering the European market, such as Iran, Azerbaijan and producers in Central Asia, and works assertively to retain control over Central Asian export. Iran is the only country that has the vol-

umes of natural gas and the location to pose any major threat to Russia's supply dominance in Europe. In the spring of 2007, Moscow spent a considerable amount of money to buy out Iran's potential access to the European gas market through Armenia (Shaffer, 2009).

If Russia can be seen as the current leader in the competition for influence in the South Caucasus, Iran can be considered an outsider for now. Iran's policy in the Caucasus is based primarily on its own security and economic considerations. Domestic inputs and constraints—primarily the presence of a significant Azerbaijani minority in Iran—and its interests and confrontations beyond the region, including that with the United States, also influence Iran's policies toward the region. However, the major Iranian concern in the region is not economic but strategic and its main objective is to expand its influence, for historic, economic and political reasons. In recent years, Iran also sees the role in energy security issues in the region and stands a good chance of being a future contributor to existing and planned pipelines through the Caucasus.

As for Turkey, Istanbul would prefer to see the European Union-backed Nabucco pipeline built <sup>1</sup>, since it would transit Turkish territory and thus provide both a new source of gas for the country and a new source of revenue. But Turkish participation in Nabucco also comes at a price. From Europe, the Turkish government seeks guarantees of eventual Turkish membership in the European Union. From Azerbaijan, the Turkish government wants a DAF (Delivery At Frontier) agreement, meaning Azerbaijani gas becomes Turkish gas as soon as it enters Turkish territory (from which Turkey will sell it on to Europe).

### *Conclusion*

Once considered a "crossroads of civilization," the South Caucasus has emerged as a crossroads of energy-export routes — spurring renewed competition in the region. The August war radically transformed the geopolitical pattern in the South Caucasus in several ways. First, Georgia lost its previous central role in the region, which may endanger many investment programs (including energy) previously linked to that country. Second, due to the break in relations between Georgia and Russia, Moscow lost part of its influence on the whole region, with the European Union and Turkey striving to fill that gap. Third, the five-day war showed everybody how fragile south Caucasus stability is and how dangerous an armed conflict may be in this region.

As the competition continues, only one thing is certain — there is no formula for energy-export routes through the Caucasus that can satisfy all the in-

interested parties inside and outside the region. The West's failure to intervene credibly in Georgia reduces the prospects of strong Western action to strengthen and broaden the east-west energy transportation corridor across the South Caucasus.

Although Russia may seem to be a common enemy, the policies Moscow follows often make sharp different South Caucasian states. And Russian policymakers frequently choose to play one against another. The recent visit of US President Obama to Turkey was far more significant than the President's speech would suggest. For Washington Turkey today has become a geopolitical "pivot state" which is in the position to tilt the Eurasian power equation towards Washington or significantly away from it depending on how Turkey develops its ties with Moscow and its role regarding key energy pipelines.

Its clear, that if Ankara decides to collaborate more closely with Russia, Georgia's position is precarious. As a result Azerbaijan's natural gas pipeline route to Europe, the so-called Nabucco Pipeline, could be blocked as well. If it cooperates with the United States and manages to reach a stable treaty with Armenia under US auspices, the Russian position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against Europe<sup>2</sup>.

Moreover, for the Turkey and South Caucasian countries (remaining members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I. S) the choices are stark - continue relations with Georgia after the August war as before, thereby tacitly approving Tbilisi's confrontational posture vis-a-vis Moscow and risking Russia's wrath, or pay heed to Medvedev's "privileged interests" in the Caucasus<sup>3</sup>. While little is clear in this respect yet, last year's military clash has given former Soviet states significant food for thought about what happens to former Soviet republics that ignore Moscow's concerns and stray too far westwards.

The global economic recession, decline of European demand and the lack of available investment are among the key factors making westbound pipelines from Eurasia largely a pipedream. Add to that the increasing geopolitical "pull" of China, an increase in Russian clout in its so-called "near abroad" after the Georgian war and the possibility of a future Iranian route - if rapprochement with the US succeeds - and these uncertainties make the future pipeline policy in South Caucasus a forecaster's nightmare<sup>4</sup>.

In addition if the combined effect of the financial crisis and the August war is likely to weaken the political support for investments in South Caucasus aimed at freeing the Caspian resources from the Russian control, it is even more likely to undermine the economic viability of these investments that has already been questioned because of the insecurity of the supply of gas<sup>5</sup>.

And the question is now how to handle this delicate situation in a strategically and geopolitically important region. So by controlling Georgia (in case Russia reaches abovementioned aims), Russia actually will be able to cut off Central Asia and Caspian resources. It means Russia would be able to isolate and cut off Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries and it will significantly strengthen its energy monopoly over Europe with all results out coming from that fact. So it's about major shift in the energy policy and major shift in geopolitics based on this energy policy and Russian energy monopoly.

The August war in Georgia demonstrated some risks associated with the functioning of the transit energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. It also demonstrated the need for broader security guarantees for a region that is vital to European and global energy security.

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### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> At the time of the project's inception, it was envisaged that the pipeline would be filled primarily with Iranian gas. However, the complex geopolitical situation around Iran, coupled with the current under-investment in the Iranian hydrocarbons infrastructure that has turned this country with colossal reserves into a net importer of gas, has led to a shift of focus. Attention now centres far more on Azerbaijan; specifically, on its offshore field of Shah Deniz. Gas for Nabucco is expected to come from Phase II of the project, which could provide the base load for the pipeline.

<sup>2</sup> William Engdahl, War, Oil And Gas Pipelines, <http://www.rense.com/general85/fth.htm>

<sup>3</sup> John C.K. Daly, UPI, Analysis: Implications of Georgia leaving C.I.S. [http://www.upi.com/Energy\\_Resources/2009/06/09/Analysis-Implications-of-Georgia-leaving-CIS/UPI-90981244588248/](http://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2009/06/09/Analysis-Implications-of-Georgia-leaving-CIS/UPI-90981244588248/)

<sup>4</sup> Ariel Cohen, Eurasian pipelines - a forecaster's nightmare, May 1, 2009, <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed050109b.cfm>

<sup>5</sup> Marco Giuli, Georgia and Systemic Impact of the Financial Crisis. *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3 (3)-Summer 2009

## The Role of the OECD and NGO's in Central Asian Republics by Transforming Their Systems

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**C**entral Asia is a region, containing five countries, serving as an important oil and natural gas exporter, being inbetween Russia, China, and Iran. This region has been a subject to several regimes and civiliazations. Latelly it is being transformed to liberal democracy, by the Western influence.

NGO-s bear one of the biggest role of injecting democracy to the Central Asia. Supported by the western governments and the support of international organizations such as the UN agencies and the World Bank. This article will talk about the difficulties and role these NGO-s, local and international, play in the democratization of the Central Asian countries, who for ages suffered from the isolation. This has neither been an easy job and nor a safe one. There has been a lot of difficulties but the foreign help in empowering the civil society, has succeeded on the spread of democracy.

Transformation from one system to another, in this case from communism to democracy, found these countries unprepared, and thus they needed tranings and preparations for the civil society leaders. In this article I will also explain the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union, in helping the civil society, NGO-s, to transform the country to further democracy, and also the role of these two important institutions in the foundation of democratic and liberal institutions of the Central Asia, like judicial, security, human rights, elections, etc..

## ეკონომიკური თანამშრომლობის და განვითარების ორგანიზაციისა და არასამთავრობო ორგანიზაციების როლი ცენტრალური აზიის რესპუბლიკებში

სავაშ გენჩი

ფათიჰის უნივერსიტეტი

**ც**ენტრალური აზიის რეგიონი, რომელშიც 5 ქვეყანა შედის, გაზისა და ნავთობის მნიშვნელოვან ექსპორტიორს წარმოადგენს რუსეთს, ჩინეთსა და ირანს შორის. დასავლეთის გავლენის შედეგად, რეგიონი გადაიქცა ლიბერალური დემოკრატიის ქვეყნად.

არასამთავრობო ორგანიზაციებმა უდიდესი როლი ითამაშეს ცენტრალური აზიის რეგიონში დემოკრატიის განვითარების თვალსაზრისით. მას მხარს უჭერდა დასავლეთის მთავრობა და ისეთი საერთაშორისო ორგანიზაციები, როგორებიცაა გაერთიანებული ერები და მსოფლიო ბანკი. ნაშრომი განიხილავს რეგიონში განვითარებულ სიმწველესა და ადგილობრივი თუ საერთაშორისო, არასამთავრობო ორგანიზაციების როლს ქვეყნის დემოკრატიზაციის პროცესის წარმართვაში. მრავალი წინააღმდეგობის მიუხედავად, უცხო ქვეყნების დახმარებით ჩამოყალიბდა და გაძლიერდა სამოქალაქო საზოგადოება.

ერთი სისტემიდან მეორეზე, ამ შემთხვევაში, კომუნიზმიდან დემოკრატიამზე გადასვლამ, გამოააშკარაა, რომ მზაობა ასეთი ცვლილებებისთვის არ არსებობდა. სტატიაში საუბარი იქნება უსაფრთხოების, ევროპასთან თანამშრომლობის და ევრო კავშირის შესახებ, რომელიც უდიდეს სამასხურს უწევს სამოქალაქო საზოგადოებას და არასამთავრობო ორგანიზაციებს სისტემის ჩანაცვლებაში. ასევე ნაშრომი განიხილავს ამ ორი ორგანიზაციის მნიშვნელობას, ისეთი დემოკრატიული და ლიბერალური ორგანოების ჩამოყალიბებაში, როგორიცაა უსაფრთხოება, ადამიანის უფლებათა დაცვა და არჩევნები.

### *Promoting Long-term Stability in Central Asia*

Central Asia stretches from Russia in the north to Afghanistan in the south and from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Xinjiang province of China to the east. It is comprised of five former Soviet Republics that became sovereign in 1991: Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan; Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Central Asia, identified as the Silk Road and the home of Tamerlane, is

a turning point of great cultures and civilizations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, USA and EU supported their integration into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support to counter Iranian pressure in the region.

Now they sit strategically between Russia, China and Iran and hold some of the world's largest resources of oil and natural gas. National and ethnic identities formerly suppressed now find appearance in language, religion, the arts, new international alignments and, irregularly, severe civil conflicts.

Since 1991 at least, it has been extensively used by the international community to promote transition in the former Communist countries, including of course Central Asia. International institutions, UN agencies and the World Bank are also making use of this concept, while it is by definition central to the Non-governmental organizations (NGO's) approach. Political scientists and anthropologists have already debated the relevance of such a concept. The existing hard economic conditions have also left a number of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries dependent on international aid. In most cases, willingness to support democratic changes in society is a situation for receiving aid. Most of these Republics are even now run by regimes with authoritarian tendencies, characterized by the hard control of society and the tolerance of very little political opposition.

The attendance of a strong civil society is vital to promote democracy as a mechanism for inspiring public pressure and forcing state institutions into becoming more responsible and answerable. NGO's play a basic role in the development and consolidation of democratic stability and pluralism in Central Asia. Their work to protect human rights, advocate legislative changes and voice the basic requirements of the population makes NGOs an necessary part of civil society.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the construction of new States, confident and assisted by the international community to bring in democratic changes, helped underline the significant role played by active non-governmental organizations in the democratization process as potential intermediaries between the population and decision-makers. Different Western democracies, where civil society has regularly formed over many years, the new political environment and increased possibilities for international support have resulted in very quick development of the NGO sector, based on criteria which were quite different from what existed under the Soviet Union only a few years before.

*NGOs in Central Asia*

Democracy sponsorship was a central part of the post-Soviet transitions and led to the funding and realization of programmes promoting free and fair elections, the development of NGOs, judicial reform, civic contribution in political processes, and the development of independent media all over the countries of the former Soviet Union. The route of creating new political structures and adopting new legal frameworks in central Asian States, combined with international assistance to help establish democratic principles in the newly independent States, offered new opportunities and challenges to the emerging NGO community.

While in Soviet times differences in existing standards between urban and rural populations were not so clear, because the state provided free health, education and social welfare services, there is currently a pointed difference between city and village. More generally, society is getting more stratified, more polarized between rich and poor, with poor people comprising the tempting majority.

International organizations working in Central Asia have played a key role in the development of NGOs in the region. This has taken the form of providing education programmes and technical assistance as well as giving grants to local NGOs for the realization of social projects.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the important role played by active NGOs in the democratization process as latent intermediaries between the population and decision makers has become increasingly accepted in many of its successor States. At the same time, the new-found prospects for international support of NGO activities resulted in the fast establishment of many organizations all over the region, and many are now encountering problems in stressed to become self-sufficient. Also, in some CIS States, where political activities are still limited, a number of NGOs continue to be perceived as political opponents, and may suffer interference with their activities.

A number of international organizations offer training programmes for NGO leaders in such areas as preparation and management. However, much of this teaching is built on the knowledge of Western organizations, and is not always important or significant to local people, whose traditions, culture and values differ considerably from those of the West.

NGOs began to show in Central Asia in the transition era following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their numbers have increased fast in four out of five post-Soviet Central Asian states over the last five or six years. This would not have been possible without the sustain of international organizations and programmes. Even as civil society encompasses political parties, trade unions,

religious organizations, sports clubs and professional associations as well as NGOs, their role varies significantly. In some spheres they have a lot of influence; in others they are comparatively weak. The role of NGOs is established in social welfare but less so in more 'political' areas like human rights.<sup>1</sup>

These very different roles reflect extensive differences in relations between the state and NGOs. At the very beginning of the transition era there was a lack of understanding during the region of the role of NGOs in the development of civil society – indeed, of their role in the development of society as a whole. There is an intelligence in which the Western conception of civil society has been artificially attached to society in Central Asia and to the transition process. Much time and effort will therefore be needed before the concept is engrossed and assimilated. Not amazingly, then, although NGOs are set up to help solve social problems, some governments in Central Asia tend to view them as anti-governmental organizations.

Democracy promotion was a central part of the post-Soviet transitions and led to the funding and completion of programmes promoting free and fair elections, judicial reform, the development of NGOs, civic participation in political processes, and the development of independent media throughout the countries of the former Soviet Union. While a vibrant civil society is recognised as an important element of democracy building, 'free and fair elections' and free media organs are seen as the most vital and basic factors in a democracy since they are the individual means of granting the government the authority and legitimacy to govern.

In the Caucasus and Central Asia, transition towards democracy has been a slow development, which has in turn shaped a unreliable number of obstacles to the development of civil society.

The question of NGO governance – particularly, the reasons for creating a board of directors as the governing body – is causing heated discussions with NGO leaders at the moment. One problem is that the position and functions of governing bodies are not exactly determined in current NGO laws. All through Central Asia, a board of directors is usually associated with direct supervision – something which people who have recognized their own organizations generally do not welcome. This means that a board of directors often exists in name alone, just to meet donors' requirements.

The Role of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Assistance to promote civil society and support activities by the growing NGO community has been an increasingly important issue for the OSCE in recent years as a tool to further democracy and human rights in its participating States.

The basic idea is that democracy, human rights and a state of law are universal concepts, which assume a society made of free citizens, not bound by any corporate or communal links, entering freely into associations to work for the common good. The United States and EU has expectant the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic regimes and terrorist groups from gaining power. Some Western organizational ties with the region have suffered in latest years, in particular those of the OSCE, which has been criticized by Central Asian governments for advocating democratization and respect for human rights.<sup>2</sup>

The OSCE is possibly Europe's most comprehensive security organization in terms of both membership and areas of responsibility. Through the institutions diverse mechanism, its 55 member states including Canada, the United States, and most European and Central Asian countries address political, economic, and security issues. In the middle of the latter are initiatives to avert mass aggression, manage crises, and rehabilitate conflict regions. Like the European Union, the OSCE seeks to reduce political, economic, and social factors within societies that many consider donate to instability, radicalism and terrorism.

Assistance to promote civil society and support activities by the growing NGO community has been an increasingly significant issue for the OSCE in recent years, as a tool to more democracy and human rights in participating States. Support the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia in exacting continues to be a priority for the Organization.

In some transition countries local NGOs still depend seriously on the initiative and support of their Western donors. To increase their confidence, professionalism and independence, and thus finally help them design, present and realize their own professional projects, it is important for NGOs to create strong links with their partners in other regions, as well as with main NGO networks with many years of knowledge. OSCE missions and countryside activities are able to approach NGOs working in the related fields and notify them of future meetings, and assist them in obtaining visas.

The OSCE's leverage over its members derives mostly from its prestige. The OSCE recently opened field presences in all the countries across these regions, and the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) has, since 1997, completed Memoranda of Understanding with all the States in which supporting civil society is a central section.

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the OSCE has dedicated bigger concentration to security issues in Central Asia. Its recent projects in the region

comprise reducing illegal trafficking in drugs and small arms, improving security components in travel documents, strengthening border controls, and countering terrorist financing and other terrorist activities. Another OSCE security priority in Central Asia has been humanizing police training, equipment, and control.<sup>3</sup>

As well preventing conflicts between or within member countries, the OSCE has long required to resolve already existing conflicts. For instance, the institution attempted to help end the 1992-97 civil war in Tajikistan, though it finally took Russian military intervention to secure the peace agreement. Since then, the OSCE has required to resolve the so-called-frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union, as well as those in Georgia, Moldova, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its progress in these cases has been minimal.

The Russian and Central Asian governments have tended to see the OSCE as extremely preoccupied with democracy and human rights rather than with attractive member's security and economic development. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) allowed a statement criticizing the OSCE for interfering in the internal affairs of member states, employing a double standard that excessively focuses on abuses in CIS countries, and becoming overly preoccupied with human rights issues at the expense of managing new challenges and promoting member's security and economic well-being. The declaration also castigated the ODIHR and the OSCE field operations for overspending, making unwarranted criticisms of member's domestic political practices, and pursuing their own reform agendas.

### *The EU Central Asia Strategy*

As the EU has become a more evident geopolitical actor, it has sought to improve its ability to respond to and prevent deadly conflict. The European Union is not living up to its potential as a geopolitical actor in Central Asia. The level of EU interest has been low, and Brussels is doing little to shape developments in a region that has mostly seen marked declines in its economic fortunes, political freedoms and social development in recent years but remains of extensive strategic significance. If this is to change, Europe must move away from largely ineffective policies, particularly the promotion of region-wide projects, and take on a more focused and active role geared to the separate characteristics of each of the region's five states. It needs also to raise the level of its representation, spend more money and stick to its political ideals if it is to have a positive impact.

Ensuring respect for human rights is of critical importance to the goals of the Central Asia strategy articulated by the German presidency and of the

EU's January 2007 Joint Discussion Paper on the Strategy for Central Asia ("the EU draft strategy"). The EU draft strategy states that the EU's overall aim is "The establishment of stable, independent and prosperous countries adhering to democratic values and market economy principles in Central Asia." It prioritizes supporting security and stability, escalation energy security, and enhancing trade and investment.

Since the January 2006 Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, energy security has risen to the top of the European policy agenda, with officials in Brussels and member-state capitals scrambling to decrease over-reliance on Russia. Too late, the EU has begun to realise Central Asia's potential importance. Its oil and gas reserves, which could be linked directly to Europe via the South Caucasus and Turkey, are seen as at least a limited solution to the need to diversify energy contribute.<sup>4</sup>

Raising human rights at the political level and establishing goals and benchmarks in human rights do not, as some in the EU have recommended, set back the EU's relationships with Central Asian governments with no consequence. In the case of Turkmenistan, for example, even in the absence of an interim trade agreement with the EU, contact and appointment with the EU continued at many levels. Particularly, several of the reform promises made by the new Turkmen president directly addresses EU parliament human rights benchmarks for incoming into an interim trade agreement with Turkmenistan.

EU assistance to the region has largely taken the form of technical assistance implemented through the program (TACIS) that was designed in 1991 to support transition to market economies and support democracy and the rule of law in the post-Soviet space. That program has included a number of large trans-national projects in transport, drugs, border controls and energy which show few consequences for the time and money invested. Even with some assistance given to combating drug trafficking, the potential for ill-gotten gains from the drug trade continues to weaken efforts.

Following the Soviet collapse in 1991, EU relations with the newly independent states (NIS) were basically conducted along the lines of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed two years earlier with Moscow. In 1991, the EU also launched the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program, modelled on its assistance program for Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>5</sup> TACIS was planned to "promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule of law in the partner States". From 1991 to 2002, the five Central Asian states got some €366 million in TACIS assistance.<sup>6</sup> As part of the reform of the entire EU development assistance system, TACIS programming ends in 2006. On the other hand, given the time-lag in implementing the yearly Action Programs for each country, TACIS-funded projects can be projected to run through 2011.

### *Conclusion*

In a multilateral response to any most important domestic political crisis in Central Asia, the OSCE would soon be eclipsed by unilateral action or by more dominant security institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although these organizations have a weaker permission to arbitrate in member states internal affairs than the OSCE, their superior resources and less challenging dialogue with Central Asian governments gives these institutions greater opportunities to encourage these leaders to resolve internal differences that could escalate into major civil strife. Should actual fighting break out, one or more of these organizations will perhaps take the lead in organizing any resulting peacekeeping force. China and particularly Russia might effort to impose peace unilaterally, but other governments likely would feel more comfortable if any military intervention occurred under the auspices of an international institution. Most importantly, a multilateral framework would make the situation more transparent and give other actors a mechanism to communicate their own interests and concerns. Unfortunately, the OSCE has established itself largely unsuccessful at performing such functions.

As a result of international attention over the last decade, a large number of NGOs have been recognized to help implement international assistance programmes. Some of these have previously ceased to exist, but many others have acquired organizational skills and are becoming more and more self-sufficient. Moreover, the degree of civil society expansion varies significantly across the region. Governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia have, since their independence, arranged different policies towards NGOs, and some States have created more favourable conditions for the NGO community than others.

The OSCE has the essential elements in place to give important support to the development of civil society. The organization has a high degree of flexibility and an capacity to adjust to changing circumstances. Furthermore, the combination of presence in the field and the experience of the OSCE's autonomous institutions has the potential to offer targeted projects and ensure efficient implementation. The consciousness of governments of the role of NGOs is in various cases still influenced by the traditional Soviet definition. Under the Soviet system, grass-roots activities were mostly controlled and organized from above, principally to create support amongst the general population for the regimes' courses of action.<sup>7</sup> The NGOs that took part in these endeavours could more exactly be described as GONGOs (governmentally organized NGOs). Changing this opinion is a long-term undertaking.

The aim of this paper is to give a general overview of the status of civil society and the role of NGOs in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and look at the lessons learned from international assistance to local NGO communities, as well as current OSCE activities. Nevertheless, the success of Operation Enduring Freedom is no guarantee of stability in Central Asia. Much work remains to be done on designing and implementing internal reforms not only in Uzbekistan, but also in Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states as well.

The NGO community is rapidly developing in a number of CIS States. As a result of international support possibilities, and the newly-learned skills on how to organize and qualify for these funds, new NGOs are established on a regular basis. Keeping track of this growth is difficult for small OSCE centres with few staff to monitor developments in all human dimension areas and even harder to follow the development of new NGOs. On top of this, the centres are increasingly involved in trying to apply local development projects.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> NGOs have, in particular, played an important role in raising environmental concerns, developing awareness of environmental issues and promoting sustainable development. The encouragement of public participation in environmental and social management through legislation in recent years has also enhanced the role of NGOs and Major Groups.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia. Testimony of Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, July 25, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> This initiative began in August 2003 as an agreement between the OSCE and the Kyrgyz government. It soon spread to other Central Asian countries. The OSCE's Special Police Matters Unit intends for this effort to bolster recipient government's ability to counter terrorism and other illegal activities, as well as curb corruption and other law enforcement abuses against citizen's rights and freedoms.

<sup>4</sup> A new European Commission Green Paper on energy strategy was published on 8 March 2006, and was reportedly extensively revised after Russia cut off gas to Ukraine. See "Call for EU to boost energy security", *Financial Times*, 20 February 2006. The Green Paper is available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/green-paper-energy/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/green-paper-energy/index_en.htm).

<sup>5</sup> That program for Central and Eastern Europe, known as PHARE (Pologne, Hongrie Assistance à la Réconstruction Économique), was created in 1989, originally to provide economic assistance to Poland and Hungary. It was used to fund the pre-accession strategy for the countries of the region, and following the May 2004 enlargement, has been converted into the main aid mechanism for eight new EU member states (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) as well as soon-to-be members Bulgaria and Romania.

<sup>6</sup> "European Commission Regional Strategy for Central Asia 2002-2006", 30 October 2002, p. 12, at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/ceeca/rsp2/02\\_06\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/rsp2/02_06_en.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> Some organizations which organized 'voluntary' activity in the past, like the 'Comsomol' (youth movement), have now lost public funding and institutional support.

## Images of St Eugenios in Georgia and Cultural and Political Ties with the Empire of Trebizond

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**A**ccording to Georgian and foreign sources it is believed that Trebizond Empire was created by the help of Georgian kingdom. This political event is revealed not only in the literature sources, but also in mural painting of Georgian churches. In particular this refers to the representations of St. Eugenios of Trebizond: the patron of the newly created empire. The fact is that St Eugenios was never more than local saint and his representations are very few outside the Trebizond area. That is the reason why the representations of St Eugenios in Georgian churches are so important and could be considered as the part of contemporary Georgian politics.

There is a figure of holy soldier with old Georgian inscription "St. Eugenios of Trebizond" in the mural painting of Timotesubani dated by 1205-1215 years. Another example of declaring the political project that has been prepared by Georgian kingdom a long time ago, can be seen in Vardzia (1184 -1185), where the royal donors \_ King Giorgi III and his daughter Queen Tamar are represented with St. Eugenios of Trebizond.

### წმ. ევგენის გამოსახულებები საქართველოში და კულტურულ-პოლიტიკური კავშირები ტრაპიზონის იმპერიასთან

ნინო ჩიხლაძე

საქართველოს ეროვნული მუზეუმი

**ს**ადღესოდ როგორც ქართული, ისე უცხოური წერილობითი წყაროების შეკვრებით ჩვენშიც და საზღვარგარეთის მნიშვნელოვან სამეცნიერო წრეებშიც მიღებულია აზრი, რომ 1204 წელს ტრაპიზონის იმპერია ქართული სახელმწიფოს უშუალო ხელშეწყობითა და სახსრებით დაარსდა. შეიქმნა საქართველოსადმი ლოიალურად განწყობილი ქვეყანა და იმაე-

დროულად, მოხდა სამხრეთ შავიზღვისპირეთში ქართული სახელმწიფოს გაელენის სფეროს გავრცობა. მოცემულ პოლიტიკურ მოვლენათა ამსახველ თუ მათზე მიმანიშნებელ ლიტერატურულ წყაროებთან ერთად, ვფიქრობთ, მნიშვნელოვანია ქართულ ეკლესიათა მოხატულობებში დადასტურებული სახვითი წყაროებიც, რომლებიც უდაოდ შეიცავს სახელმწიფო პოლიტიკის გამოხატველ ინფორმაციას. საქმე ეხება პონტოს მიდამოების ლოკალური მნიშვნელობის წმინდანის – ეგგენი ტრაპიზონელის საქართველოში შემორჩენილ გამოსახულებებს, რომელთა რაოდენობა ტრაპიზონსა და მის მიმდებარე რეგიონშიც არ არის ბევრი, მე-12 საუკუნის დასასრულისა და მე-13 საუკუნის დასაწყისის ძეგლები კი იშვიათი გამონაკლისია.

სწორედ ამ კონტექსტში განიხილება ტიმოთესუბნის 1205-1215 წლებს შორის შესრულებული წმ. მეომრის გამოსახულება თანმდევი ასომთავრული წარწერით: “წმ. ეგგენი ტრაპიზონელია” და ვარძიის ცნობილი საქტიტორო კომპოზიცია შესრულებული ტრაპიზონის იმპერიის დაარსებამდე 20 წლით ადრე, 1184-1185 წლებს შორის, სადაც მეფე გიორგი III და თამარ მეფე მფარველობას ჩვილადი ღმრთისმშობლის ხატთან ერთად, ევედრებიან სწორედ წმ. ეგგენი ტრაპიზონელს.

The paper deals with the images of St Eugenios of Trebizond surviving in Georgia. Only a negligible number of images of the saint preserve in Trebizond and its surrounding regions, while there is not a single securely identified representation from the 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> century.

Who is St Eugenios of Trebizond and how did his cult evolve? This is a local saint, who gained popularity in the environs of Trebizond as early as the Middle Ages. The first epic text describing his martyrdom, presumably written not earlier than the 6<sup>th</sup> century, tells a story of St Eugenios, instrumental in spreading Christianity in Trebizond under Roman Emperors Diocletian and Maximian in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century, as well as about his three companions, St Kanidios, St. Valerianos and St. Akylas, all of whom are commemorated on 21 January. The story has it that St Kanidios, St. Valerianos and St. Akylas were arrested together, tortured and executed, while St Eugenios was found slightly later hiding in the environs of Trebizond, in a place called ‘thorny’. After being tortured through different means, he, as well as his companions, was beheaded (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, 194-195). On the one hand, the popularity of St Eugenios in the region in the early Middle Ages is without doubt, which is

indicated by a legend concerning a trial in Constantinople preserved in the collection of the miracles of St Eugenios compiled by Metropolitan Johnnes Lazaropulos of Trebizond. The merchants from Trebizond summoned to the court as witnesses cited only Eugenios. Each of them being called Eugenios, the judge raised a question as to why a Trapezuntine referred only to St Eugenios while there was a multitude of other saints and why their majority bore this name. Later, as for example in the period of the Empire of Trebizond, the situation with respect to this name changed, due to which the description given in the legend is assigned to an earlier period (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, pp. 199-200; F. Uspenskij, 1929, p.13). However, despite its popularity, the cult of St Eugenios failed to fully emerge in the Early Middle Ages: only several prerequisites of the evolution of the cult of the saint could be observed. The text on the martyrdom mentioned neither the day of the death nor the precise place of burial. Nor the image, social status and appearance of the saint were specified (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, p.195). Moreover, even the 11<sup>th</sup> century revised version of the martyrdom presented by the Greek writer of Trebizond origin, Joannes Xiphilinus, fails to reveal much about the evolution of the cult, which allows us to assume that by the beginning of the 11<sup>th</sup> century, St Eugenios's church and monastery as a pilgrimage centre was not of major importance in Trebizond (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, p. 197). It became such only after the establishment of the Empire of Trebizond, when the cult reached new height. With the help of the state, the saint was declared official protector of Caesar, the city of Trebizond and the entire empire (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, pp. 197-9; A. Eastmond, 2004, p. 146). His image was imprinted on the coat of arms and the seals of the ruling dynasty of the Komnenoi, as well as on aspers, silver coins struck in Trebizond. St Eugenios's Church was named among the three holiest sites in the Empire of Trebizond the other two being Virgin Chrysokephalos ('Gold-headed') and Hagia Sophia (F. Uspenskij, 1929, p. 14). Originally built as a basilica and later transformed into a domed church, it attracted particular attention after the victory of the second emperor of Trebizond, Andronikos Gidos over Seljuk Melik, since the victory was associated with the miraculous patronage of St Eugenios (A. Eastmond, 2004, pp. 51-53, A. Bryer, 2002, part 2, p. 90). Described in the typicon of St Eugenios's monastery, the celebration of the day of the commemoration of the saint that started a day before, on 20 January and was attended by a large number of people, demonstrates the pompousness which characterized the event dedicated to the patron saints of the Empire (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, p. 200). The reverence to the cult of St Eugenios was pursued in the same way throughout the existence of the Empire of Trebizond. The saint was considered to be a protector of the population of Trebizond in their struggle against enemies

and at the same time, a symbol of the independence of the state and of the sovereign policy free of the influence of Byzantium which had claims over the country. This can also explain the reason why St Eugenios remained a local saint at all stages of the evolution and expansion of the cult, and despite a few exceptions, failed to reach outside the borders of Trebizond (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, pp. 200-201, 210).

After the fall of the Empire of Trebizond in 1461, the importance of the cult of St Eugenios began to diminish gradually. It is noteworthy that none of the works of architecture or fine arts associated with St Eugenios can be found among post-Byzantine (second half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century through the 19<sup>th</sup> century) samples collected by scholars specializing in the history and culture of the Pontos, namely A. Bryer, D. Winfield, S. Balance and G. Isaac (A. Bryer, 2002). In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the Russian researcher, F. Uspenskij could not hide his surprise over the fact that the patron saint of the city was given to oblivion by local Orthodox Greeks and despite applying to various clerics, he failed to find a single image of St Eugenios even among old icons (F. Uspenskij, 1929, pp. 113,42). The archbishop of Kartli and Metropolitan of Kutaisi, Timote Gabashvili, who visited Trebizond among other holy sites toured by him from 1755 to 1759, provides an interesting note in his *Momosvla*. Of three great relics of the city of Trebizond, seized by the Turks, which included the Monastery of St Eugenios, he identified only Hagia Sophia (Timote Gabashvili, 1983, pp. 456-457). With respect to the cult of St Eugenios, he noted the following: 'And from there we reached Chaldia (now called Gumishkhana), where St Eugenios, St Kanidios and St. Valerianos were martyred. Thereafter we studied the churches and they were built by the Georgians. And we enquired about it and were said that Gumishkhana belonged to the kings of Georgia, as the silver mined here was for Georgia. The source of the Chorokhi river forms the boundary of Georgia' (1983, p. 561). Georgians here certainly meant inhabitants of Chaldia since Gumishkhana, modern-day Giumushene (Argyropolis) located in the mountains near Trebizond, was the centre of the settlement of the Chans with a medieval castle from which the Chans controlled a highly important pass of Zigani (E. Zhordania, 2002, p. 14). What is interesting in this passage is that the cult of the patron saint of the Empire is no more in evidence in Trebizond proper in the 18<sup>th</sup> century but is rather localized in Chaldia, in the settlement of the Georgian tribes.

Thus the overview of the stages of the evolution of the cult of St Eugenios allows us to assume that St Eugenios, instrumental in the spread of Christianity in Trebizond together with his three companions, all of whom were martyred in Trebizond, was popular with local people back in the 11<sup>th</sup> century. Yet the cult failed to further develop even in the 11<sup>th</sup> century when a

metaphrastic text describing the miracles of his martyrdom was created. The next and the most important stage of the evolution of the cult is related to the transformation of the image of the popular saint into the patron of the Empire and the icon of the guardian of battles. The final stage saw the gradual disappearance of the cult of the saint in the region together with the fall of the Empire of Trebizond. It also demonstrates that in the 18<sup>th</sup> century it was alive on the territory populated by the Georgians, while no trace of the worship of the cult is evident in Trebizond, the city of St. Eugenios.

The emergence of the images of St Eugenios and the formation of its iconographic type are assigned to the period of the evolution of the cult. The iconography of the saint was far from being formulated in the early period, which is evidenced by several images of St Eugenios from the 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> century to the 1204, among which note must be made of a miniature in the Menologion of Basil II showing the beheading of the saint, as well as two seals of individuals, the figures featured on which are considered to be St Eugenios (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, pp. 207-208).

The number of the images began to increase from the period of the foundation of the Empire of Trebizond. The same period saw the spread of two clearly formulated iconographic representations of St Eugenios. The first, which spread earlier than the second, is St Eugenios the Martyr, who is a richly dressed courtier. He is shown as a middle-aged man with a high forehead, his dark hair combed behind reaching the neck and with short beard. Decorated with edges and precious stones, he wears a long tunic and a patterned gown. He holds a cross fixed onto a long staff in one hand, and a wrinkled edge of the gown, in the other. Similar representations can be found in the cave church of St Eugenios's monastery at Trebizond, the 'Upper Church' of Sarmashicle in the Matzuka gorge, and in the chapel of the tower of Hagia Sophia in Trebizond (A. Bryer and D. Winfield, 1985, 224f, 273f, fig.83, 236, fig.73). All these examples are from the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> century. One of the finest and best preserved images of St Eugenios is a double-side icon dating from 1374 which preserves in the Monastery of Dionisius on Mount Athos. One side of the icon shows Alexios III Komnenos together with John the Baptist, while another features St. Eugenios, St. Kanidios, St. Valerianos and St. Akylas (A. Karakatsanis, Thessalonike, 1997, pp. 96-97). Similar is the miniature of the typicon of 1346 of the Monastery of St Eugenios (O. Rosenqvist, 2003, p. 209). Similar iconographic types were presented on Trapezuntine aspers (O. Rosenqvist, 2003, p. 208), however, the mounted images of the saint were also in evidence (A. Bryer, 2002, part 2, p. 91), which is another iconographic type spread at the time. This is St. Eugenios in armour, a warrior's gown and a long dagger. For example, paintings from the late 13<sup>th</sup> and early 14<sup>th</sup> century of the chapel of

St Elijah from Vazelon Monastery in Matzuka gorge or the murals of the now inexistent palace in Trebizond (A. Bryer and D. Winfield, 1985, pp. 292, 225c, vol. II, p. 215, no 55).

Considering the peculiarities of the evolution of the cult of St Eugenios and the formation of the respective iconographic type, the images of St. Eugenios preserved in Georgian murals acquire particular relevance. Furthermore, two of them are the earliest images among those that survive to the present day. One of the images preserves at Timotesubani, which is located in the Borjomi gorge. Represented to the right of the entrance door, towards the edge of the west wall of the west arm of the cross-domed church, is a warrior saint in grey armour and a red cape with a dagger in one hand and a long spear, in another [ill.1]. The figure is accompanied with an inscription in *asomavruli* (old Georgian majuscule) script, which reads as 'Evgeni Trapizoneli' (Eugenios of Trebizond) (E. Privalova, 1980, p. 100). The painting was thoroughly studied in the 1970s by the prominent art historian, Ekaterine Privalova, who believed that it was executed by a representative of the Toreli dynasty, possibly the most powerful official at the royal court of Queen Tamar, minister of interior Shalva Toreli of Akhaltsikhe between 1205 and 1215. Moreover, E. Privalova shared a view expressed back in the 1930s by the researcher, Dimitri Gordeev, according to which the representation of the saint of Trebizond points to the timeframe within which the painting was made. It was the period when the relationship of Georgia and Trebizond reached its height. It has been argued that brothers Shalva and Ivane of Akhaltsikhe were immediately involved in the Trebizond military campaign, while the inclusion of the figure of St Eugenios among warrior saints could have served to indicate the political and military might of the Georgian state in Trebizond. However, it was also noted Timotesubani was the only Georgian site where the image of St Eugenios could be found (E. Privalova, 1980, pp. 121-122). Yet, there is another even more interesting example: the image of the holy martyr incorporated into the donor composition of Giorgi III and Queen Tamar in the Church of the Dormition at Vardzia, which carefully imitates the established iconographic type of St Eugenios [ill.2].

The tall arched niches on the east and west portions of the compositionally most important north wall at Vardzia are taken up by donor compositions. An arched niche in the wall to the east features the figures of the representatives of the royal family turned to the east in a three-fourth posture before the enthroned Virgin with Child and the only martyr below her. All of them are shown against the background of the now faded blue sky studded with stars and equally faded brownish-grey ground. Shown with a halo, Giorgi III and his daughter Tamar are presented to the Virgin and the martyr stand-

ing near her by an angel hovering above King Giorgi. The enthroned Virgin with Child points with her hand to the scepter held by the angel, who seems to be giving it as a token of divine authority to Giorgi III who has his hands raised in supplication. Queen Tamar stands behind her father with a church model in her hand. The inscriptions at the head of Giorgi III and Queen Tamar read as follows: King of all East/King Giorgi son Demetre/King of Kings [K. Melitauri, N. Shooshiashvili, S. Khantadze, G. Jamburia, 1955, pp. 66-67, fig. 19], Of all East/King of Kings/ son of Giorgi Tamar who is alive [K. Melitauri, N. Shoshiashvili, S. Khantadze, G. Jamburia, 1955, pp. 66-67, fig. 20]. The martyr whom 'the kings of all East' address together with the Virgin with Child, is a middle-aged man with a characteristic hair style with his hair reaching the neck and with a dark beard. He is clad in a red tunic richly embroidered with edgings and a gown decorated with tablium, the wrinkled left edge of which he holds with his left hand. In his right hand he holds a cross erected on a tall handle [ill.3]. Almost fully lost Greek inscription was reconstructed by T. Kaukhchishvili as St Eugenios of Trebizond (T. Kaukhchishvili, 2004, p. 236), which is attested by the iconographic type of the saint. The painting at Vardzia is securely dated to 1184-1185 according to the image of young Queen Tamar who is painted before marriage (D. Berdzenishvili, et al, 2000, p. 118). It appears that the local saint of Trebizond was pleaded to be a guardian of the most important endeavours, the fulfillment of which would only be possible in 20 years!

Having studied and compared Georgian and foreign written records scholars in Georgia and abroad have agreed that the foundation of the Empire of Trebizond in 1204 was made possible with the support of the Georgian state (M. Gabashvili, 1998, p. 142, A. Eastmond, 2004, pp. 18-21). Medieval Georgian and Greek sources confirm that thanks to the direct efforts, 'diligence and achievement' of Queen Tamar, a descendant of Byzantine emperors, Alexios Komnenos (1204-1222), who was also a relative of the Bagrationi royal dynasty and had grown up at the Georgian royal court, ascended the throne of Trebizond (Kartlis Tskhovreba, vol. II., 1959, pp. 142-3, Michael Parantos, 1960, p. 16). Apart from the efforts of Georgian military units, the support provided by the aboriginal Georgian tribes inhabiting the south Black Sea coast, the promoted Laz and Chan population, played a vital role in accomplishing this. The Empire of Trebizond was formed as a vassal state of Georgia, which was associated with the expansion of the influence of the Georgian state over the south Black Sea littoral. Georgian historians hold a view that this was an outcome of a long and careful contemplation of the foreign policy of the Georgian royal court (*Sakartvelos istoriis narkvevebi*, 1979, p. 332), though, as an early 20<sup>th</sup> century emigrant researcher, Zurab Avaliani

noted regretfully, Georgian historical records preserve no trace of the aspirations, estimates and thoughts that guided Georgian public figures in their attempt to establish the kingdom of Trebizond in 1204 (Z. Avalishvili, 1989, p. 52). Historians have modestly suggested that the efforts to bring the region of Trebizond under Georgian influence, which, in its turn, implied the westward expansion of the Georgian state and its gaining control of the Black Sea basin, must have been initiated before Queen Tamar. It is assumed that King Davit Aghmashenebeli (David the Builder) had taken steps to this end by undertaking a military campaign to the region of Trebizond (V. Kopaliani, 1968, pp. 109-121). It has also been noted that bearing in mind the goals of the Georgian state with respect to Trebizond, King Giorgi III may also have made an agreement with Andronikos Komnenos, who later emerged as Byzantine Emperor though for a short time (1183-1185) (M. Gabashvili, 1998, p. 146; M. Gabashvili, 2007, No 2(28), p. 43).

It is thus evident that the assumptions made by historians with regard to the preliminary work that took years and aimed at laying a foundation for the Empire of Trebizond, an important move in Georgian foreign policy of Middle Ages, are fairly well-grounded. Apart from the body of evidence offered by written sources, this viewpoint is further confirmed by visual sources, such as murals adorning Georgian churches, which certainly provide information on the state policy of the time. Within this context, the idea of establishing Vardzia castle acquires particular relevance. The historical composition of the period of Queen Tamar *Istoriani da azmani sharavandedtani* makes the following reference to Vardzia: 'Vardzia was started by beloved father of Giorgi, who failed to finish it and she completed it and decorated richly and donated a great number of villages' [Kartlis Tskhovreba, vol. II, 1959, p. 91]. It is possible that Vardzia was founded not only for defending the southern region, but also to ensure effective control of the neighbour area of Trebizond. The image of St. Eugenios of Trebizond at Vardzia, which is not only the earliest of the surviving images of the saint, but also precedes the foundation of the Empire of Trebizond, raises a question as to whether the Georgian royal court could play a role in the evolution of the cult of the saint and the formation of its iconographic type.

There is another question concerning St. Eugenios of Trebizond which has been raised by the paintings at Vardzia. St. Kanidios, St. Valerianos and St. Akylas mentioned together with St. Eugenios are not represented here. But in the same context with St. Eugenios depicted are four out of the five martyrs from Trebizond, namely St. Auxsentios, St. Mardarios, St. Eustratios, St. Orestes and St. Eugenios, all of whom are commemorated on 13 December. It is not only that their popularity exceeded that of St. Eugenios of Trebizond

and three martyrs mentioned together with him, but also that the image of Eugenios of Trebizond emerged from the literary and 'historical' image of St. Eugenios, namesake of St. Eugenios of Trebizond and one of the five saints (J.O. Rosenqvist, 2003, p. 194). In some cases the two saints were even mixed up. The same must be the case here, which is confirmed by the absence of the Georgian translation of *Passio* of St Eugenios of Trebizond, St. Kanidios, St. Valerianos and St. Akylas, while the *Passio* of the five saints was known in Georgia as early as the 8th-9th century. Another translation of the text was made in the 11th century by Ekvtime Atoneli (Euthimius the Athonite) (K. Kekelidze, vol., I, pp. 133-134, 184). Neither can the images of St. Kanidios, St. Valerianos and St. Akylas be found at Timotesubani, while the representations of the five martyrs are present here too. This logic seemingly explains the popularity of the five martyrs and their frequent depiction in the late medieval paintings, especially in works that reveal either an obvious affinity with Trebizond, e.g. late 13th century paintings in Achi St. George (J. Iosebidge, 1990, pp. 31, 49, 61, 77-78) or suggest only a possible kinship with the Empire, e.g. 14th century paintings at Jumati Church of the Archangel.

The emergence of the image of St Eugenios in Georgian paintings of the later period can be explained by different historical circumstances. The study of the representations of St Eugenios and martyrs related to him in will enrich the history of Georgian state policy and culture with new evidence, which is a subject of future research.

Figure 1. The Church of Timotesubani (1205-1215).  
St. Eugenios as St. Warrior represented to the right of the door  
towards the edge of the west wall




Figure 2. The Church of Vardzia (1184-1185). The donor composition of  
King Giorgi III and Queen Tamar with St. Eugenios




Figure 3. The Church of Vardzia (1184-1185). St. Eugenios (detail)



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## Introduction to the Foodways of Georgia

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*This article's theme is an introduction to the foodways of Georgia, the main purpose of the research is to scientific way map out the foodways of Georgia and its origins. The research project is still in its infancy so the author throughout the paper, consequently discusses the staple foodstuff in today's Georgia such as wine, bread, Khachapuri and Khinkali. The author research method is interdisciplinary where different sources are used such as artefacts, historical written sources (for example, receipts, cookery books, narrative stories, accounts, agricultural texts, lists), photographs (past and present) and oral sources (such as interviews with local housekeepers). The author also stresses the importance of working in an interdisciplinary way, in order to get a wider, broader answer to the asked questions instead of just working with one source.*

### ქართული საკვების ტრადიცია

ულრიკა სოდერლინდი  
სტოკჰოლმის უნივერსიტეტი

ამ სტატიის თემა წარმოადგენს ქართული საკვების ტრადიციის შესავალს. კვლევის ძირითადი მიზანია მეცნიერულად განსაზღვროს ქართული საკვების ტრადიცია და მისი წარმოშობა. კვლევის პროექტი ჯერ საწყის სტადიაშია, რის გამოც ავტორი განიხილავს მხოლოდ დღევანდელი საქართველოს ძირითად საკვებ პროდუქტებს, როგორებიცაა ღვინო, პური, ხაჭაპური და ხინკალი. ავტორის კვლევის მეთოდი ინტერდისციპლინარულია, სადაც გამოიყენება სხვადასხვა წყაროები, როგორებიცაა არტეფაქტები, ისტორიული წერილობითი წყაროები (მაგალითად, რეცეპტები, კულინარიული წიგნები, ნარატიული წყაროები, აღრიცხვები, აგროკულტურული ტექსტები, სიები), ფოტო მასალა (ძველი და ახლანდელი) და ზეპირსიტყვიერი წყაროები (მაგალითად, ინტერვიუები ადგილობრივ ოჯახის დიასახლისებთან. დასმული შეკითხვებისათვის უფრო ფართო პასუხების გასაცემად, ავტორი ხაზს უსვამს ინტერდისციპლინარული გზით მუშაობას.

### *Introduction*

According to a Georgian legend, God took a supper break while he was creating the world. He became so involved in his meal that by accident, he tripped over the high peaks of the Caucasus and as a result he spilled his own food onto the land below. The land below blessed with the scarps of Heavens table was Georgia. This article is about a newly started project the working name of that is “Foodways of Georgia”, as the working name indicates the research field is to map out in a scientific way the foodways of Georgia and its origins.

### *Method and Theory*

The project is carried out in a highly interdisciplinary manner where different kinds of sources are used such as: artefacts, historical written sources (for example, receipts, cookery books, narrative stories, accounts, agricultural texts, lists), photographs (past and present) and oral sources (such as interviews with local housekeepers). As an archaeologist I have learned and been taught to interpret minutiae of human relics as evidence of lives once lived and as a historian I am well accustomed to work with written sources and photographs as indices of culture. As I see it, interdisciplinary work gives a broader, deeper and more complex picture and answer to the asked question/s in a study than just limited oneself to one type of source. Most of the times the different kinds of sources do not tell the same story or history to the asked question/s and from my point of view that is what makes working dynamic in an interdisciplinary way. This is especially true for the Caucasus region with its complex pre-history (Bukhrashvili, 2003. pp. 226-227).

Culinary art in the life of Georgians in the past and present is fundamental in the research and by combining different kind of sources it serves the method very well to work in an interdisciplinary way.

The theoretical framework for the research is based on a created theory that is called “homo gastronomicus”. A lot of factors are of vital importance for the reasons and choices the human being makes in her diet throughout his/her entire life. In short these factors are on a personal level; need, physique, nourishment, efficiency, edibility, tradition, ideology, technology, availability, distance, economy, regulations, influences (that are professional, commercial and social), geographical and mental borders, philosophy, the five senses, heritage from childhood, social structure, social class, gender, utensils (Söderlind 2005, p 21-47).

Apart from that a nation's gastronomy also consists of factors such as diet, provisions, food stuff (in different categories), culinary art, cookery and fare. The choices of diet are thus complex and never static. It gets even more complicated due to the fact that the factors mentioned above do not necessary have the same meaning for all individuals in the same geographical area. All these factors and contexts constitute the "homo gastronomicus" and can be applied to any period in time (Söderlind 2005, p 21-47).

### *Survey of the Field in Short*

The research of food and beverage is a field that has been minor in general amongst historians and archaeologist if one looks at it on a large scale. However, that being said the field is not totally empty on scientific works regarding antiquity and the Middle age areas. Then most important works regarding the antique area have been written by Dalby, Andrew that writes about the antient period in Greece and Imperium Romanun (Dalby, 1996, 2000), he has also written about food in the Byzantine Empire (Dalby, 2003). Dalby is not the only scholar that has paid attention to the cuisine of antiquity, worth mentioning in the field is also Grottenelli & Milano's (2004) work on the role food played for the identity of humans in antiquity, Garnsey's work (2002) on how food reflected the different social classes during the time, Wilkins & Hill's (2006) large and general work of what was eaten in Greece and Rome and on the same theme of Alcock's (2006) and Brothwell's (1998) works on distribution of food stuff as an overview in the classical world. On the same topic but with a different angles are the works of Faas (2003) and Slater (1991) that deals with the actual eating and dining of the foodstuff. The cuisine of the classical and antique area had a major impact on local cuisines all over Europe during the Middle Ages which has been proved by several researchers (Adamsson, 1995, 2002, 2004, van Winter, 2007, Scully, 2007, Redon, Odile, Sabban & Serventi, 1998, Bober, 1999, Elliot, 2004, Bhote, 2003). Very little has been done in Georgia in the field of food and beverages, worth mentioning here is the work by Bukhrasvili (2002, p 33-36) that deals with food techniques of the central Transcaucasian populations of the mid- 3<sup>rd</sup> millennium B.C.

### *Why study Georgia from a Culinary and Gastronomic Perspective?*

Georgia (საქართველო, Sakartvelo) is a transcontinental country in the Caucasus region, situated at the dividing line between Europe and Asia. The country's geographical location with borders on the Black Sea, the modern

Russian Federation, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, has meant that through pre-history and history, it has been a crossroads between the West and the East.

Due to its location, the country has been invaded several times over the course of history, for example, by the Greeks, Persians, and the Ottomans, to name but a few. The invasions mean that much of the antique and Islamic worldview still exists at the country's borders—which is an ancient cultural situation. The invasions have also left their footprints on Georgia's food- and drinking traditions and habits. This has resulted in the existence of many different gastronomical and culinary branches in the foodways of Georgia today.

I am still in the early stages of the research on Georgia's food and drinking traditions and habits. Consequently, in this paper, I will concentrate on some staple foods of Georgia, such as wine, bread, *Khachapuri* and *Khinkali*.

Georgia was one of the earliest Christian countries in the world which has attributed a certain role to wine in the transition from pre-history into the Christian era. Wine still holds a very special place in the hearts and minds of the Georgian people. I will thus deal first of all with wine in Georgian foodways.

### *Wine*

The beginning of human civilizations is closely connected to the development of agriculture and the history of cultivated plants, and Georgia played a crucial role in this process. One of the reasons for that is that wine culture in Georgia can be traced to early prehistoric times (Rusishvili 2007, p 5, 13). The research of linguists such as T. Gamkrelidze and V. Ivanon indicates that the root of the Indo-European term for 'wine' - *u(e/o) iano* which means wine – have derived from the Georgian word ღვინო [Rvino] (Gamkrelidze, 1984, p 647, 649-651). These linguists are of the opinion that the word would have been transferred into the Proto-Indo-European language before this language started to separate into its various branches in the fourth millennium B.C. The separation transformed the word in different ways, leading to the English 'wine', Italian 'vino', and Russian 'vino', to give but a few examples (Gamkrelidze, 1984, p 649-651, Mcovern, 2003, P 33-34).

The archaeological discovery of cultivated vines in Georgia supports the linguistic theory of the origin of the word 'wine'. Cultivated grape pips have been found on the archaeological site 'Shulaveris Gora' (situated in the trans-Caucasus region of modern Georgia).

The site is dated to sixth – fourth millennium B.C. and belongs to the Shulaveri-Shomu Tepe chalcolithic culture (Kushnareva, Chubinishvili, 1970,

p 170). Even if there is a large time span for the culture itself C14 (Radiocarbon dating is a radiometric dating method that uses ( $^{14}\text{C}$ ) to determine the age of carbonaceous materials up to about 60,000 years old) analyses of the cultural layer where the pips were found gives a dating of 6625±210 years millenium B.C (Kushnareva and Chubinishvili, 1970, p 170). At other sites belonging to the Shulaveri-Shomu Tepe culture a ceramic vessel which had ornamentation in relief was found. The ornamentation appears to show grapes and could very well be the earliest 'label' for grapes and wine that it is known of today. In the vessel there was also found a sediment that showed that is consisted of too much wine residue after analysis (Hansen, Mirtskhulava, Guram 2007, p 13-19, Chilashvili, 2004, p 47-9. Soltes, 1999, p 58-59).

After the initial evidence of cultivated grapes and of wine-making. cultivated grape pips were found in many other archaeological sites dating to the Bronze Age, Antiquity, and the Middle Ages. This indicates a situation of continuity in the cultivating grapes of Georgia (Rusishvili, 2007, p 13-35). It is not until the Bronze Age that table grapes for eating are found which indicates that humans in the earlier chalcolitic societies cultivated vines and grapes for wine-making and not for eating. Wine was, therefore, the primary reason why the vine was cultivated ( PhD, N. Rusishvili, personal communication, Center for Archaeological Studies of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2008-10-23).

It is not only grape pips that appear in the archaeological sites that can be linked to wine. At a site belonging to the Trialeti Culture (third – second millenium B.C.) a superb sample of toreutic art, a silver wine cup richly decorated, was found. This cup has become known as the "Silver Cup Of Trialeti" (Kushnareva, and Chubinishvili, 1970, p 16). There is ongoing debate about what the scene depicted on the cup means. Some researchers state that it is a depiction of the God Mithra surrounded by worshipers, and of the tree of life. Others, however, are of the opinion that the depiction is that of the God Mithra surrounded by hops and worshippers drinking haoma (Kuftin, 1941, p 84, Jafaridze, 1981, p 15, , 2004, p 67-73.). Mithra means 'contact' or 'pact' and these terms are closely associated with a God known among the Persians around 1200 B.C. Mithra was understood as a personification of the sun and a God of justice. The God Mithra is often described as a forerunner of the God Mithras who became known as a very important God in Greece and Rome during Antiquity. The people of Georgia worked not only in silver during their middle Bronze Age period; they also mastered the art of working in gold as is evident from the discovery of a wine cup made of a gold sheet dating from that period. The cup, which has a double wall and hollow legs, is richly decorated with sardonic, lapis lazuli, red jasper, agate, and amber stones. The cup is a stunning example of glass- pasted filigree work (Japhardidze, 1981, p 52).

During an archaeological excavation in 2006 (Mtskheta, the old capital of Georgia) a small bronze figurine depicting a 'Tamada', holding a drinking horn in his right hand, was found. The figurine is dated to the beginning of first millennium B.C (Japaridze, 2006, p 23). To this day, the Tamada is the toastmaster at banquets or special dinners in Georgia. The occasions on which the Tamada is present are called '*supra*' (table). The Tamada's main task at the *supra* is to salute the toasts. The Tamada is elected at the beginning of the *supra* and it is considered a great honour to be so selected for this function (Goldstein, 1999). A *supra* goes on for hours and the Tamada gives the toasts in a special order. The first toast is for the host and his family; thereafter follows a toast for the mother country of Georgia, then toast to the memory of the deceased heroes of the country and families of Georgia, followed by a toast to parents (especially mothers), friends, relatives, and the future of Georgia, to name a few of the toasts performed at a *supra*. Usually the guests empty their wine glasses on each toast and the glasses are filled again for the following toasts. No wine is drunk between the toasts. When the Tamada has given the last toast and rises up from the table the banquet or dinner, this is a signal that the event is over.

A special kind of artifact known as a '*kvevri*' has been found in the course of many excavations. A *kvevri* is a wine vessel which became known as an amphora during Antiquity in Greece and the Roman Empire; In Georgia, however, this kind of vessels has always been termed '*kvevris*' and still is. It is known from sites that can be dated as far back as Antiquity, that the *kvevri* was placed up to its neck in the ground and then filled with grape juice. The *kvevri* was sealed with a lid and the juice was left to ferment. The wine-farmer looked after the fermentation process until the wine was ready. The wine was then transferred to bags made of animal skins. In Georgia, there is no tradition of carrying wine in *kvevri*; skin bags have been used for this purpose since antiquity – perhaps even at an earlier period also. There are many reasons for this, including the fact that it was easier to carry a skin bag full of wine on one's back than to transport a hard *kvevri*. Furthermore, the skin bags did not break as easily as the *kvevri* did during transportation on ships or in chariots. The *kvevris* was mainly used for during the fermentation process of the wine. However, it is evident from several archaeological sites that, during Antiquity the *kvevris* were also used for non-cremation burials (Chilashvili, 2004, p 91-105).

*Fig. 1: It is known that at least since antiquity wine was left to ferment in kvevris that had been placed up to its neck in the ground. This photo is from a bishop's palace dating to the Middle Ages. Some wine farmers still use this ancient fermentation technique (© Söderlind, Ulrica, 2008).*



*Fig 2: During archaeological excavations kvevris are a common artifact to detect. This kvevri was excavated under the floor of the old church in Atskuri, Georgia. The expedition was led by professor in Archaeology Litcheli, Vakhtang (© Söderlind, Ulrica, 2006).*




Georgia was one of the world's first Christian countries, and dates such as 337 A.D. and 319 A.D. have been put forward for the country's adoption of Christianity (Tarchnisvili, 1953, p 572). Georgia's conversion to Christianity is closely linked to St. Nino. According to one tradition, St. Nino was from Kolastra, Cappadocia (in today's Turkey) and she was a relative of St. George (the patron saint of Georgia). She was said to have come to Georgia from Constantinople. Other sources claim that she came from Rome, Jerusalem or Gaul. According to a legend, St. Nino saw Virgin Mary in a dream and she told Nino that she should enter Georgia with a cross made of the wood of vine stocks. When Nino woke up from her dream she found herself holding two pieces of wood from vine stocks and she tied them together with her own hair. With this cross made of wine she fled Roman persecution in Cappadocia and made her way into Georgia and started to teach Christianity. The legend also tells that she performed miraculous healing and converted the Georgian queen, Nana, and eventually the pagan king, Mirian III, of Iberia. Mirian III declared Christianity an official religion in c. 327 A.D. and Nino continued her missionary activities among Georgians until her death in 338 or 340 A.D (Machitadze, Zakaria, 2006, p 48-52, Wardrop, M./Wardrop, O, 2006, p 12. Tarchnisvili, 1953:572, Lang, 1956, p 13- 39.).

St. Nino's tomb is still shown at the Bodbe Monastery in Kakheti – which is also the main wine region– in eastern Georgia. She has become one of the most venerated saints of the Georgian Orthodox Church and her attribute, a Grapevine cross, is a unique cross in the Christian world. Since, according to the legend, it was the Virgin Mary, who told St. Nino to go to Georgia and teach Christianity, the Grapevine cross became a symbol of Georgian Christianity.

Humans cannot live on wine alone and, as in the case of wine-culture, evidence for bread consumption in Georgia also goes back to pre-historic times. Four endemic cultures of wheat were also found in the Shulaveri Gora site representative of the Shulaveri-Shomu Tepe chalcolithic culture – where the first evidence of cultivated vine was also found (Kushnareva and Chubin-ishvili, *op. cit.*, 1970, p 170).

Fig 3: Saint Nino's cross made out of vinestocks.  
(© Söderlind, Ulrica, 2006).



### *Bread*

As indicated above, bread has a long traditional history in Georgia, dating back to the chalcolitic period. The crop that is mainly used for bread-making in Georgia today is wheat. The Georgian word for wheat flour actually is translated into English as “bread flour”.

A special oven called ‘*tone*’ exists in Georgia for bread baking. This kind of oven is designed to provide very high, dry heat. Fuel for the fire is provided by charcoal which lines the bottom of the structure. In order to produce temperature approaching 900 degrees Fahrenheit (480 degrees Celsius), bakers maintain a long vigil to keep the oven’s coals continually burning. At such high temperature, the bread made in a *Tone* oven develops a very crisp outer layer without sacrificing moistness on the inside (Todua, 1979, p 692).

One can find analogies between the ‘*tone*’ oven and the ‘*tandoor*’ oven in Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, the Transcaucasus region, the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia and Bangladesh. The earliest example of a *tandoor* oven has been found at the Harappa and Mohenjo Daro settlements of the ancient Indus Valley Civilization (2600-1500 B.C). Even so, ovens of the *tandoor* -type have been found in early-Harappan contexts (The Early Harappan Ravi Phase

is named after the nearby Ravi River, lasted from ca 3300- 2800 BC). The mature phase of earlier village cultures is represented by Rehman Dheri and Amri in Pakistan. Trade networks linked this culture with related regional cultures and distant sources of raw materials, including lapis lazuli and other materials for bread-making. Villagers had, by this time, domesticated numerous crops, including peas, sesame seeds, dates and cotton, as well as various animals, including the water buffalo) on the Makran coast, including at the mound site of Balakut that pre-dates the findings from the Mohenjo Daro settlements (Mohenjo-daro (Mound of the Dead) was one of the largest city-settlements of the Indus Valley Civilization of south Asia situated in the province of Sind, Pakistan. Built around 2600 BC, the city was one of the early urban settlements in the world, existing at the same time as the civilizations of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Crete). Description of ovens of this kind are also found in texts and accounts from Mesopotamia (Bottéro, 2004, p 47).

*Fig. 4: A detailed photograph of bread being baked in 'tone' oven. This sample of bread is ready for consumption and is being taken out of the oven. 'Tone' bread is thin bread and it is preferably eaten when warm. 'Tone' bread is never cut using a knife but is divided into smaller pieces by hand instead (© Söderlind, Ulrica, 2007).*



The word *tandoor* comes from the Dari words *tandūr* and *tannūr*; these are derived from very similar terms, Persian *tanūr*, Arabic *tandūr*, Turkish *Tandır* and Azeri word *təndir*. However, according to Dehkhoda Persian Dictionary the word originates from Akkadian *tinûru*, and is mentioned as early as in the Accadian Epic of Gilgames (reflexes of which are Avestan *tanûra* and Pahlavi *tanûr*). As such, the term may not be of Semitic or Iranian origin at all, dating back as it does to periods before the migration of Aryan and Semitic people to the Iranian plateau and Mesopotamia (Bottéro, 2004, p 47).

Fig 5: A wall painting in Tbilisi that advertises the merchandise of bread made in a "Tone" (© Söderlind, Ulrica, 2007).



The fact that the main crop grown for use in bread baking in Georgia was wheat, does not mean that no other crops were used. In the western part of the country a crop called "ღომი" [Romi] [ghomi], that belongs to the Monocotyledons culture, was used. The crop (that was similar to millet) was boiled and eaten instead of bread. When sweet corn came into use in the western part of the country, it was used instead of Ghomi and the crop is now extinct. Nevertheless, this kind of bread is still named Ghomi in western Georgia, even if it is baked using fine grained cornflour and such bread is often called cornbread when described to visitors. Ghomi was also found in the Monocotyledons cultural period and remained in use until the beginning of twentieth century (T, Tskvitinindze, personal communication, Kobuleti, Georgia, 2007-09-24). Bread (პურის) is a very important element of a diet for Georgians; and, with just two exceptions, *Khachapuri* and *Khinkali*, it is eaten at every meal. It does not matter how many dishes there is on the table, if bread is missing, the meal is not considered to be complete.

*Fig 6: My hostess in Mestia, Georgia, baked fresh bread every morning. For a Suede it was very nice to wake up to the smell of newly baked bread*  
(© Söderlind, Ulrica, 2007).



### *Khachapuri and Khinkali*

*Khachapuri* (ხაჭაპური) is a specialty of Georgian cuisine. There are different regional varieties, such as, *adjarian khachapuri*, *imeritian khachapuri*, *ossetian khachapuri* and *Mengrelian Khachapuri*. The name is very often translated into English as cheese bread, but it is not bread at all. The dish consists of a mixture of dough made from a mixture of youghurt, wheatflour, baking soda, sugar, egg yolk and salt. The dough is prepared approximately three hours before using. The different varieties of the dish arise from the seasoning used – such as sour cream, garlic, and so on – and this is also specific on the regional bases. Even if the different varieties of khacapuri do not look alike, they are all made using this dough and are filled with cheese before they are baked in a pan on the stove or in the oven, and then coated with butter before being served (*Georgian dishes, s.l., s.d* 16-18, 20, 26). *Khacapuri* is a very popular dish and is often eaten as a snack between meals or as fast food, even though the dish is very filling.

Fig 7: Different kinds of *Khachapuri* exist in Georgia today. This version can be found in Mengrelia, Nokalakevi (© Söderlind, Ulrica, 2007).



*Khinkali* (ხინკალი [khinkali]) is also a typical Georgian special dish and, along with *Khachapuri*, is considered as a national dish. *Khinkali* is a kind of filled dumpling. Grey flour (such as flour from rye), rather than white wheaten flour is used to make the dough, which consists of flour, salt and water. The dough is rolled out, round pieces are cut out and minced ham and pork are placed on top of them. The minced meat is flavoured with chopped onions, (in some cases also garlic) egg, pepper, and green herbs (such as parsley, coriander, cumin etc). The *Khinkali* with meat filling is the most common variety, although cheese, potato and mushrooms are also used for this purpose. The dough is wrapped around the filling and the dumpling is twisted around several times, the best made one is the one that is twisted around twelve times. The dumplings are put into boiling water and are served with butter and black pepper (*Georgian dishes, s.l., s.d.,30*).

The dumplings are eaten by hand without the use of any cutlery. The dumpling is picked up by hand where the dough been twisted round. That part is harder then the rest and not as hot either as the remainder of the dumpling. The eating of *Khinkali* is an art form since all of the meat juice stays inside the dumpling. It is not easy for a foreigner to eat *Khinkali* while maintaining good table manner. As *Chinkali* is a filling dish, it is very common to leave the part of the dumpling uneaten. Thus when a meal is finished it is possible to count how many *Khinkali* each person had eaten. Wine is not a good choice while eating *Khinkali*. It is one of the few Georgian dishes when wine is not recommended.

It is presumed that *Khinkali* is originated from China, where they were originally named '*Jiao Tzu*'. From China they spread to Russia (Pelmeni) and Central Asia (chuchvara). It is possible that the spread of the dish from China to Georgia started with the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century.

### *Closing Discussion and the Future*

I am still in the beginning of my research regarding the foodways of Georgia and as the work moves forward new questions arise and need to be answered.

An important question that arises and that is possible to answer as the research proceeds, is whether if hops really are depicted as surrounding the God Mithra on the silver wine cup that dates to the Bronze Age, and whether the God is drinking *haoma*. If this proves to be the case, it will indeed change what is known to date about the *haoma* cult – that the cult was closely connected to Mithra in the Persian Empire before the God was transformed into Mithras during antiquity. Many researchers have devoted much effort in trying to find out what the main intoxicating ingredient of the *haoma* beverage was. Some say that mushrooms (*Amanita Muscaria*) were used, while others are of the opinion that the original plant would have been a small bush that secreted a strong smell and had bitter leaves. The *haoma* beverage was a very intoxicating one and was also hallucinogenic. The plant that is in use today among the worshippers and followers of Zoroaster is a different one – which belongs to the Efediner (*Peganum Harmala*) family. The intoxicating and hallucinogenic effects of this plant are not as strong as its forerunner. If, indeed, the main ingredient in *haoma* was hops, there must have been some other ingredients in the beverage that gave the consumer the strong hallucinations. What was the ingredient remains to be seen.

Even if the research is still in its early stages, I consider that it is safe to say that the cradle of wine-making is today's Georgia. This is due to the early discovery of cultivated grapes in complex societies dated to the chalcolitic era in Georgia, and also, due to the fact that the inhabitants of these early societies cultivated the vine in order to procure wine for drinking and not grapes for eating, something that took place later – actually in the Bronze Age. I know from sources written in antiquity that Greece took a great interest in the Kingdom of Colchis – the territory of modern western Georgia (Lordkipanidze, 2000, p 11-12). As a result, Greece colonized the coast of Colchis and established trading posts in Phasis (modern-day Poti), Gyenos, and Dioskuria (modern-day Sokhumi). Phasis and Dioskuria became splendid Greek cities dominated by mercantile oligarchies.

These cities became very important trading centers along the Black Sea coast. Wine amphoras have been discovered near Poti (Gamkrelidze, 1992, p 108) which shows that there was a developed export and import wine-trade in existence. This shows that wine was an important and established product in the society's economy during the Grecian era – but it does not indicate when wine became an important economic factor in society. However, just because earlier societies, such as the chalcolithic one, have not left any written records does not mean that wine was not an economic factor. So far, there have been just a few maritime excavations in Georgia along the Black Sea shore line, and if further excavations are allowed with a focus on locating ships and boats from earlier periods, then it might be possible to indicate when wine became an important economic factor in Georgia. I strongly believe that wine was an important economically long before antiquity and, since Georgia was probably visited by people travelling along on the waterways since the Stone Age, discoveries from that period and the Bronze Age would help to shed light on this question.

There are around six hundred species of grapes in Georgia today (Chilashvili, *op. cit.*, 2004, p 198-213). The wine louse (*Phylloxera vastatrix*) that was so devastating for the vineyards in Europe in the late nineteenth century did not affect Georgia to the same extent. This means that even if Georgia has lost some of its species, some ancient ones still exist. It would be very interesting to collect samples from these wine stocks and to analyze them in order to find out how they are related to each other, and also if the ancient stocks are the ancestors of the modern ones. This can be done in cooperation with biologists and plant pathologists that have access to several grape DNA banks in Europe.

With regard to the staple food – bread – there is still a significant amount of work ahead of us in order to map out all the different kinds of bread that exists in the country, and I have not yet completed the search of written sources regarding bread and bread-making. For example, I am currently working on finding out where the 'tone' came from originally, discovering if it indeed has its roots in the old civilizations of the Indus valley and Mesopotamia.

I am also very interested in finding out why there are different varieties of the dish *Khachapuri* in different parts of the country, and also how far back in time I can trace it. As for *Khinkali*, I believe that it originated from China but further research on this question is necessary before any firm conclusions in this regard can be reached. However, I have a working theory about the diffusion of the dish. I think it started to spread with the Mongolians and their invasions. In Georgia, one cannot find *Khinkali* in the western part. I think

that the dish never reached that region of the country due to the fact that the Mongolians never entered the forest which covers its surface. They did not know how to fight a battle in the forest region as they were unfamiliar with forests in their own homeland. It is of great interest that a dish that has a foreign origin is regarded as a national dish. There is a written source from the year 1658 that states that *Khinkali* was made of dry ham of animals (it does not say anything about salting or any other preparation of the meat besides drying) (Sulxan-saba, 1993, p 423). For me, this raises the question as to how, why, and when the dried meat was transformed into the dish we know today as *Khinkali*. I hope that I can answer that question in due course as the research progresses.

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- Alexander Pushkin once said that "Every Georgian dish is a poem".

## On the Descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze (the Son of Bakur)

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All the researchers, who have ever questioned Grigol Bakurianisdze's ethnicity – whether they consider it Georgian or Armenian – have unanimously agreed upon his origin from the province of Tao. Nobody has called into question that standpoint, which was first suggested by N. Marr. In fact, one cannot find any indications on his origin from Tao in the available sources. Having compared the sources with each other, we have come to the conclusion that Grigol belonged to the main branch of the reknowned Georgian royal family of Parnavaziani-Khosroviani (Sasanidz). When the kingship of Kartli had been abolished by persians in the middle of VI century, the family settled down in Kakheti. After one of its members, Nerse I, superseded Guaram the Young, the son of Stepanoz II of the Gorgasliani's Klarjeti branch, on the throne of Kartli's erismtavaris in the 570s, Kakheti still remained the Bakuriani's patrimonial domain. Nerse I and his sons – Stepanoz, Adarnase and Philip – are mentioned as the Bakuriani in the list of erismtavaris in Muktsevai Kartlisa. The Bakuriani were Kartli's erismtavaris till 780s inclusive, when Ashot Bagrationi deprived them of that honor at the end of the century. A Bakuriani, Grigol by name – in our opinion, the smallest son of Nerse II – had to relinquish his rights to the title of Erismtavari of Kartli and content oneself with the rights to his family domain, Kakheti, after a lost battle with Ashot the Kurapatat in the early 9th century. The revolted Donauri deprived Grigol's descendents of their sovereign rights to Kakheti in the early 830s. We suppose that Bakuriani were still considered the noblest feudal family of Kakheti after that, though the sources pass it over in silence. About two centuries later, a Bakuriani, Grigol's father, was serving to Giorgi I and, together with Prince Bagrat, went to Byzantium as a hostage of Emperor Basil. Information maintained in Petritsoni's *Typikon* gives us some reason to surmise that Grigol Bakurianisdze's brother-in-law (his sister's husband), Abas, was brother to King Aghsartan of Kakheti, which means Grigol's close filiation with the family of Kvirikiani – Armenian Bagratuni – ruling in Georgia at the time. We have also specially perused the last part of Muktsevai Kartlisa – the list of erismtavaris – in this connection. The reading of the defective, obscure text is suggested as follows: "Then Nerse the Great and his sons: Philip, and Stepanoz, and Adarnase, and Guaram the Great Bakuriani, and the son of Bal [gh] [a] dadi [Adarnase], and the sons of Adarnase: Stepanoz, and Ashot, and Guaram, the great Eristavis, lived." The brackets represent restored parts and in the word "Bal [gh] [a] dadi" the original "L" is restored as initial "GH." Confusion between "L" and "GH" is caused by the similarity of these two in Georgian-Nuskhuri (Minuscule) writings.

## გრიგოლ ბაკურიანის-ძის წარმომავლობის შესახებ

მანანა სანაძე

საქართველოს უნივერსიტეტი

ყველა მკვლევარი, ვინც კი გრიგოლ ბაკურიანის ძის ეთნიკურ წარმომავლობას შეეხება, იმისდა მიუხედავად მიიჩნევდა მას ქართველად თუ სომეხად, ერთსულოვნად იზიარებდა თვალსაზრისს, მისი ტაოდან წარმომავლობის შესახებ, ეს თვალსაზრისი, რომელიც პირველად ნ. მარმა დაამკვიდრა, არავის სადაოდ არ გაუხდია. სინამდვილეში, წყაროებში არავითარი მითითება გრიგოლის ტაოდან წარმომავლობის შესახებ არ მოგვეპოვება. წყაროების ურთიერთშეჯერების შედეგად, მივედით დასკვნამდე, რომ გრიგოლი ცნობილი ქართული სამეფო საგვარეულოს გოვრგასლიან-ხოსროიანთა (სასანიანთა) მთავარ შტოს ბაკურიან/ბაკურიძეებს ეკუთვნოდა. ეს საგვარეულო VI ს-ის შუა წლებში სპარსელების მიერ ქართლში მეფობის გაუქმების შემდეგ, კახეთში დაემკვიდრა. კახეთი ბაკურიანთა საგვარეულო დომენად დარჩა მას შემდეგაც, რაც მათმა წარმომადგენელმა ნერსე I-მა VII ს-ის 70-იან წლებში ქართლის ერისმთავრის ტახტზე გოვრგასლიან-ბივრიტიანთა კლარჯული შტოს წარმომადგენელი სტეფანოზ II-ის ვაჟი გუარამ ყრმა შეცვალა და ქართლის ერისმთავრის პატივის მიღებასთან ერთად კვლავც ქართლის მმართველ პირველ საგვარეულოდ იქცა. ნერსე I და მისი ვაჟები სტეფანოზი, ადარნასე, ფილიპე და გუარამი ბაკურეანებად არიან მოხსენიებული „მოქცევაი ქართლისაის“ ერისმთავართა ჩამონათვალში ბაკურიანები ქართლის ერისმთავრობას საუკუნეზე მეტ ხანს, VIII ს-ის 80-იანი წლების ჩათვლით ინარჩუნებდნენ, სანამ მათ ეს პატივი იმავე საუკუნის მიწურულში ამოტ ბაგრატიონმა არ წაართვა. IX საუკუნის დასაწყისში ბაკურიანთა საგვარეულოს წარმომადგენელი გრიგოლი, რომელიც, ჩვენი აზრით, ნერსე II-ის უძცროსი ვაჟი იყო, ამოტ კურაპალატთან წაგებული ბრძოლის შემდეგ, იძულებული გახდა ქართლის ერისმთავრობაზე უარი ეთქვა და მხოლოდ საგვარეულო დომენში, კახეთში მთავრობას დასჯერებოდა. დაახლოებით IX საუკუნის 30-იან წლებში გრიგოლის შთამომავლებს კახეთის მთავრობა წანარმა დონაურებმა წაართვეს. ამის შემდეგაც ბაკურიანები, უნდა ვივარაუდოთ, კახეთის უმსხვილეს ფეოდალურ საგვარეულოდ რჩებოდნენ, თუმცა მათ შესახებ წყაროებში ცნობები აღარ მოგვეპოვება. თითქმის ორი საუკუნის შემდეგ ამ საგვარეულოს წარმომადგენელი გრიგოლის მამა ბაკურიანი იმყოფება გიორგი I-ის ამაღლაში და უფლისწულ ბაგრატთან ერთად ბასილ კეისარს მძევლად მიჰყავს ბიზანტიაში. „პეტრიწონის ტიპიკონში“ დაცული ცნობა საფუძველს გვაძლევს ვივარაუდოთ, რომ გრიგოლ ბაკურიანის-ძის სიძე (დის ქმარი) აბასი იყო კახეთის მეფის აღსართანის ძმა. შესაბამისად, გრიგოლი ახლო ნათესაურ კავშირში იმყოფებოდა სომეხ ბაგრატუნთა საქართველოში მმართველ კვირიკიანთა საგვარეულოსთან. სტატიის მიხედვით, ციხეა შესწავლილი „მოქცევაი ქართლისაის“ ქრონიკის ბოლო ნაწილი—ერისმთავართა ჩამონათვალი და შემოთავაზებულია ტექსტის დაზიანებული და ამის შედეგად გაუგებარი ადგილის შემდეგი წაკითხვა: „... მერმე ნერსე დიდი და ძენი მისნი: ფილიპე, და სტეფანოზ, და ადარნასე, და გუარამ დიდი ბაკურეანი; და ძმ ბა[ლ][ა]დადისი [ადარნასე], და ძენი ადარნერსესნი: სტეფანოზ, და ამოტ, და გუარამ. დიდ-დიდნი ერისთავნი ესთენ იყვნეს.“ ოთხკუთხა ფორჩხილებში მოცემულია აღდგენილი ადგილები, ხოლო სიტყვა „ბადადისი“ „დედნისეული“ „ლ“-ს ნაცვლად აღდგენილია პირვანდელი „ლ“. „ლ“ და „ლ“ არევა გამოწვეულია ქართულ-ნუსხურ დამწერლობაში ამ ორი ასოს მსგავსებით.

The descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze has been a disputable issue for scholars for a long time. Before the publication of the Greek edition of the Typicon of the Petritsoni Monastery there were only two notes on the descent of the Great Byzantine official of XI century. In her historical work "The Alexiad", Anna Comnenus – a Byzantine princess and historian the daughter of Caesar Alexius Comnenus - notes that Grigol "belongs to a noble Armenian family" (Komnina, A. 1965. p. 465; Georgica, VI, p. 60). In historical work Jamanakagrutiun – Chronicles, Mate Urkhaets, an Armenian historian, calls Grigol Bakurianisdze "Georgian by tribe" (Մարթնու Ռւրիսանցի, 1898. p.148). It should be pointed out that Anna Comnenus was born in December, 1083, while Grigol Bakurianisdze was killed in a fight with Pechenegs in 1086. In this circumstances, the princess and historian was not personally acquainted with Grigol Bakurianisdze. When the latter passed away, she was not even three years old. Apart from the Byzantine historians and public officials, from their imperial height, used to make mistakes in mentioning the nationality of people of non-Greek origin. We can put forward lots of examples illustrating this. As for Mate Urhaets, he was a younger contemporary of Grigol and was an Armenian at the same time. Undoubtedly, he would have known perfectly well whether a political figure of his epoch was Georgian or Armenian by tribe.

In 1888, in Leipzig, G. Museon published a new translation of the Greek version of the Typicon of the Petritsoni Monastery and in 1904, Luis Petit published the original of the translation (Louis Petit, Typicon de Gregoire Paeurianos ...). The published "original" was the XVIII century copy of the Petritsoni Monastery of the XIII century copy. However, it did give scholars an opportunity to get acquainted with the work. After the publication of the Greek version of the Typicon, the issue of the descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze seemed to be clarified when Grigol Bakurianisdze mentioned that he was "Georgian by origin" and in this way he called himself Georgian. This should have explained all issues and put an end to the debate over the descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze. However, N. Marr put forward a new vision of the issue. In his work "Аркауи Монгольское Название Христиан, В Связи с Вопросом Об Армянах-Халкедонитов", which was published in 1905, he stressed that Grigol Bakurianisdze may have called himself Georgian because he was Kalkedonit, the same as Aurtherodox by faith (Marr, N. 1906. p. 18-25). The fact is that the re-written copy of the Greek version says that the Typicon of the Petritsoni Monastery was written in Greek, Georgian and Armenian. Similarly, Grigol made his handwork in these languages: Greek, Georgian and Armenian. It's true, as a Byzantine official, Grigol was in charge of Armenian countries that were part of Byzantium for a significant period of his life; it was still unusual why he - Georgian by origin, as he puts it himself, created the

third Armenian version of the Typicon and why he signed it in Armenian. The above-given point of N. Mar seemed to explain the contradiction. That is why the version turned out viable. Since then, some scholars have considered Grigol to be Georgian (Protitch, A, 1923. p. 17; Honigmann, E. 1953. p. 222). Others believe he was Armenian (Grabar, A. 1922. pp. 121-122; Uspenski, 1948. p. 75; Hans Georg Beck, 1959. p. 218).

As it later turned out, the Petritsoni Monastery Typicon does not exist any more. The original seems to have been seriously damaged as early as XIII century. Therefore, the monks of the Monastery copied the Greek and the Georgian versions of it. These versions were stitched in the Koraisi Library on the Island of Kios. The discovery of a copy of the Georgian version brought more clarity into the research on the descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze. In the Georgian version of the Typicon, there is no indication of the existence of the Armenian version. In addition, the Georgian version is the one that has been preserved unchanged. It has been copied from the original of 1803 while the Greek text does contain changes (Shanidze, 1971. pp. 21-40 ). Akaki Shanidze, the publisher of the Georgian version considers that a information on the Armenian version of the Typicon and the Armenian sign of Grigol Bakurianisdze have been entered by the person who copied the Greek version. Seemingly, the copier did not know Georgian and considered the Georgian version to be Armenian (Shanidze, 1971. pp. 21-40 ).

Armenian historians P. Muradian (Muradian, 1968. pp. 103-118) and V. Arutinova-Fidanian (*Типик Григория Пакуриана*, 1978) tried to substantiate the Armenian descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze. Georgian scholars A. Shanidze (Shanidze, 1979. pp. 173-180), G. Gozalashvili (Gozalashvili, 1970. pp. 167-192), L. Menabde (Menabde, 1980. pp. 253-276) and N. Lomouri (Lomouri, 1981. p. 16) prove that Grigol Bakurianidze was of Georgian descent. There is also a lack of unanimity among Russian and Western scholars. Some of them agree to the opinion of N. Mar and V. Arutinova-Fidanian and consider Grigol Bakurianisdze to be an Armenian Kalkedonit, while others believe that the words of Grigol Bakurianisdze “Georgian by origin” prove the Georgian descent of the latter.

All scholars, who have touched on the ethnicity of Grigol Bakurianisdze, no matter whether they considered him Armenian or Georgian, unanimously agreed that he was from Tao. This opinion, which was first introduced by N. Mar, has never been questioned. It is interesting to note that in reality in historical sources there is no indication on the descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze from Tao.

In the Typicon Grigol Bakurianisdze provides the following information on his descent:

“... In the Petritsoni Monastery that was described and proven by an order of me - Grigol, by the will of God, the Sevastros and Megas Domestikos of all the West, the desired son of Bakuriani - the Sovereign of Eristavis (the corresponding part of the Greek text reads: “the own son of blessed Bakuriani - the bright Eristavteristavi”) of the East and of Georgians... and the kin of my brother - the desired Abaz Magistratos” (Shanidze, p. 62 (2)).

“Fathers and brothers who live in the present Monastery, since we are Georgian by kindred, strong and brought up as fighters... “ (Shanidze, p. 61 (4))

“Since our blessed father passed away early and left us orphan little and not mature by age, our mother with whim distributed all that our father has gained, all his property and gave to other siblings - our sisters and left us portionless, without estates. Our sisters took all their portions and went to their husbands. The squandered all the property in strange parts and lost all”

Me too, with my servants and rudunebi, was looking for and a living place in Armenia, Georgia and sasarkinozeti and later in Greece. And I spent a long time this way. And all this - whatever I have gained and deserved, the honour of an official bestowed upon me - all that happened to me was God’s will and the merit of the prayers of my parents, as well as the long pains, troubles and bloodshed I have gone through” (Shanidze, p. 101 (8-9)).

“And went for three days to Msgepsi for Sepa: on one day -for my father Bakuriani, on another day - for the brother of my father Khosrovan, and on the third day - for the nephew of my father Bakuriani” (Shanidze, p. 116 (2)).

“Other gold ring indicated I were the sovereign of Prastins as I wished, my relatives and my servants, since they were Armenian by faith” (Shanidze, p. 123).

“Nuns of my Monastery are Georgian by family name” (Shanidze, p. 126 (3)).

“Those who entered the Fortress of Periton that was the possession of Abaz, the brother of Aghsartan, our relative by marriage...” (Shanidze, p. 71 (7)).

The quotations give us a clear picture of the following: 1. Grigol could distinguish between nationalities: by origin and by faith. 2. He refers to Armenians as to people related to him by faith, and not relatives. There must have been many people like this in Georgia of XI century, when a significant part of Kvemo Kartli was occupied by Armenians. It is obvious that the two-century Armenian rule in Georgia could not have passed without leaving a trace. Some noblemen from Kvemo Kartli would have converted to Monophysitism - the faith of Armenians. Apart from that, at the mentioned time Kakheti was ruled by the Kvirikian and we cannot exclude that Gagik the King of Kakheti and Aghsartan - his son, Armenians by father were also Monophysitists. The brother of Aghsartan and his close relatives must have been Monophysitists, too. In general, we have to make one point. “The Iberian community” of

Byzantium was never actually a part of Georgia, not counting relatively short historical periods. The Iberian community used to be a part of Byzantium. In such a case, if the population of this part was also Armenian, it is not clear why the Armenian speaking population of Byzantium had the Georgian-Kalkedonuri religious service and not the Greek-Kalkedonuri one.

The historians whose only proof of the Georgian descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze is his Kalkedonitoba, cannot actually illustrate even one case when a person with an undoubtedly Armenian descent calls himself "Georgian" because of Kalkedonitoba.

Armenian sources usually give the name of Duophysitists either to Kalkedonits or to people of Greek faith.

3. The quintessence of all the stated is that the Typicon of the Petritsoni Monastery does not seem to give any evidence on where Grigol descended from. All the scholars following N. Mar without an exception repeated the groundless version of N. Mar on the descent of Grigol from Tao - without giving the version any critical consideration. The list of the estates that Grigol owned, including the one in Tao, does not help us in any way determine his descent. It is quite clear from the information presented by Grigol that his mother had left his brother and himself "without an estate". The brothers started serving the Byzantine Caesar and got all their estates from the latter. Therefore, declaring that Grigol was from Tao, based on the fact that he had been given an estate there by Byzantine Caesar - would be absolutely groundless. There is an opinion, according to which Byzantine Caesars granted estates to those who served them in the motherlands of the latter. Firstly, this did not always happen and there are lots of cases illustrating this. In addition, what is the most important, whenever such a fact did occur, the territories where estates were granted were subordinated to Byzantium. It is clear that if Grigol were from, let's say, Kakheti or Kartli, Caesar would have been unable to grant him an estate here for the simple reason that those parts were not under his control. The fact that the Byzantine Caesar granted estates to Grigol in the Armenian and Georgian parts within the borders of Byzantium can only corroborate that the Caesar granted estates to people in places that were close to the motherlands of the latter, however under Byzantine control.

The only information that might be an attempt to confirm the descent of Grigol in Tao is the note of Kedrene (Skilitsa) on the father of Grigol. The Byzantine historian "David Kurapalate passed away and made the King (Caesar Basil implied) his heir and the owner of his possessions. When the latter went to Iberia, he ascertained the property left to him, assured Giorgi, the brother of the last Kurapalate and the ruler of internal Iberia, to be content with his estates and not invade those that did not belong to him. He concluded a truce with him, took his son captive and left for Phoenicia. He took with him

noblemen from Iberia, the highest ranking of them were Fevdat and Fers the Bakuriani ..." (Georgica, 1963. p. 46).

Later, while describing a war with Giorgi I, Kedrene notes: "as Giorgi, the sovereign of Abazgia violated the agreement concluded with the Romans, and invaded the Roman borders, the King launched a campaign against him with all his army... after that there was the second fight... Giorgi escaped to the mountains in Iberia. After a while, he conducted talks with the king (Caesar Basil), gave him some parts of the country that the latter wished for and concluded an armistice with him. He also sent his son Bagrat with him as a captive. The King conferred the title of Magistros upon Bagrat and sent him back" (Georgica, 1963. p. 46).

As we can see, Kedrene uses various sources to get information on the relations of the kings of Georgia (Bagrat III, Giorgi I) with Caesar Basil. Therefore, though he presents the story of Caesar Basil coming to Georgia twice: once while narrating the death of David Kurapalate in 1001 and the second time while describing a war with Giorgi I in 1021 – he makes an important mistake in while using the sources. The mistakes were caused by his superficial knowledge of the political situation in Georgia. From the two parts of the story of Kedrene mentioned above, the second narrates the developments of 1021, i.e. the story of captivation of Prince Bagrat, while the first episode is a mixture and blending of Caesar Basil's entrance of Georgia in 1001 and 1021. The episode narrates how Caesar came to Georgia owing to the death of David Kurapalate in 1021, and how Prince Bagrat the son of Giorgi was taken captive, which happened in 1022. Kedre blends the list of the distinguished people whom Caesar Basil took with him at different times. We believe that the Caesar took Prince Bagrat and Bakuriani at the same time and Fevdat and Fers - the sons of Jojik at a different time - twenty years before that, in 1001 when he first came to Georgia. It is clear the Fers was at Caesar's court long before Bagrat was taken captive. The fact that Fers was decapitated a little earlier before the developments, because of his participation in the uprising against Caesar.

Hence, out of the people listed above, the Caesar of Byzantium could only have taken with him Bakuriani, not brother Jojikisdze when he took Bagrat prisoner. The mentioning of the people together by Kadrene is the result of a mistake of Byzantine historians that we have mentioned above.

It is clear that Bactrian settled near Kghrene is the father of Grigol. Firstly, Grigol calls himself Bakurianisdze. Apart from this, Caesar conferred the title of a Petrikios on Bakuriani as well as Pevghate and Persi the Jojikidze. The title corresponds to the Georgian title "To the Head of Eristavis, the God". This is the title that Grigol refers to his father with. The chronology of devel-

opments here is matching. Bakuriani, who left Georgia with Prince Bagrat to serve Caesar, presumably came back to Georgia with the heir of the throne in 1025. Indeed, he should have had Grigol in 1026-1027. As we know, by 1083, the creation of the Petritsoni Typicon, Grigol calls himself old which makes us conjecture that he should not have been younger than 50 (Orbeliani, 1991. pp. 360-361). If we also consider that in 1086 he personally participated in a combat and got killed, we should suppose that he would not have been much older than 60. We will not probably be mistaken much if we say that Grigol was 58-60 when he died. Hence, at the time of creation of the Tipikoni, Grigol should have been 55-57 years old.

In this way, it is clear that Bakuriani, the son of Grigol was taken by Caesar Basil when the latter took Prince Bagrat captive. This is quiet natural. Giorgi I would not have his only son and heir go captive alone and would have sent a big retinue- compiled of representatives of the brightest families in Georgia - to accompany him. In this way, the information of Kadrne is useless in determining which part of Georgia Grigol was from. The information is only another proof of Grigol Bakurinisdze's belonging to one of the brightest families in Georgia. The fact that Caesar Basil took captives from South-Western Georgia does not give any information on the descent of the latter. There were hostilities in the place, truce talks and Caesar took captives from here, which, again, is quite normal. We should keep it in mind that Giorgi was supported by the whole army of Georgia in his fight. „Tsanarni and Shakni“ the same „Kakhni and Herni“ (Kartlis Tskhovreba, 1955. pp. 285,383) were among the fighters. In this way, the Tao descent of Grigol Bakurianisdze is not corroborated by historical sources.

There is some information on the origin of Grigol in the name of his father and the family name Bakuriani itself. Bakuriani means “the son of Bakur”. Such a formation of family names seems to be quite common in the Georgia of V-X centuries. Later it is replaced by adding the suffixes “dze” (son) and “shvili” (son, daughter). The formation of a family name with the suffix from the father's name is the only way in “Matiane Kartlisamdeli”, the oldest part of Kartlis Tskhovreba. We date this part back to no later than I half of VIII century. E. g. Juansher Juansherian, Agharsan Agharnersian, Nerse Nersian... Such a formation of family names is common in a relatively later period, too. E. g.: Marushian, Shavlian (Shavle-Savle)... The family name Areshian, mentioned by the historian of David the Builder, is notable in this respect. It comes from the name of a Heri nobleman – Aresh. The offspring of Aresh were Areshian and Baram. As we can see, we are facing an identical situation in this case. First, a family name comes from a name Aresh (like Bakuriani – from Bakur). Later, Bakuriani and Areshian become first names within the respec-

tive families. In this way, we have Areshian - a representative of the Areshian Family and Bakuriani – a representative of the Bakuriani family, i. e. Areshian Areshian, Bakuriani Bakuriani (the cousin of Grigol, the father of Grigol). Both these family names are later formed with “dze” and “shvili”. In Vakhusti’s work we come across these surnames in the forms of Areshidze and Bakurisdze.

In this way, Grigol belonged to a Georgian noble family Bakuriani-Bakurianisdze. What information has been preserved about this family? This family originated from the son of Vakhtang Gorgasali and the king following him Darchil/Archil II. This king of Kartli was the son of Vakhtang and his Persian wife Balandukht. This king of Kartli is commonly referred to as Dachi Ujarmeli in sources. Based on Kartlis Tskhovreba, the ruling of Kartli by Persians ended with the death of one of the descendants of King Dachi – Bakur. After that the sons of Bakur- a representative of this main branch of the Gorgasali-Parnavazi – settled in Kakheti and started off the Bakurianisdze, the same Bakuriani family (Kartlis Tskhovreba, 1955. pp. 217,225).

Nerse Bakurisdze - one of the representatives of this family – was the Erismtavari of Kartli in the 70-80s of VII century (Draskhanakerteli, 1937. p. 14; Sanadze, 2000. pp. 15-23). Nerse and his offspring are mentioned as Bakuriani in Moktsevai Kartlisai. We believe that right here is necessary to dwell on Nerse Bakurisdze – the same Bakuriani, i. e. the Nerse of Moktsevai Kartlisai. Z. Aleksidze identifies him with Nerse II (Alexidze, 2001. pp. 311-315) – the Erismtavari of Kartli of the time of Abo Tbileli, which is a mistake, of course. The fact that Nerse II had sons Philip and Agsharane is not enough for such identification.

All the people mentioned in the respective part of Moktsevai Kartlisai, including Aghsartan with his sons Ashot and Gurgen, belonged to the verge of VII-VIII centuries, the beginning of VIII century. As for the Nerse mentioned in Moktsevai Kartlisai, he is the grandfather of Nerse – the Erismtavari of Kartli of the period of Abo Tbileli – the father of his father Aghsartan (Sanadze, p. 21). The thing is that it was Nerse I, who had a son called Stepanoz, the same sovereign of Kartli Stepanoz III (710 – 738), the father of Mir and Archil (Sanadze, p. 21; Sanadze, (a); Sanadze (b); Saqartvelos Sapatrarko, 2001, p. 64 ). As for Nerse II, the Eristmavari of Kartli of the period of Abo Tbileli, Stepanoz (the same Stepanoz IV) was his niece and not his son.

Here we would like to bring clarity to one more issue. Based on Sumbat Davitisdze, son of David, Nerse and his offspring were considered Bagrationi, which is not true. Sumbath Davitisdze was three centuries away from the period of Nerse I and used Moktsevai Kartlisai in the respective part of his work. While using it, he made a mistake typical of an old Georgian chronicler. Namely, he considered the Eristavis coming one after another on the list to be fathers and sons. In reality, Moktsevai Kartlisai notes:

1. Shatberduli List: „... and after him the Eristavi was Guaram Kurapalate 6 and the younger Guaram 7 and after them Arshusha Kurapalate 8 and Varaz Bakur apai Patrikioz who converted the Garbanelni 9 and later Nerse [10] with his sons: Philipe 11, Stepanoz 12, Adarnese 13, Guaram 14 and Bakureani Ba[L]dadisi 15 and the sons of Adarnese: Stepanoz 16, and Ashot Kurapalate 17, and Guaram 18. These were the great Eristavis” (Zveli Kartuli Agiografia, I. p. 97).

2. Chelishuri List: „... and after him the Eristavi was Guaram Kurapalate 6 and the youngest Guaram 7 and after them Arshusha Kurapalate 8 and Varaz Bakur apai Patrikioz who converted the Garbanelni 9 and later Nerse [10] and his sons: Philipe 11, Stepanoz 12, Adarnese 13, Guaram 14 and Bakureani Badadisi and the sons of Adarnese Stepanoz 16, Ashot Kurapalate 17, and Guaram 18. These were the great Eristavis” (Zveli Kartuli Agiografia, I. p. 97).

3. Sina Manuscript: „... and after him the Eristavi was Guaram Kurapalate and the young Guaram and after them Arshusha Kurapalate and Varaz Bakur apai Patrikioz who converted the Garbanelni and then Nerse the Great and his sons: Philipe, and Stepanoz, and Adarnese, and Guaram the Great Bakureani, son of Ba[L]dadisi, and the sons of Adarnese Stepanoz, and Ashot Kurapalate, and Guaram. These were the great Eristavis” (Aleksidze, 2001. pp. 82-83).

If we compare the texts it will be obvious that: 1. the “Baldadisa and not “Badadisi” is a more correct form, since it was easier to miss a letter in writing than to add one (Compare, Bar(da)banelebi). 2. the form Baghdadisi is a distorted version of Bagh(a)dadi, the same Bag(a)dadisi that was later a basis for Bagrat-uni. 2. Baldadadisi misses Adarnese, i.e. the text has to be restored in the following way: „ ... and later Nerse the great with his sons: Philip, Stepanoz, Adarnese, and Guaram the Great Bakuriani and Bagh(a)dadisi (Adarnese) and the sons of Adarnese Stepanoz, and Ashot and Guaram. These were the great Eristavis” (Sanadze, May 15, 2003; Collected Works, May 27-30, 2003. pp. 31-34).

Hence, we deal with two families: Nerse and his son Bakuriani (the Nersiani of Kartlis Tskhovreba)(Kartlis Tskhovreba, I, p. 241) and the offspring Adarnese (the same Agharnersiani of Kartlis Tskhovreba) (Kartlis Tskhovreba, I, p. 242).

The Bakuriani: Nerse I, Stepanoz III, Mir, Archil, Juansher, Nerse II, Stepanoz IV (by mother’s line) are Georgian Erismtavaris almost by the end of VIII century. Before Ashot Kurapalate (the family of Bagration-Adarnersian) took away the position of Erismtavari from them. Kartlis Tskhovreba provides precise information when it mentions that after Stepanoz Erismtavari the Byzantine Caesar gave the title of Erismtavari to the Bakurisdze, i. e. the

Bakuriani. Yet, the chronicler makes one mistake. This fact happened not after Stepanoz II was Eristavi, not Stepanoz I. Nerse – not Adarnese - was the first Eristavi among the Bakuriani. And the Byzantine emperor to raise Nerse Bakuriani to the Eristavi throne was Constantine 668-685 and not Herecle (Sanadze, Kartli on the Biarders of VII VIII Centuries. p. 17).

Ashot, the son of Aghasran mentioned on the list of Erismtavaris of Moktsevai Kartlisai, is the father of the great Ashot Kurapalate (died in 826). It is a fact that the author of the Shatverduli collection of X century, mixed him with Ashot Kurapalate by mistake, and added “Kurapalate” to his name in the text.

Here we would like to briefly touch on the issue of Agharnersian, the same Baghaghad (Bagrationi). Kartlis Tsovreba contains the following data on the father of Ashot Kurapalate Adarnase: “At the time there came one sovereign (Erismtavari Archil is implied) who was a relative of David Prophet. His name was Agharsane. He was the nephew of Aghasrane the Blind, whose father was the relative of Bagratonian and whom the Greeks crowned as the Erismtavari of the Armenian parts. He was taken captive to Klarjeti and subjugated there together with the sons of Guaram Kurapalate” (Kartlis Tskhovreba, 1942. p. 154).

The inscription on one of the manuscripts discovered on Sina Mountain by the expedition of the Institute of Manuscripts provides enough information to understand the above-given text.

The inscription reads: “when the blessed and great mampali Aghasrane – the son of Stepanoz, the nephew of Dimitri, the nephew of the great Guram - passed away and his blessed wife – Queen Latavra, the daughter of Stepanoz, sister of Aghsartan the mother of Bagratuniani and Kurapalate passed away on the 2 of January after twenty years, was buried in Jvari, St Mary, by the portion of her daughter and son (Aleksidze, 2002. p. 23-36).

While comparing the texts we can see that Agharsane, the father of Ashot Kurapalate, was the grandson of Adarnese the Blind (Aleksidze, 2002. p. 23-36). If we look at the chronology, the Adarnese Blind will appear as living in VII-VII centuries, a contemporary of Nerse Bakurisdze and his sons mentioned in the Moktsevai: Stepanoz, Ashot and Guaram should have been the contemporaries of Mir and Archil – the sons of Stepanoz. To be more precise, Adarnese, the father of Ashot Kurapalate and grandson of Aghasran the Blind, was the young contemporary of Archil. As for the word “father” , he was father as used to refer to Adarnese the Blind, in this case it stands for the person who started the family, the forefather, and not a real father. The insertion of Murvan the Deaf belongs to a later time. Otherwise, the two parts convey the same information. The forefather of Agharsane the Blind, the

grandfather of Agharsane the father of Ashot, a grandfather or the father of the grandfather, one of the representatives of the Armenian Bagratuni by Moktsevai Kartlisai the son of Baghdad came to Kartli with the sons of Guaram Kurapalate, to be more precise, the sons of Guaram: the Erismtavari of Kartli Stepanoz, his brother Demetre and the son of Stepanoz Agharsane, who were representatives (Sanadze, 2002. 18-19. pp. 41) of Baghdad-Bivriant in their turn and became the relative of Stepanoz by making his son marry Latavra, the daughter of Stepanoz. In this way, two branches of Bagghads: the Georgian Bivritiani and Armenian Bagratun – merged into one. If the text of Kartli Tskhovreba uses the word “father” in a generic sense, to mean a forefather, the inscription of the Sina Mountain Manuscript uses the word “mother” in the same sense.

The respective part of Kartlis Tskhovreba was wrongly interpreted by Vardan, an Armenian historian of XIII century. He changed Adarnase the Blind, whom he was not informed about, to Ashot the Blind, whom he knew from history. Since, according to Kartlis Tskhovreba, Adarnase was the nephew of the person whose name was changed to Ashot the Blind (the list of Anas). The historian considered Vasak to be his father, based on simple calculations. I.e. he carried out scientific research and established a fact (Areveltsi, 2002. pp. 103, 106). Many of the modern historians repeated the mistake of Vardan. After the publication of the inscription of the Sina Manuscript, it became clear that this opinion was groundless.

All the above mentioned explains the family conflict that took place when the Erismtavari of Kartli (the son and her or Archil Erismtavri) Juansher married Latavra (the daughter of Aghsarane Bagrationi). The thing is that this branch of the offspring of Baghdad did not belong to royal family of Kartli Khosroian-Parnavazian, the same Sasanian-Parnavazian. Such were 1. only the offspring of Vakhtang Gorgasali: the Bakuriani from Kakheti, 2. the Bivritian-Gorgasalian, the same offspring of Guaram Kurapalate in Klarjeti; 3. the offspring of Rev the son of Mirian – the Revians in Kakheti, who we believe were the same Ruvistavi or Rustaveli (Sanadze, *Kartlis Eristavebi...*p. 31). Shota Rustaveli (Beradze, Sanadze, 2003. p. 191) should be from the same family and last – 4 the Perozian. As for the sons of Baghdad, who became the relatives of Erismtavari Stepanoz by marriage and whose relation with him could be defined as feudal dependence, no doubt their position was lower than that of the Bakuriani, who led even in the other Parnavazianta royal branch as the representatives of the senior branch.

Let us come back to the family of the Bakuriani again. Grigol, the nobleman of Kakheti, who fought Ashot for Shida Kartli and the honour of the Erismtavari of Kartli - should have been Bakuriani. What does this assump-

tion give us? First, as it has already been mentioned that the Bakuriani are a Kakhetian branch of the Parnavazian-Khosroians. Nerse, being the Erismtavari of Kakheti, ascends the throne of Kakheti. It is a fact that Kakheti remains their domain in the later period, too. (Let us recall the control over Kakheti by Archil Erismtavari – the grandson of Nesre I, Juansher - the son of the latter and the following Erismtavari). Both sons of Nesre pass away during his lifetime: Adarnase (called after his grandfather) – 783 and Philim - 784 (called after his uncle) (Aleksidze, p. 314). Z Aleksidze, the publisher of the Sina Monuscrip inscription, considers (Aleksidze, p. 314) them both Erismtavaris, for some reason. Yet, according to the manuscript, if a scholar does not have additional information, the note cannot be relied upon. Just the opposite, it is clear that the brothers did not have the honour of Erismtavari. Al Mahdi (775-785), angry with Nerse, deprived the family of the latter of the title of Erismtavari and conferred the title on the representative of the same family Stepanoz. Stepanoz was not only the nephew of Nerse but also the son of his cousin, too. We believe so as we consider Gurge - his father, the Eristavt-eristavi to be the grandson of Nerse. Of course, it is hard to say for sure from which specific family of the Bakuriani, a Kakhetian nobleman Grigol comes from. We can only make a conjecture in this case, too: we believe that he was the younger son of Nerse. 1. This was the first name in the family - a person was called Grigol for the first time. If we recall that Nerse had children who had the name of their father and his brother, presumably he called his young son the name of his father-in-law. We know that the nephew of the wife of Nesre was Grigol (Grigol Khandzteli) which is an indication that the name of Grigol's father-in-law was Grigol. Which family did Nerse's wife belong to, if her father's name was Grigol? It is obvious that Nerse would only have married a royal person. We only know one royal family where there was a name Grigol. This is the Revian, the same Ruvistavian family (Kartlis Tskhovreba, I. p. 159). In this way, the name Grigol appears in the Bakuriani family from the Revian family and the first person to have this name is the young son of Nerse Grigol Bakuriani who, after his family lost the Erismtavari title, was the Kakheti principal in VIII-IX centuries.

Later Tsanari Donauris take power away from Bakuriani-Bakurianisdzes in Kakheti. The former had the title Chorepiskopos. After that, the history of the Bakuriani family is not known for the following two centuries. They appear in sources again in the retinue of King Giorgi. This is Bakuriani, the father of Grigol Bakurianisdze, whom we have already mentioned above.

As we remember Grigol's father passed away early and Grigol's mother left him and his brother Abaz without an estate – She had given all the estate to her daughters as dowry. The husband of one of the daughters, Abaz, was

the brother of Aghsartan, according to Grigol. It is clear in the respective part of the text that Aghsartan was a famous person. This part does not need further elucidation. The only person who would correspond to the description is Aghsartan - the King of Kakheti, the son of Gagik, and the grandson of David - the great king of Tashir-Dzorageti. If this assumption is right, the relatives of Grigol on his sister's side were the Kvirikian of Tashir-Dzhorageti and Kakheti. This clarifies who the people, referred to by Grigol as his relatives "of Armenian faith", actually were. Here, we would like to remember one more note that Grigol Bakurianisdze provides about himself. "Me too, with my servants and rudunebi, was looking for a living place in Armenia, in Georgia and Sasarkinozeti (Muslim World) and later in Greece" (Shanidze, *Georgian Monastery in Bulgaria...* p. 101 (8-9)). As we can see Grigol served in Armenia and later in Georgia before serving in Greece, i. e. the Caesar of Byzantium. Which Armenia does he imply in this case? From 1021 the Kingdom of Vaspu-rakan was a part of Byzantium. Byzantium joined in the Kingdom of Shirak formally from 1041 and *de facto* from 1045 (after the captivation of Gagik). Thus, for a man born in about 1026-1027 the only Armenia (not counting the Kingdom of Vananda, which, however, is not referred to as Armenia by Georgian sources and hence, Georgian of the historical period in question) where a teenager of 17-18 could have started serving in 1043-1044 and also referred to Georgians as the Armenians of this Kingdom, could have been Shatir-Dzorageti. In reality, Gagik (1037 – 1058), the son of David Umitsatsklo (990 – 1048) ruled over the United Kingdom of Kakheti and Hereti at that time and it would not have been difficult for a representatives of the Kakhetian family to gain a good position and the due honour at the court of the father-king.

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## From the History of the Foreign Policy of Georgian Kings in the 1<sup>st</sup> Half of the 14<sup>th</sup> Century

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*The present paper focuses on the diplomatic relations between Georgia and the Sultan of Egypt. The Georgian envoys were sent to Egypt several times – in 1305/6, 1310/11, 1316/7, 1320. Their goal was restitution of the Monastery of the Holy Cross in Jerusalem confiscated in 1270s by Baybars I, the Sultan of Mamluk Egypt. Considering the issue the author of the paper comes to the following conclusions:*

*In all cases the envoys were sent by the king of the West Georgia, Constantine, son to David, who achieved the goal in negotiations with the Mamluk Sultan;*

*Giorgi the Brilliant began his activities on the Holy Land after establishing peaceful relations between Ilkhans and Mamluk Sultan under the treaty concluded in 1323. The latter was carried out with the active part of Giorgi V. Giorgi the Brilliant got independence by the flexible diplomatic policy, alliance with Ilkhans in the confrontation between the Golden Horde and Ilkhans and determining his right function in that situation;*

*“King of kings” David, who is mentioned is a renovator of the Monastery of the Holy Cross in the bead-roll of the Monastery, is not David VIII, as it was supposed in the scholarly literature, but David IX, son of Giorgi the Brilliant.*

### ქართველი მეფეების საგარეო პოლიტიკის ისტორიიდან

#### მე-14 საუკუნის პირველ ნახევარში

გიული ალასანია

საქართველოს უნივერსიტეტი

*სტატიაში განხილულია ქართველი მეფეების დიპლომატიური ურთიერთობა ეგვიპტის სულთანებთან. ქართველი ელჩები გაიგზავნენ ეგვიპტეში რამდენიმეჯერ: 1305/6, 1310/11, 1316/17, 1320 წლებში. მათი მიზანი იყო იერუსალიმში ჯვრის მონასტრის გამოხსნა მუსლიმანთაგან. აღნიშნული მონასტერი ჩამოერთვა ქართველებს ეგვიპტის სულთანმა ბეიბარს I-მა, 1270-იან წლებში. განხილული წყაროების საფუძველზე სტატიის ავტორი მიდის შემდეგ დასკვნებამდე:*

*ელჩებს ყველა შემთხვევაში აგზავნიდნენ დასავლეთ საქართველოს მეფე, დავით ნარინის შვილი, კონსტანტინე, რომელმაც მიაღწია მიზანს მაძლუქ სულთანებთან მოლაპარაკებაში და დააბრუნებინა ჯვრის მონასტერი ქართველებსათვის;*

გიორგი V აქტიურ ურთიერთობას წმიდა მიწასთან იწყებს მხოლოდ 1323 წლიდან, მას შემდეგ, რაც მისი მონაწილეობით დაიდო ზავი ილხანებსა და მამლუქ სულთანს შორის;

გიორგი ბრწყინვალემ მოიპოვა დამოუკიდებლობა მოქნილი დიპლომატიური პოლიტიკით, ილხანებთან მოკავშირეობით ოქროს ურდოსა და ილხანების დაპირისპირებაში და არსებულ ვითარებაში თავისი ფუნქციის სწორად განსაზღვრით;

“მეფეთა მეფე” დავითი, რომელიც მოხსენიებულია მონასტრის აღაპში როგორც ჯვრის მონასტრის მეორედ აღმშენებელი, არ არის დავით VIII, როგორც ეს ნავარაუდევია სამეცნიერო ლიტერატურაში, არამედ დავით IX, გიორგი ბრწყინვალეს შვილი.

The present work is contemplation on some episodes from the history of Georgia in the first half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century – the time of momentous triumph. It is the period when Mongol rule over Eastern Georgia came to an end, the country restored its political integrity, and talks on the protection of the rights of Georgians on the Holy Land - one of such rights being the deliverance of the monastery of the Holy Cross in Jerusalem - completed successfully.

Some considerations established in historiography and different views on the same facts, often caused by scarcity and insufficiency of resources and consequently miscellaneous interpretation of sources – have drawn our attention. The purpose of the current study is not to bring new original materials into scientific circulation. Rather, it is to present a different reading of some historical sources and hence to specify some facts, taking into consideration the international context of the time.

First of all, it concerns the relation of Georgian kings with the sultans of Egypt that was followed by the return of the monastery of the Holy Cross in Jerusalem, seized by Muslims, to Georgians. In the Georgian historiography three potential different dates are mentioned to denote this fact: 1305, 1310 and the 1320s. The first version is the most supported of all [1, 208-216; 2, 95; 3, 47; 4, 79; 5, 263, 6, 43, 48; 7, 697; 8, 102; 9, 482-483; 10, 83; 11, 26-27; 12, 103].

It has been mentioned many times that according to the notes of Arab historians: Baybars al-Mansuri (approx. 1247-1312), Shihab al-Din al-Nuwayri (died in 733/1333), al-Maqrizi (1364-1442) and al-‘Ayni (died in 1451), in 705/ 24.07.1305\_12.07.1306 and 710/31.05.1310\_19.05.1311, Georgian envoys paid a visit to Cairo with an aim to get back the monastery of the Holy Cross. Some authors only refer to the year AH 705 (Mujir al-Din al-Hanbali, the same al-‘Ulaymi, died in 1521), while others (for example, Mufaddal ibn Abi l-Fada’il, whose work was completed 759 /1357-58) only point to 1310/11 [12, 94-104; 13, 38-9; 14, 289 -299].

Not long ago, G. Japaridze also touched upon the subject and by way of adding new additional materials cast light on the issues that still seem obscure. At the same time, G. Japaridze repudiated the position of a German

scholar J. Pahlitzsch, according to whom there were two missions – in 1305 and in 1310, not only the one of 1305, when the monastery of the Holy Cross was freed. G. Japaridze called for the attention of the following information of Baybars al-Mansuri of 710-1310-11:

“Georgian envoys arrived from Constantine, son of David, lord of Kurjistan (Georgia) and Tiflis (Tbilisi). They asked him [Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad] to return the Church of the Cross (*Kanizat al-Musallaba*) which had been taken [from them] in the past by force. It is known to have been theirs from old times and the chief of their priests dwells in it [in the church]. And His well-embracing justice proceeded slowly with returning it, in fulfillment of the *Shari‘a*, intending to protect the public interests and impede [others’] schemes... [14, 294].

The quoted fragment makes it clear that: 1. it was Constantine, son of David, the King of western Georgia, who initiated sending the envoys – an unknown fact for Georgian historiography; 2. there lives a chief of the Georgian monks in the Monastery; and 3. The Sultan delayed returning the Monastery.

Right here, G. Japaridze states that although Constantine was not “the lord of Tbilisi”, this is the way the latter presented himself in his letter to the Sultan [14, 295-296].

Similar to D. Gocholeishvili [13, 39], G. Japaridze considered that the monastery of the Holy Cross was returned in 1310. With an aim to substantiate his position, the latter presented convincing argumentation. First of all, he noted that “after the year 710/1310-11, Georgian envoys never went to the Sultan to Cairo again to return the monastery of the Holy Cross” – the evidence that G. Japaridze gained while studying Arabic narrative sources of 14<sup>th</sup>\_15<sup>th</sup> cc. and based on the decree of Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad b. Kalawun dating back to Ramadan 8, 710, i. e. January 29, 1311 on paying an honor to Sadun al-Kurji – a monk living in the monastery of the Holy Cross, as well as all other monks living with him, the Georgians and Georgian pilgrims residing in other churches of Jerusalem [14, 295]. Right here, we would like to draw your attention to the fact that although, according to the source referred to above (the work of Baybars al-Mansuri), there was a Georgian chief residing in the Monastery, the information may be reflecting the event of a relatively later period of time than 1310/11 – when the work of Baybars al-Mansuri was being written (no later than 1325). It should be recalled that it would have been quite possible for Georgian monks to live in one of the chambers of the monastery of the Holy Cross, even at the times when the Monastery was seized and renovated as a mosque by Muslims. There is evidence that Georgian monks managed to get back to the premises of the Monastery under some circumstances. For instance, this happened in the reign of Vakhtang III, when in 1300, accompanied with Mongols, the

king managed to enter Jerusalem - controlled by allies for a short time. The same can be proved by the other sources [36,188], among them by the dead-scroll of the Jerusalem monastery of the Holy Cross, which was presumably established to commemorate Vakhtang III. It is common knowledge that together with Mongols Vakhtang III participated in the Syrian campaign; he entered Jerusalem, visited Georgian monks and contributed silver - 1000 "Tetri" and great amount of Satin and different kinds of tissues to support the Monastery. "*We fathers Sol(o)m(o)n and Svi(me)on used this contribution for the good of the Monastery*" – reads one of the dead-scrolls of the monastery of the Holy Cross [6, 42, 97-8].

G. Japaridze remarks that "only al-Maqrizi writes on the failure of the year 710, while the positive outcome is mentioned by al-Nuwayri, Mufaddal ibn Abi l-Fada'il and al-'Ayni. Out of them Mufaddal Ibn Abi l-Fada'il and al-'Ayni were the contemporaries of the event" [14, 291]. This is really the case however the authors provide the information somewhat later – after some times as passed. The earliest of them is al-Nuwayri, since his work was written in 1314-1331. According to the second author Mufaddal ibn Abi l-Fada'il (whose work was completed in 1357/58) "the envoys of al-Ashkari, accompanied by Georgian envoys, visited the Sublime Porte with a request to return the monastery of the Holy Cross of Noble Jerusalem. (The monastery) was seized by Sheikh Khidr in the reign of al-Zahir and remodeled into a mosque, as stated above. It was returned (to Georgians) based on the decision of learned people (*al-'ulama'*). Indeed, it [the church] cannot be taken away" [13, 38]. About the same information is preserved in the work of al-'Ayni: "in the month of Rajab, the envoys of al-Ashkari – Ruler of Constantinople - visited the Sublime Porte. The envoys were accompanied by Georgian envoys. They asked for the return of the church of Musallahia (resp. al-Musallaba) in Jerusalem. Sheikh Khidr had taken it away from them in the reign of al-Zahir, and returned it based on the decision of learned people" [13, 37-38]. As mentioned above, the author of the information died in 1451. There can be an opinion that data on the return of the Monastery appeared any time from 1310 till the time when the authors created the works. However we'd probably need to take into account the circumstance that, whatever the case, in the works of the authors - constructed according to the principle of chronology – the information that we are interested is to be found in the events of 710. We should also note that in 1320, during his pilgrimage to the Holy Land, Italian Pipino Francesco – who visited the Monastery of the Holy Cross of Jerusalem, attributed the ownership of the monastery to Georgians [15, 10, 11, 15].

After having clarified the identity of the one who sent envoys to Cairo in 710/1310-11, G. Japaridze never again touched on the issue of the identity of the Georgian king who sent envoys in 705/1305-6. However he justly questioned the possibility of Georgian subordination to the Sultanate of Egypt under Mongol rule, promised by Georgian envoys: "In 705, according to al-Maqrizi, Georgians promised to help and support the Sultan whenever

he needed, in exchange for the return of the monastery of the Holy Cross. Subordination to the Sultan of Egypt at the time of Mongolian strength in Georgia would have been out of question”, claims the scholar [14, 296].

In historiography there are different opinions on the identity of the person who initiated sending envoys in 1305-6. Some scholars refer the mission of AH 705 to David VIII (1293-1311) [6, 45; 12, 97; 9, 478-479]; A. Tsagareli, D. Kipshidze and S. Kakabadze refer the release of the Monastery of the Holy Cross to Vakhtang III (1298-1308, or 1304 according to D. Ninidze), who is at the same time identified with Brtilma, mentioned in Arab sources. How well are these doubts substantiated?

It is well-known that after the creation of the Il-khan State (1256), Eastern Georgia fell under its control. From that time on, all the forces of the kings of Eastern Georgia participated in each war of Il-khans and were the main buttress for them. In addition to Georgians sources, Arab sources also provide information about this. According to the latter, Georgians are “support and reserve for the Hulaguid army, who trust them and rely on them. Especially the family of Juban and his sons and the remainder of their descendants owing the past kindnesses of Juban to them [the Georgians] ... Juban was a sincere friend to their king BRTLMA..” [4, 77; 13, 51]. Georgian participation contributed a lot to the seizure of Baghdad in 1258. In the following years Georgians together with Il-khans participated in campaigns against Egypt several times, and returned to their homeland with trophies. In 1268-9 “the khan expressed his will to launch a campaign against Egypt and called on King David with all his forces. There was a fierce warfare wherein King David and his forces fought as mighty advance-guard. There was a massacre, with people killed on both sides and it all ended with the fleeing of the Egyptians... enriched with countless trophies. They came to Tpilisi [16, 235-236]. Because of the joint Georgian\_Il-khan campaigns against Egypt in the 1270s, Georgians were taken away the monastery of the Holy Cross. For some time, it was turned into a mosque. At the same time, Georgians were forbidden to enter holy places on horses and were only allowed to sit on horses with their legs dropping down on one side [12. 91].

Georgians further continued carrying out similar attacks together with Il-khans. David, son to Giorgi-Lasha, Demetre the Devoted, Vakhtang III and Beka – the Atabeg of Samtskhe, all participated in these warr. The Cilician Armenia and the Rum Sultanate, i. e. all those under the Il-khan control also participated in this coalition of Georgians and Il-khans. The comment of D. Gocholeishvili, regarding the hypothesis of B. Silagadze, seems reasonable. According to this hypothesis, in the times of Ghazan Khan (1295-1304), after defeat from the Sultan of Egypt, there started a new peaceful era in the history of relations between Egypt and Georgia [12, 93; 13, 36], since - as sources illustrate - Georgians also participated in the campaign of 1312/13 of Il-khans against Egyptian mamluks on the territory of Syria [13, 36]. In this situation, any initiative of Eastern Georgia to get closer to Egypt

and establish peaceful relations seems questionable in those years. By that time the foreign policy of Eastern Georgian kings was quite synchronous and tightly intertwined with the policy of Il-khans.

It should be pointed out that the Pope of Rome and the rulers of Western Europe also participated in the anti-Egyptian coalition. When Öljeitü Khan (his Muslim name was Muhammad Khodabandeh) ascended the throne of Il-khans in 1304, in an attempt to seek an ally in his fight against the Sultans of Egypt, he immediately sent two envoy missions in the Mongolian language in a letter written with Uighurian characters to the French king Philippe IV. He also sent letters to the King of England, Edward II and the Pope of Rome Clement V [17, 225]. It is a fact that that Georgian participation (together with Crusaders) in the conquest of Palestine-Syria in the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> cent. was a widely-discussed issue in European sources. The work of Hetum – the King of Cilician Armenia – created round 1300, provides some important information on the Georgia split into two parts: “each has a king of its own. The King of Georgia is the subordinate of the Asian Emperor .. The King of Abkhazia never subordinated either Tatars or the Emperor of Asia”. The Author addressed the Pope of Rome with the following words: “would he be willing to write a letter to the King of Georgia. They are Christians and compared to other nations they have greater willingness to return the Holy Land. Would he ask them help the Crusaders” [18, 159]. The same author gives a detailed description of the failed campaign of Il-khans - supported by Cilician Armenians and Georgians - to Syria at the time of Ghazan Khan. In this fight Georgians were led by Vakhtang III and Beka Jakeli - the ruler of Samtskhe.

M. Tamarashvili notes that in the year 1307, Pope Clement V has sent missionaries to Georgia [19,39]. Especially active they became in times of King Giorgi the Brilliant, and since 1318, many missionaries were sent here. In 1321 the Pope calls the King of Georgia to join the Western Church and also, asks Him to give a helping hand to the missionaries, ensuring their security and free pass to the areas inhabited by the Tatars or any other tribes [19, 40].

According to some related sources, in the year of 1323, new Crusade was planned to take start from France and the Egypt was quite aware of it. Al-‘Ayni points that ‘the Pope of Rome intended to send the whole army against “the infidels”, i.e. us; our troops marched to stand against, but there has been no sign of the enemy. Thus we presume that he (the Pope) could not maintain his menace’ [20, 16].

In the years of 1328-1329, according to the prescript of Pope John XXII, Episcopacy was transferred from Smirna (Asia Minor) to Tbilisi, and was put under ascendancy of the Archiepiscopacy established in Il-khan State, Sultaniye, in 1318 [19, 32-33, 39]. In 1332-1333 King Giorgi the V received envoys from the Philip V of France, and delivered personal letter urging Georgian king to participate in joint campaign against Egypt – to liberate the Holy Land [20,159; 21,96]. In his answer, Giorgi V claims that ‘Divine Lords

of France often call for the Eastern kings against Muslims, but then change their minds, never come and desert us alone in this everlasting struggle... Firstly, tell us, exactly when you are planning to come overseas, and I'll be right there with my 30 thousand troops [22, 210; 21, 96; 20, 158].

Attitudes towards the King of Eastern Georgia is well shown in the letter of the Sultan of Egypt, that Arab authors – one Al-'Umari and Al-Qalqashandi had preserved: 'May God Almighty make permanent the felicity of the exalted presence, the presence of the great monarch, the hero, the bold, the lion, the illustrious, the attacker, the dauntless, the enthroned, the crowned, a scholar of his community, just to his subjects, the successor of the Greek kings, Sultan of the Georgians...the bulwark of the lands of Rum and Iran, the strengthener of Christianity..supporter of the religion of Jesus, who glorifies Jerusalem by sincere purpose, the helper of the Bab who is the Pope of Rome, the lover of the Muslims, the best of close companions, and friend of Kings and Sultans" [4,78; 13, 52].

However, the interrelations between Western Georgia and Egypt was quite different, and started right after breaking Georgia into two parts. Mongols' apostate, David Narin, son of the Queen Rusudan, was first to send his envoys to Egypt; though a bit earlier, in 1265, and that before Hulagu's death, Sultan Baybars had sent his envoys to Georgia [23, 277]. According to al-Maqrizi (1364-1442) Georgians visited Baybars in Ramadan, 663/ June-July, 1265 and brought him a lot of gifts and went away burdened with even more [23, 277]. Then, in 1268, envoys came again and brought letters from king of Georgia to the Sultan of Egypt [12, 89-90]. Iv. Javakhishvili comments on the issue: 'Undoubtedly, Sultan would be pleased to find Hulagu Khan's enemies his allies: as it was, Il-khan of Iran never abandoned the plans of conquering his domains' [24, 88].

Chr. Müller and J. Pahlitzsch hold the opinion that two Georgian kings addressed the Sultan of Egypt in 1268: one - the King of Abkhazs and the other – "King of Tbilisi"; thus the scholars presume that the King of East Georgia, though under Il-khan control, still hoped to overthrow them [23, 27, 78]. But I still think that that day situation was in no favor for such assumptions. The envoys from Egypt clearly were sent to Western Georgia and the letters they brought back should have been from the King of western Georgia, who eventually titled himself the same way as it is in the above-mentioned writings of Baybars. We believe that in both cases, the King of West Georgia is the person. It's rather dubious to think that David, son of Giorgi-Lasha, once pardoned for his tergiversation by the Mongols, would dare to step so far – at the very time when he and the Il-khans, confronted the Sultan of Mamluks.

In 1263, according to the treaty between Byzantium and Egypt, the latter got rights to sail the Black Sea. The same time, intensive political, diplomatic and cultural relations were set up between the Golden Horde and Egypt [25, 15, 26, 81]. Also, some sources provide us information about the West Georgia's contacts with the Golden Horde. 14<sup>th</sup> century anonymous

Georgian author tells of some anti-Il-khans getting shelter in the West Georgia, the case with David Narin himself receiving the fugitive Tegüder: "...and met him with pleasure, and laid a table for five hundred stewed beef, and pork and mutton; six hundred horses, fifteen hundred caws, thousand sheep, two thousand pigs – all for his host, and served Tegüder as inferior' [27,261]. Contacts between the West Georgia and Egypt were by no means lessened afterwards, as it is well proved by the fact of Konstantine's (son to David) envoys' visit to Egypt in 1310-11.

In the 1260s David Narin also establishes close contacts with Byzantium and marries the daughter of John, the Emperor Mikhail II Paleologos's brother [22, 204]. This was part of the treaty set between David Narin and the Byzantium. According to this Treaty, the privileges assigned to the Georgians before Crusaders' conquer of Constantinople were restored. Thanks to the Arab historians, it's getting clear that Byzantium, confronting the Rome, held close relationship with the kings of West Georgia, as it is proved by the fact of the joint trip of their envoys to the sultan of Egypt in 1305-1310. Arab historians, though, make a mistake stating that the Lascar Dynasty hold power in Constantinople of that age – as since 1260s, Byzantium had been ruled by the Paleologos family.

While East Georgian kingdom and Samtskhe princedom kept alliances with the Il-khans, Cilician Armenia, Rum Sultanate, and the Pope of Rome, the West Georgian kingdom, naturally, allies with the Golden Horde, Egypt, and Byzantium – those that confront the Il-khans and the Pope of Rome.

It's clear that both Eastern and Western Georgian kingdoms strongly depend on outer circumstances and their steps are cautiously measured according to then present political conjuncture.

Thus, we may sum up that in the years of 1310-11, as well as in 1305-6, envoys were sent to Egypt not by the king of eastern, but of western Georgia – i.e. Konstantine, though in none of the known documents the name of the king is ever mentioned.

Alongside with his rule time dating (1299-1311), presumption that the king of East Georgia, David VIII participated in getting back the monastery of the Holy Cross, is based on the records in one of the dead-scrolls of the Holy Cross monastery in Jerusalem: 295 (m-288), table XXXII says that 'In eternal memoriam of David the King of Kings, reconstructor of the Monastery that had been turned into mosque and now again in Georgian possession...' [6, 106]. E. Metreveli comments that nobody else but David VIII should have been presumed here [6, 176], but how much trustworthy is the assumption? David the King of Kings is also mentioned in another dead-scroll : (m-193 XXVII), 196 (m-XXCIII) and there we read: 'blessed he be, for a lot of gold had been bestowed to the Monastery, thus liberating it from great debt...' [6, 97]. According to the comments, David IX (1346-1360) is named here, as well as in 7 (m-6) table XXVII; 195 (m-193) table XXVII [6, 117, 162], and no other dead-scroll naming any David from East Georgia. Uniting all in the table XXXII, 'that does not surpass the

chronological margin of the yearly XIV c., can not be considered as a solid proof, as it already has been pointed by B. Silagadze [12, 97]. As for liberating the Monastery in 1305/6, it can't be true, so far as the talks for its liberation were carried even through the years 1310/11 (see D. Gocholeishvili and G. Japharidze).

Apart from the abovementioned authors, some other historians also provide information on Egypt-Georgia relationships: Al-'Umari (1301-1349), and Al-Qalqashandi (1355-1418). They say that the talks on liberating the Monastery were held by Brtilma, the King of Georgia, identified by the most of scholars as Giorgi the Brilliant; but taking into consideration the discrepancy between the names Brtilma-Giorgi, some scholars have different points of view [4,77,80; 13,42-43]. According to David Lang, Al-'Umari mixed up the King with his vassal - it has to be the Prince of Siuniq, son to Eliqum Orbeliani - Burtel (Birtvel) Orbeliani [4, 77, note 4; 5, 262, note 2].

Al-'Umari says that '... he started negotiations with the Sublime Porte of Sultan about the Monastery, and quite succeeded, as Sultan issued decree on giving it back to the Georgians. It's located outside Jerusalem and in earlier time, had been turned into mosque' [13, 52].

Besides, King Giorgi's activities concerning the Holy Land are well reported in some Georgian documents. The Book of Eristavs (15<sup>th</sup> c.) tells as follows: 'The news spread that Persians conquered Jerusalem, and the King was in woe. Then sent He Pipai, the son of Shalva Eristavi to Jerusalem, all upon dry land, with lots of gifts to deliver and was he well greeted, the gifts accepted, and the locks of Jerusalem opened to him; thus came he back to King Giorgi with good news, and the King rejoiced, as the locks were in hand of Georgians again' [29, 350].

Iv. Javakhishvili presumed that one of the pleas to Sultan of Egypt would have been the liberation of the Holy Cross Monastery and returning it to the Georgians [24,175]; then he aligned Arabic sources on Georgian-Byzantium joint mission to Egypt, carried overseas, with the name of Giorgi the Brilliant [24,175], discharging the underlined note of Pipai's travel "all upon dry land".

A. Menteshashvili accepts the opinion on redeeming the monastery by Giorgi the Brilliant. Relying on al-'Ayni saying that Georgians got to Egypt together with Golden Horde and Byzantine envoys in 1320, he sums up that this was the very mission aimed at redeeming the Holy Cross Monastery. Thus - he says - this very year should be considered as the date of liberating it' [30, 19]. A. Menteshashvili also reveals another document about Georgians visit to Cairo in 716/1316-17. According to the script, eight ambassadors came to Cairo that year, one being that of Georgian King's [30, 19].

However, Iv. Javakhishvili's and A. Menteshashvili's opinion on dating the redeeming of the Monastery was not accepted by other scholars but V. Kiknadze (21, 62). It's noteworthy that most of them also assigned Georgian missions to Egypt in 1316-17 and in 1320 to Giorgi the Brilliant, among

them V. Kiknadze who also holds that he was enthroned in 1318 [21, 58]. Different opinion is carried out by G. Arakhamia, who considers Giorgi Mt-sire to be the initiator of sending the envoys in the first case [8, 104].

We can not abstain but share V. Kiknadze's and G. Japaridze's viewpoints, that long talks were held for the redemption of the Holy Cross Monastery [21, 63; 14, 298], as well as their opinion concerning Giorgi the Brilliant's activities concerning the Holy Land, but we are far from agreeing that Georgian missions of 1316/17 and 1320 were also inspired by him. We should keep in mind that right at that time East Georgia, together with the Il-khans, were confronting the Golden Horde raids.

In 1318/19 Uzbek-Khan invaded Shirvan and Arran and reached the Kura River. Next year Choban raided Transcaucasus to give support to Abu-Said, and Uzbek had to retreat. Then, in 1325, Choban raided through Georgia to Derbent, and reached as far as Tergi River [4,80; 5,264; 21, 43-44]. It's inevitable that Georgians were participating in the raid – after all, military operations were carried on through Georgia. Thus, it's hard to believe that the king of East Georgia would send his envoys at such a time and with the Golden Horde companions.

Taking into consideration the given circumstances, we are inclined to think that the talk is about the king of Western Georgia, Constantine, whose activities towards Egypt were quite clear. But the point is that the interrelation between the East and the West Georgian kingdoms are not of that kind: confrontation started even in 1360s c., and then, King Giorgi the Brilliant had to use all his power and diplomatic skills to unite the two – part by part, so to say.

As for his activities concerning the Holy Land issues, they are more expectable to have started in after the long talks between the Il-khans and the Sultan of Egypt came to the end. In 1323 they signed treaty and everlasting peace was proclaimed. Thus, we conceive that the scholars who think that Giorgi the Brilliant was the one who actually redeemed the Monastery of Holy Cross are partly right [24, 175-176; 32, 251; 30, 18] since the position of the monastery became more sustained in his times.

Arab historian Ibn Al-Dawadari claims that the same year - 723/1323 Abu Said's envoy came to the Sultan of Egypt and asked for peace, and the treaty was the result of this visit [13, 49; 33, 131; 119-148]. The peace was established for many years between those two states. It's also mentioned that Choban played favorable part in signing this treaty, and King Giorgi, according to Georgian and Arab sources, held close contacts with him; some even claim that the Monastery case was solved with his personal effort. We may presume that this was the very reason for the destruction of Pope's plans for raiding Egypt in 1223, as the Il-khans and the Georgians would not support the coalition.

We share opinion of V. Kiknadze, that the envoys of Giorgi the Brilliant came to the Sultan of Egypt not with one, but with several requests; the status of the Cross monastery was still on agenda (21,64). Although the

monastery was possessed by the Georgians by that time, Giorgi the Brilliant probably asked once again for confirmation of their rights.

According to al-'Ayni, in 1322/23 Uzbek of the Golden Horde reproaches the Sultan of Egypt for not allowing his ambassador to build a mosque within Jerusalem, while letting Georgians to reconstruct the church [21, 65]. There is no mention of the name of the king there, but by that time it could well be Giorgi V.

All in all, Giorgi the Brilliant, who's enthroning was partly due to Choban the Vezir of the Il-khans, kept loyalty to him – till his death in 1327. Flexible policy and diplomacy helped the King to solve the row of local problems: according to evidence by Vakhusti, being enthroned he suppressed the Samtskhe governors who perpetually confronted Il-khan Öljaitu, being separated from the common political space and achieved their obedience, then 'repressed and enslaved all who was intractable within Caucasus and made them all to render tribute' [34, 256]. All these were in the Il-khans' interests, as since 1262, the Golden Horde, the owner of the much part of the North Caucasus, permanently raided their territories. At the same time Giorgi expelled Ossetians from the Georgian territory and solved his longstanding problem.

Some of the Georgian feudal lords' secession from the king may well be explained by the grudge between Choban and Il-khan families - Georgian warlords might have taken the latter's side. Their treason could be an explanation why the son of Choban, Mahmud, the appointed ruler of Georgia in those years, couldn't reach the ruler of Golden Horde Uzbek Khan. One can find the related evidence in the Arabic sources: (al-'Umari, al-Qalqashandi): "When his father got into trouble, he was seeking protection at the court of Sultan Uzbek Khan but failed. Danger could not be avoided and he lost his life and that couldn't be escaped". "As Giorgi had taken advantage, he invited the nobles of Her – Kakhi and Somkhiti, who adjoint Chingizids, to Tsivi and massacred them", - one can read in the late interpolation of some manuscripts of "Kartlis Tskhovreba". [27, 325]. It's supposed "Chingizids in this context doesn't mean Mongols as a whole, but descendants of Chingiz Khan and the Georgian nobles adjoint Chingizids against Choban. Taking apart a short time after defeat of Choban, nevertheless, King Giorgi had no significant problems with the Il-khans – in spite of the fact that he refused to pay tribute and maintained considerable autonomy. Even in time when Giorgi V was in the West Georgia and was dealing with unification of the country, Mongols didn't appoint another king in the East Georgia. According to the order of the Pope in 1328-29 Tbilisi Episcopacy was subordinated to Sultaniye Arch-Episcopacy, as the East Georgia was considered to be under Il-khans' control.

The Georgian nobles could betray the Georgian King in other times as well. That could happen many times when the Georgian King was repulsing the invaders from the North. One can suppose that Giorgi V massacred the

Georgian nobles at Tsivi as they adjoint Mongol invaders from the North. The related evidence is preserved considering attacks of the Golden Horde in 735/1334-35 and 736/1335-36. Uzbek Khan invaded Azerbaijan and Iran and reached Kura. According to the sources, "some by their mindedness aspired toward him and he reached Kura relying on them" [35, 93,143]. Not accidentally, Abu Said died in 1335, during the campaign against the Golden Horde.

Vakhushti Bagrationi mentions King Giorgi's raids to Daruband and setting order on Caucasian crossovers and that was duly appreciated by the Mongol Il-khans [34, 256-257]. "He conferred the title of Atabeg and Amirspasalar to Sargis Jakeli, gathered troops and entered Rani; nobody opposed him; from there he moved to Shirvan and subdued them and levied Daruband with Lezghians." [34, 256-257].

After uniting the Georgia "the King again investigated the situation of Mtiuls and Caucasians (highlanders of Georgia and Central and West Caucasia), since a lot was improper there. Gathered the troops, entered and subdued all in Caucasus who exceeded the rights of the King" and 'taming and enslaving all and everybody throughout the Caucasus, and ruling from Nicophysy to Daruband...' [34, 258-259] – Georgia again summons up the traditional role of defending the southern territories from invaders. Probably, that was the reason why, according to the Arab authors, the Hulaguids 'Trust and lay on the Georgians, and especially so the sons, grandsons and other offspring of Juban' [13, 51, 54].

Thus, we presume that:

\* In the years of 1305/6, 1310/11, 1316/7 and 1320 it was the King of the West Georgia – Constantine the son of David, who sent his envoys to the Sultan of Egypt and managed to redeem the Holy Cross Monastery from Muslims;

\* Giorgi the Brilliant starts his activities in the Holy Land in strict accordance with the Peace Treaty he himself negotiated between the Il-khans and Egypt (1323);

\* No dead-scroll carries the script of David VIII, the King of Georgia, but David IX, son to Giorgi V, is named as the rebuilder of the Holy Cross Monastery.

\* King Giorgi the Brilliant obtains independence thanks to his flexible diplomacy, through his backing up the Il-kans in confrontation of the Northern and Southern Mongols, and rightly defining his personal role in the conflict.

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## Narrative of the United Caucasus: Political or Historical Project?

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*The paper deals with the problem of the narrative of united Caucasus in the prism of interrelation of historical narrative and collective memory. The idea of the Caucasian unity has been existed for centuries. At different times it has got different content and shape. The attempts of creation of the common Caucasian narrative were blown a new breath in the post Soviet period, emerging in different contents, although they were found to be unsuccessful. The experience of the common past, preserved in the collective memory, turned out to be unable to overcome existed grievances, territorial pretenses and mutual allegations preserved by the same memory. The offered analyses of the presented materials point to the narrative of united Caucasus more as a political/ideological myth, rather than a real project, based on a historical reality.*

### ერთიანი კავკასიის ნარატივი: პოლიტიკური თუ ისტორიული პროექტი?

ნინო ჩიკოვანი

ივანე ჯავახიშვილის სახელობის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი

**ნ**აშრომში განხილულია ერთიანი კავკასიის ნარატივის საკითხი, კოლექტიური მეხსიერებისა და ისტორიული ნარატივის ურთიერთმიმართების პრობლემის ფონზე. ერთიანი კავკასიის იდეა არსებობის საუკუნეებს ითვლის. სხვადასხვა ისტორიულ პერიოდში იგი სხვადასხვა შინაარსსა და ფორმას იღებდა. პოსტ-საბჭოთა პერიოდში მან ახალი დატვირთვა შეიძინა, თუმცა ერთიანი კავკასიის ნარატივის შექმნის მცდელობანი უშედეგო აღმოჩნდა. კოლექტიურ მეხსიერებაში შემონახულმა საერთო წარსულის გამოცდილებამ ვერ შეძლო გადაეფარა იმავე მეხსიერებაში დალექილი ურთიერთუნდობლობა, წყენა, ტერიტორიული პრეტენზიები. წარმოდგენილი მასალის საფუძველზე, ერთიანი კავკასიის ნარატივი წარმოგვიდგება უფრო როგორც პოლიტიკური/იდეოლოგიური მითი, ვიდრე ისტორიულ რეალობაზე დამყარებული პროექტი.

The issue of the unity of the Caucasus became a topic of the constant debates and discussions since the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the “total triumph of the memory”, as called by Piere Norra, was fully experienced by the peoples of the Caucasus.

The studies in the collective and historical memory have revealed that the social groups are determining the topics for remembering and forgetting (Burke, 1980) and our memory and our history are being constructed by them according to the contemporary needs. Paper aims to analyze the narrative of the united Caucasus through the political context, which determined its different forms and influenced on its actualization at the different times.

The sole successful attempt of the political unification of the Caucasus was exercised in the 11<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> centuries. It was the period of the unification of the Georgian political entities. Although the success of the process was not guaranteed yet, the idea of the united Caucasian state was born. The conception of Leonti Mroveli (Leonti Mroveli, 1995) was a successful attempt of the creation of the common Caucasian narrative, which is gradually revealed in the description of the facts of and in their interpretation (the myth on the origins – the common origins of the Caucasian peoples, formation of the Georgian state with participation of the different peoples, relations with the neighbors, formation of the Georgian language and its declaration as a state language, creation of the written language, pagan Gods and Christianization).

It's a well-known fact that the common historical legacy, the common history and the common ancestors play an important role in the formation of the group ethnic identity. The so called ethno-historical myths are the crucial factors in the formation of the identity, enabling the different communities to identify with their ancestors (Smith, 1986). Exactly this function is ascribed to the myth of the common origins of the Caucasian peoples in the work of Leonti Mroveli. In this respect, it is an interesting piece of the formation of historical memory.

The ideological-political conception formed in the 11<sup>th</sup> century and the attempts of the creation of the common Caucasian narrative (or the one encompassing any part of the Caucasus) were “revitalized” later. For example, during the reign of Erekle II, the idea of the unification of the South Caucasus under the rule of the King Erekle emerged (Tukhashvili, 1972; Macharadze, 1989). In this case the role of the center was ascribed to Georgia as well, although the circumstances were radically different and this idea of unity was determined by the actuality of the foreign orientation.

Caucasian peoples were united in the framework of the Russian Empire. The administrative entities of the South and the North Caucasus became the

parts of the region ruled by governor-general, whereas Tbilisi was ascribed the role of the administrative center. The unification in the common political space contributed to the restoration of the traditional contacts and actualization of the common past and the memory of the historical co-existence between the peoples of the Caucasus, although the imperial principle of *divide et imepa* was a serious problem and challenge in this respect.

Since that period, the name of Shamil is among those which founded the different versions of the common Caucasian narrative. Imamatus – unification of the portion of the Northern Caucasus – became a symbol of the unity of the Caucasian peoples in their struggle against Russia. The official narrative was created during the Soviet time, in which the two stages could be easily discerned, as well as the counter-narrative, being finally shaped in the post-soviet period.

From the 20s of the 20th century Shamil was the hero of the struggle for independence from the *Tsarist* rule and colonialism. Although the above-described portrait did not fit in its entirety to the interests of the Soviet historiography as the name of Shamil was associated with the anti-Russian and anti-soviet movements. His name became even more contradictory from the 1950s, when Shamil was officially declared as “the reactioner” and “the agent of the Ottoman Turkey and England.” The Soviet historiography tried to find a compromised variant for the created dilemma: Shamil himself was the leader of the “progressive”, “popular”, “anti-colonial” and “national-independent” movement, but later on “anti-popular” feudal and clerical elements took the leadership and the movement got a reactionary nature (Gammer, 1999). The version was in effect till the end of the Soviet Union.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Shamil became a national hero for Chechnya and Dagestan. The different political camps were trying to use him for their purposes. As a reaction to the Soviet narrative, the different versions of narratives on Shamil were formed. The Dagestan-Avar narrative is among them, in which the fact that Shamil was originally Avar played an important role and it was the element of the national identity and collective memory of Avars. A kind of compromised nature of the above-mentioned narrative should be stressed: the victories of Shamil are a matter of pride, whereas the enemy is not mentioned at all (Gammer, 1999).

The different narrative has been created in Chechnya. In this case the main element of the formation of the collective identity and memory was the three centuries long struggle against Russia in which Shamil was the main figure and symbol. Although other figures also appear, among them Imam Mansur should be mentioned first and foremost, with Chechen origins and

the first leader of the struggle against Russia. He called for the unity of the Caucasian peoples.

Another version of the narrative was created in the center – in Moscow. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Shamil – previously tabooed topic – appeared in the center of the interest of professional historians, as well as journalists and publicists. But after the beginning of the first Russian-Chechen War (1994) the number of books and articles on the topic of the Caucasian history declined and the issue of Shamil became the subject of media covering (Gammer, 1999). Until the second war of Chechnya (1999) Moscow changed the memory politics and from 1997 she was actively involved in the arrangements dedicated to the 200 anniversary of Shamil. Shamil was placed in the pantheon of the official heroes of Russia. The new official narrative was created: mostly it is identical of the Dagestan-Avar narrative, although with one difference: the period after 1859 is stressed in particular: Shamil influenced on the process of reconciliation with the former enemy and he became an admirer of Russia and its culture. He bequeathed to the Dagestan peoples (and to Chechens as well) an eternal peaceful coexistence with Russians. This narrative of Moscow was an attempt to contradict with an effort of using the legacy of Shamil against Moscow. This aspiration coincided with those of the local Dagestan-Avar elites and other North Caucasian ones, as well as with the interests of the North Caucasians, represented in the central government, as all other narratives could be used by the alternative elites.

Since the establishment of the soviet rule in the Caucasus the two versions of the narrative of the united Caucasus are formed. One of them was created in the Soviet historical science and it was based on the ideology of the brotherhood and friendship of the soviet peoples. It should be mentioned that the roots of the “brotherhood” did not traced far in the historical past, rather it was based on the new Soviet ideology through the overcoming of the old hatreds and enmity.

The plan of the forming of the “new soviet men” implied the erosion of the differences between the peoples. Correspondingly, the substitution of the ethnic identity with the common Soviet identity was accented, which should be much deeper and stronger than any other identity. Although the official rhetoric of brotherhood and unity had a real impact on the thinking of the *Soviet* citizens (Cornell, 2001), but the Soviet identity did not manage to substitute the ethnic, religious or some other group identities, rather it came to coexist with them. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the unifying Soviet identity disappeared and the inefficiency of the narrative, based on the ideology, became obvious. The fact influenced on the Caucasian peoples and it was painfully reflected in their lives, which was expressed in the Caucasian conflicts first and foremost.

Since the 20s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the issue of the creation of the Caucasian Confederation was actively discussed in the emigrant circles. The past referred for the arguments. In this respect, the letters of Dimitri Vachnadze, Nikoloz Inasaridze, Samson Firtskhalava, as well as the Armenian politician A. Jamalian, are quite interesting (Sharadze, 2004). Although quite often rational arguments were overshadowed with emotion and pathetic, but these letters in the emigrant periodicals, as well as the attempts of the creation of the Caucasian confederation in the 30s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are interesting as the attempts of the overcoming of conflicting memory.

In the post-Soviet period the narrative of the united Caucasus was loaded again and it got a new content. It is interesting that it was formed in parallel with the empowerment of ethno nationalism.

In the beginning of the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the Caucasus was the scene of the several conflicts, the conception of the "Common Caucasian House" was born, which was determined by the new circumstances, created after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and by the pathos of the confrontation with Russia. The idea was realized in the form of the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples, which was supported by the governmental officials of the Russian Federation.

Confederation played not only the negative role in the conflicts of the Caucasus, but the experience was also layered in the collective memory of the Caucasian peoples in spite of its short-term existence. In the later period the attitude towards the idea of the unity of the Caucasus became more cautious and skeptical. Although the supporters of the idea of confederation were striving for its reanimation from time to time but it did not gain any response.

Another attempt of the creation of the united Caucasian narrative in the post soviet period came from the official political circles. In the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as a response to the conception of S. Huntington and in the form of its alternative the idea of the "Peaceful Caucasus" was offered by the President of Georgia and the President of Azerbaijan. Different from the "Caucasian House" it was aimed not at the unity of any form, but rather it was looking for the common interests and for the creation of the conditions for the peaceful co-existence through negotiations and agreement.

In terms of creation of the common narrative several international conferences held in Tbilisi, in 1997-1998 under the initiatives of politicians should be taken into consideration. A particular attention was paid to the search for the historical-cultural foundations of the unity of the Caucasian peoples. The speeches delivered at these conferences by the Georgian politicians could serve as an example of the effort of creation of the new narrative. In these cases the attempts of revitalization of the myth of kinship of the Cau-

casian peoples and the creation of the common Caucasian narrative, which would reflect the influence of the political conjuncture and aspiration towards introducing some changes in the existing situation of the Caucasus is obvious. Obviously the Caucasian peoples share too much, but these common characteristics were shadowed in the post-soviet period and they were substituted with conflicts and contradictions, part of it being the result of the soviet legacy, the soviet national politics (mass deportations, exiles, artificial demarcations of boundaries between the union republics and autonomous structures, purposeful change of the demographic balance, etc.) while others have got much more deeper roots.

Historical textbooks are another type of narratives which have a strong influence on the formation of the collective memory. "Historical textbooks are considered as one of the important sources of the formation of the national identity and historical consciousness. On their basis pupils get the impression on their nation and on its place in history, as well as they are provided with perception of their neighbors" (Stojanovic, 2001). In the soviet era history teaching was conducted according to the Union program, by the textbooks written in Moscow first and later translated into the titular languages of the soviet republics. The main subject was "History of the Soviet Union". It was the united soviet historical narrative on which the collective memory based on the common past of the Soviet people should be formed. In reality, "*The History of the Soviet Union*" was the history of Russia with minor additions of the historical sketches from the history of the Soviet peoples. Its starting point was not the victory of the Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet rule, but it covered the period from the ancient times till the modern era. The Soviet textbooks were the testimony of the statement that the selection of the information for the secondary schools and their systematization were an ideological process, being in service of the interests of the concrete class and social group (Podch, 2001).

Several cases of the failure of the creation of the common Caucasian narrative for the formation of the collective memory in the post-Soviet period clearly point to the serious hindrances in this respect. For example, in 1997, the project called as the "Tbilisi Initiative," was financed by the Council of Europe aimed at the creation of the common history textbook of the Caucasus with participation of historians from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Russian Federation. The working process lasted for several years with no results: interpretation of histories were too diverse and different; the experience of the common past, preserved in the collective memory, did not manage to overlap the historical grievances, territorial pretenses and mutual allegations, accumulated in the memory. Forgetting the relativity of the historical

verity each part stood as a guard of its own truth. Each of them created their “own” histories of the Caucasus. It worth’s to mention that as more distant past was the matter of discussion, the more severe debates followed and mutual agreement was impossible.

As R. Karagiozov mentions, in this case the collective memory won over the representation of the history in that form, which was envisaged under the project. The same is much true for the case, when collective memory won on the Soviet version of the history of the Soviet Peoples, looking for the establishment of the brotherhood and unity (Garagozov, 2005). The attempt of the actualization of the common Caucasian narrative did not succeed.

The creation of the common Caucasian narrative is seriously hindered by the tradition of ideologization and mythologization of the national histories. Overcoming of this experience is met with the serious resistance of the collective memory, i.e. stereotypes, beliefs, etc. (Исмаилов, 2005). Besides, until nowadays the Marxist formational methodological frame maintains its dominant positions, with an accent on the economic and political development. It has not vacated the place for the methodological pluralism yet; although quite often neglected verbally it often appears in the form of mixture alongside with the other approaches (mostly with local-civilizational one). The strong political determination of history is one of the main obstacles to the overcoming of the collective memory and creation of the common narrative. And the third obstacle serves to be the “schematic narrative templates” offered by J.Wertch, called “matrix” by Mark Ferro. The Georgian, Azerbaijanian and Armenian types of the templates were studied and analyzed by R.Karagiozov. Not surprisingly, they are essentially different from one-another. Alongside with other factors, the collective memories of these peoples were also reflected in them, complicating the process of creation of the common schema during the attempt of creation of the common narrative.

Thus, the creation of the common Caucasian narrative remains to be an unfulfilled aim so far. As for the idea of the united Caucasus, it serves to be the so called “useful myth”, historians serving as its guardians, as Karl Beker mentioned (Becker, 1932).

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## External Threats and Authoritarian Backlashes: A Retrospective on Internal Conflicts in Georgian Society After the August War

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*In the years since the November 2003 Rose Revolution, popularly elected leaders in the Republic of Georgia have responded to organized protests with repressive tactics. These reactions suggest that former challengers to authoritarian elites may utilize similar methods of retaining power during crisis periods. Yet, the alleged involvement of agencies of the Russian Federation in fomenting domestic instability has also figured prominently in the policies of the Saakashvili government. These conditions culminated disastrously in the Russian invasion of August 2008. The present study suggests a theoretical model for analyzing international influences on state-society relations in Georgia since 2003. The model provides a tool for examining the role of external threats in the relationship between the activities and strategies of opposition groups and the national security perceptions and practices of Georgian political elites.*

### ქართულ საზოგადოებაში არსებული შიდა კონფლიქტების რეტროსპექტივა აგვისტოს ომის შემდეგ

ჯეისონ სტრაიქსი

კლარემონტის უნივერსიტეტი

**2003** წლის, ვარდების რევოლუციის შემდეგ არჩეულმა მთავრობამ ორგანიზებულ საპროტესტო გამოსვლებს რეპრესიული ტაქტიკით უპასუხა. მსგავსი რეაქცია ზრდის ალბათობას, რომ შესაძლებელია ავტორიტარული ელიტის ყოფილმა წარმომადგენლებმა გამოიყენონ მსგავსი მეთოდი კრიზისის განმავლობაში თავიანთი ძალაუფლების შესანარჩუნებლად. რუსეთის ფედერაციის ჩართულობა ადგილობრივი არასტაბილურობის გამომწვევის მიზნით თვალნათლივ აისახა სააკაშვილის მთავრობის მიერ გატარებულ პოლიტიკაში. ამ მდგომარეობამ კულმინაციას მიაღწია 2008 წლის აგვისტოში, როდესაც რუსეთმა ქვეყანაში შემოჭრა განახორციელა. ნაშრომი გთავაზობთ 2003 წლიდან, სახელმწიფო-საზოგადოებრივი ურთიერთობების მიმართულეებით საერთაშორისო გავლენის ანალიზის თეორიულ მოდელს. ის წარმოადგენს გარე საფრთხეების მნიშვნელობის განმსაზღვრელ საშუალებას, ოპოზიციური ჯგუფების, ეროვნული უსაფრთხოების და ქართული პოლიტიკური ელიტის ქმედებებსა და სტრატეგიებთან მიმართებაში.

In the years since the November 2003 Rose Revolution (*Vardebis Revolutia*), the popularly elected leadership of the Republic of Georgia has responded to organized political protests with tactics such as crackdowns by security services and militia, control of the media, mobilization of pro-regime counter-demonstrators and provocateurs, and the imposition of emergency laws. On one hand, these reactions suggest that once in office, former challengers to authoritarian elites may utilize similar methods of retaining power during crisis periods as their predecessors. Yet, allegations of involvement by agencies of the Russian Federation in fomenting domestic instability have also figured prominently in both the public discourse and actions taken by the Saakashvili/United National Movement (*Ertiani Natsionaluri Modzraoba*) government. This is represented by the recurrent ploy of presenting intercepted telephone communications and video recordings as evidence of purported collusion between opposition and foreign elements. Significant examples of such instances are the suppression of the Ortachala Prison riot, the Kodori Gorge operation and related imprisonment of Forward Georgia! founder Irakli Batiashvili, the arrest of leaders of Igor Giorgadze's Samartlianoba (Justice) Party in an alleged coup attempt, and detainment of four Russian military officers and seven alleged Georgian accomplices in 2006, and the targeting and physical assault of opposition activists and raid and seizure of the Imedi and Caucasia television facilities by the Interior Ministry and police forces in 2007.

However, establishment views of foreign sponsorship of popular unrest have longstanding precedents in post-Soviet Georgia. For instance: during the historic student protests against the policies of former president Eduard Shevardnadze in November 2001, news media widely characterized the events as being driven by "specific political forces", including alleged Russian influence (Manning, 2007. p. 194). Western observers have also frequently attributed these notions to the immediate challenges to Georgian sovereignty posed by the Russian-sponsored separatist states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have fostered the perception of a continual threat to national security from external sources (Cornell et al, 2005. p. 12; Cornell et al, 2007. pp. 4, 18). These conditions culminated disastrously in Russia's retaliation to the Georgian Armed Forces intervention in Tskhinvali in August 2008, which may have altered the present government's perspective regarding the use of such preemptive responses. However symbolic, the recent expansion of sessions of the National Security Council to include dialogues with opposition leaders on the first anniversary of the invasion might exemplify this shift in orientation (Kvelashvili, 2009; Rustavi 2, 2009).

The present study therefore proposes a theoretical model of political conflict in order to scientifically examine the significance of external threats as an intervening variable in the relationship between the characteristics of Georgian opposition groups, and the public security policies exercised by Georgian elites. The model suggests a linkage between the orientations of domestic political actors, the influences generated by geopolitical forces, and the responses of an incumbent government to threats to its ability to remain in office caused by internal unrest. This modifies an approach developed in an earlier study of protest and policing in post-Soviet “color revolution” states to examine the state-society *and* international dynamics that have developed in Georgia between the Rose Revolution and the August War (Strakes, 2008). The following sections will 1), review previous studies that provide supporting logic and evidence for the theory, 2), present the main components of the model, and 3), discuss the empirical measures and data necessary for analysis of these issues.

### *Theoretical Framework*

The conceptual foundations for investigating the interactive relationships described above draw from several research agendas in political science and international studies, including the literature on domestic political conflict, the impact of interstate relations on internal political processes, and national security in post-Soviet Georgia. The first segment of this framework is based upon recent empirical findings that among developing nations, semi-democracies (or governments in the process of transition between regime types) are more likely to engage in repression than either fully consolidated democracies or authoritarian states (Fein, 1995; Regan and Henderson, 2002). This maintains that the extent of threats to incumbent leaders is equated with the type and scale of demands, strategies and tactics of opposition groups, and in turn the level of repressive force applied in response (Moore, 2000). The likelihood of the use of coercion during incomplete transitions to democracy is therefore greater because the opening of the political space increases opportunities to challenge the present regime, while at the same time the fragility of existing institutions limits the capacity to channel discontent, leaving it with a limited range of options to defend itself from removal. In addition, an action-reaction process may occur in which the suppression of nonviolent protests by the incumbent regime may intensify popular opposition and internal uprisings (Francisco, 1995).

Secondly, various studies by American political scientists have presented evidence of a significant association between the magnitude of external mil-

itary threats and the decline of liberal democracy in ethnically divided societies (Midlarsky, 2003); the negative impact of major regional security threats on the level of political tolerance in small states such as Taiwan (Wang and Chang, 2006) and Israel (Peffley et al, 2008); and a similarly negative effect of external threats to territorial integrity on prospects for democratization (Gibler and Thies, 2006) and recognition of dissident groups (Gibler and Hutchinson, 2007).

Lastly, since the 1990s, Georgian analysts have suggested that the nation's situation is characterized by a weak tradition of statehood and a significant connection between internal and external threats (Nodia, 1998, 2005: 65-68; Rondeli, 1998). Yet, while the official National Security Concept promulgated in July 2005 emphasizes the dangers posed by internal conflicts supported from outside the country, infringement of territorial integrity and spillover of conflicts from neighboring states (i.e., "the Russian Federation's military presence on the territory of Georgia would be a risk factor to the stability of the country in certain circumstances"), it does not make specific reference to the sponsorship of anti-government activities by foreign agencies (National Security Concept of the Republic of Georgia, 2005. pp. 3-5). Further, despite its emphasis on these conditions, the document states that "the likelihood of open military aggression against Georgia is low", and that, pending their final withdrawal, "[M]ilitary bases of the Russian Federation located in Georgia are no longer a direct threat to [its] sovereignty" (2005. p. 4).


Thus, in order to address the problem of *indirect* threats, it is useful to interpret elite security perceptions in terms of the difference between "objective" and "subjective" challenges (Nodia, 2005.p. 41). The first are based on pre-existing conditions that cannot be directly controlled, such as a state's geography, size and resources, while the second involves the policies chosen in response to threats and the ability of decision-makers to implement them. In turn, each of these factors plays a role in defining the "national project", or the concept of public order and its supporting institutions held by a government. In the Georgian context, the combination of ethnic and territorial divisions, economic and administrative incapacity and unresolved questions of national identity have made it imperative for leaders to consolidate and maintain their control of the polity. This linkage between the definition of the national interest and the resort by elites to whatever actions deemed necessary to remain in office is expressed in the following quotation:

"Politicians, especially when in government, like to frame many issues as security threats, because it is easier to mobilize people on matters said to endanger core national interests (and to enhance the incumbent government's standing or influence in the process)." (Nodia, 2005. p. 42).

### Model of Post-2003 Georgian State-Society Relations

The resulting theoretical synthesis is specified as follows: the schematic displayed in Figure 1 below presents a conceptual model of post-Rose Revolution Georgian politics containing three essential elements: the independent variable (IV), or the characteristics of political opposition groups, including structure (organization and leadership), size (number of participants in public actions), strategies (political objective), tactics (methods), and foreign orientation (policy toward Russia); the intervening variable (IV), or the level of threats or challenges to domestic interests that have emanated from the international system; and the dependent variable (DV), or elite behavior, which is composed of two factors: the definition of vital national interests by the governing elite, and the policing practices administered to protect and preserve those interests. Together, these represent the situational context of Georgian perceptions of national security. In turn, the upper right-hand block arrow indicates a positive association between the presence of external challenges and the security perceptions and practices of the incumbent government. Finally, the central arrow represents the bi-directional process of challenge and response between opposition and authority structures. The definition of primary indicators and sources of empirical data for each of these variables are discussed in the following section.

Figure 1. Internal/external threats and state responses in post-2003 Georgia.



## *Data and Measures*

### *Opposition Characteristics*

The post-2003 Georgian political opposition can be classified according to three main categories: 1), those groups and entities which have representation in the Parliament and embody the institutionalized momentum of the Rose Revolution, 2), pre-2003 groupings which advocate pragmatism or have maintained separation from the broader public protest movement, and 3), those which were established by former members of the country's administrative and business elite who have become political opponents or personal foes of the incumbent president. The trajectory that these groups have followed during the post-Revolution period is also affected by broader conditions of popular unrest generated by economic hardship, perceptions of unaccountability or indifference by the national leadership, and undesirable government policies. In the present instance, a further significant factor in identifying their influence on elite reactions is their policy orientation toward Georgian bilateral relations with Russia, which can be discerned from the programmes or manifestos of the individual parties. Table 1 presents a basic summary of data on eight major opposition groups active in Georgia during the period between the presidential elections of January 2004 and January 2008. This information is drawn from a range of public media sources, including *Civil Georgia*, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, and the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association. The columns indicate whether opposition groups and actions are initiated by individuals (elite-led) or are broadly-based (popular), small (less than 5,000 participants) or large (greater than 10,000 participants) in size, whether strategic goals are limited (e.g., constitutional reforms) or maximalist (e.g., resignation demands), whether tactics used are non-violent (e.g., negotiations, hunger strikes, "tent cities") or violent (e.g., riots, attacks on police, property damage), and foreign orientation (cooperation with or opposition toward Russia). *For each group that falls into a respective category, the matrix cell is marked by an X. Finally, each marked category in which a change occurred in a particular characteristic over time is indicated by a subscript denoting its first ( $X_1$ ) and second ( $X_2$ ) position.*

Opposition Group	Elite-led	Popular	Small < 5000	Large > 10000	Limited	Maximalist	Non-Violent	Violent	Foreign Orientation
Democratic Front	X			X	X		X		Normalization of relations with Russia
Conservative Party	X		X		X		X		No stated position
Industry Will Save Georgia	X		X		X		X		Ties to Russian business, anti-IMF and World Bank
Republican Party of Georgia	X		X		X		X		No stated position
Georgian Labour Party		X	X		X <sub>1</sub>	X <sub>2</sub>	X <sub>1</sub>	X <sub>2</sub>	Partnership with Russia
Movement for a United Georgia	X <sub>1</sub>	X <sub>2</sub>		X		X			No stated position
New Conservatives /New Rights	X		X		X <sub>1</sub>	X <sub>2</sub>	X		Improved relationship with Russian Federation; withdrawal from CIS and removal of peacekeepers from Abkhazia
National Council of Unified Public Movement	X			X		X	X		No stated position

### *External Threats*

In the post-Soviet era, Russia has been identified as the only state from which Georgia has received serious external threats. Even prior to the August War, post-independence relations had ranged from poor to tense, verging periodically on military confrontation (Nodia, 2005. pp. 39-40). Yet, it is important to note that despite some popular characterizations of the August events (as well as primordialist understandings of identity-based conflict), Georgian resistance to Russian influence in the Caucasus has not followed a singular pattern of historical precedents. During the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, the kings of Kartli-Kakheti sought direct intervention by the Romanovs and subsequent integration into the imperium of Catherine II in order to resist the advancing forces of the Ottoman and Qajar empires (Polyevktov, 1930. p. 368; Jones, 1987. pp. 53-54). Similarly, although the Russian annexation of the Georgian territories in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century and the resultant consolidation of the na-

tionalist movement was analogous with the manner in which the later establishment of the Czarist *gubernias* of Baku and Elizavetpol galvanized the Azerbaijani bourgeoisie to campaign for Transcaucasian independence, the 1832 revolt of Georgian nobles sought the restoration of the royal oligarchy rather than the ideal of popular sovereignty (Jones, 1987; Çağla, 2003. pp. 119, 122-123). Instead, it was the Georgian Mensheviks/Social Democrats during the 1920s that expressed the most intense rejection of Russian/Soviet centralization of control (Jones, 1988).

In addition, Moscow and Tbilisi have maintained intimate economic and infrastructural ties in the post-Soviet period, and domestic producers have remained highly dependent on Russian consumer markets as a primary source of revenue, while until recent years Russia had remained Georgia's largest trading partner, at a total volume of \$637.4 million in 2006 (AmCham, 2009)

Thus, Russian-Georgian relations should be examined as a series of complex historical interactions rather than as a continual struggle against imperial ambitions. The involvement of the Russian Federation on Georgian territory and its indirect influence within national society continued in both accommodative and coercive forms after the consolidation of the Rose Revolution. These have included the presence of Russian troops in the military bases at Gudauta (Abkhazia), Batumi (Ajaria), and Akhalkalaki (Javakheti), all but one of which were officially closed ahead of the three-year deadline set in the May 2005 withdrawal agreement, which generated resistance from local businesses dependent on their patronage (Niklas Nilsson and Johanna Popjanevski, 2009: 30-31); and conversely, a combination of import bans on agricultural and trade goods (e.g., "wine wars"), broad economic sanctions, including restrictions on air, land and sea transit (e.g., closure of the Kazbegi-Zemo Larsi customs checkpoint) and postal and banking communications, and visa cancellations and deportation of remittance laborers, all which were imposed from March-October 2006 (Anjaparidze, 2006).

### *Elite Behavior*

One of the primary indicators of how political leaders in a transitional country perceive national security is the practices through which they police society. A central concern in reforming domestic security agencies in the former Soviet countries has been the reorientation of their function and operations from the safeguarding of elites to the protection of the rights and safety of citizens. Recent studies on the political economy of institutions posit that the longevity of an authoritarian government is dependent on its continued

ability to provide private goods or patronage to a small “winning coalition” of regime supporters, while public goods such as welfare subsidies and social guarantees are distributed broadly to rest of society (Bueno de Mesquita, 1999, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). Yet, while monarchies and military juntas completely exclude their subject populations from politics, Soviet-style or Leninist systems purposively expand the “selectorate”, or that proportion of the society that chooses its leaders by introducing membership in an official party and establishing universal voting rights. Therefore, citizens of post-socialist states have historically enjoyed a limited degree of inclusion in the political process, despite the fact that elections and candidates were formerly the sole purview of the Communist elite.

Yet, as the size of the winning coalition gradually increases during the initial stages of democratization, it becomes progressively more difficult for leaders to maintain their incumbency, as supporters receive greater incentives to defect from the elite, while potential challengers gain greater access to resources for seeking to replace the leadership. Further, there is a possible corollary relationship between increased popular mobilization and social instability. Because they offer a greater chance that citizens might gain access to exclusive benefits, efforts to expand the selectorate may eventually increase popular pressures to introduce further reforms. If formal institutions or electoral systems are weak or insufficiently representative, expressions of discontent or conflicts of interest will occur outside of the political system in the form of strikes, riots or antigovernment demonstrations (Zak, 2000).

These conditions are in turn linked to policing patterns and the suppression of conflict as symbolized by public opposition to central authorities. For the military/defense establishment and security services additionally constitute the immediate supporters of an incumbent leadership in authoritarian and newly democratizing polities. As such, the basic structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) and police forces remained virtually unchanged from their Soviet-era format during the period from independence in 1991 until after the Rose Revolution (Transparency International Georgia, 2005: 1-2). Security and law enforcement agencies are especially difficult and costly to reform, as they have historically served as the guarantors of state power and protection of elite interests. This concerns not simply the ordained roles and functions of individual ministries and police forces, but their actual employment and conduct, particularly during periods of transition or crisis.

### Conclusion

This paper has sought to introduce a social scientific mechanics to critically and systematically address the controversial issue of external interference in the internal affairs of the Georgian state during the Saakashvili era. The model defined above aims to provide a foundation for analyzing these relationships using both qualitative (i.e., historical and ethnographic) and quantitative (i.e., statistical) methodologies. It is hoped that its application in further studies will help to increase the understanding of post-Rose Revolution and post-August War Georgian political conditions as the nation continues the process of reconciliation, social evolution and institutional reform.

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## **Georgian-Russian Conflict and Its Influence on the Energy and Security Situation in the Black Sea – Caspian Region.**

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*In this article author analyzes the influence of the Russian-Georgian crisis of August 2008 on the security and energy situation in the Black Sea region. The main threats and risks due to the Russian-Georgian crisis 2008 in the Black Sea region may be considered as activation of the situation in the separatist regions of Moldova and Azerbaijan, security of the transport routes, pipelines, energy resources supply from the Caspian basin. For Ukraine – complication of the relations with Russian Federation, aggravation of the Black Sea Fleet status problem, possibility to use South Ossetia Scenario in the Crimea, difficulties for the realization of the “White Stream” Project. Author also considers positions of the third parties in particularly the EU, Turkey, Armenia, Belarus and other CIS states and how the conflict touches their interests and relations with parties to conflict. Events of August 2008 demonstrated which mechanisms the Russian Federation is ready to use to prevent post-soviet states from the Euroatlantic integration. And the same time the conflict has demonstrated how six days crisis in such interconnected and important region as the Wider Black Sea can influence and impact not only on the regional players and neighbors but on the common European security and stability.*

### **რუსეთ-საქართველოს კონფლიქტი და მისი გავლენა ენერგო უსაფრთხოებაზე**

ჰანა შელესტი

სტრატეგიული სწავლების ეროვნული ცენტრი

**ნ**აშრომში ავტორი აანალიზებს რუსეთ-საქართველოს 2008 წლის აგვისტოს კრიზისს, შავი ზღვის რეგიონის ენერგო მდგომარეობის და უსაფრთხოების მიმართულებით. შავი ზღვის რეგიონში, რუსეთ-საქართველოს 2008 წლის კრიზისის შედეგად, მთავარ საფრთხეებად შეიძლება ჩაითვალოს მოლდავეთისა და აზერბაიჯანის სეპარატისტული რეგიონების გააქტიურების, სატრანსპორტო გზებისა და მილ-

სადენების უსაფრთხოების, კასპიის აუზის ენერგო უზრუნველყოფის საკითხები. უკრაინისათვის რუსეთის ფედერაციასთან გართულე-ბული ურთიერთობა ვლინდება შავი ზღვის ფლოტის სტატუსის საკ-ითხის გამძაფრებაში, ჩრდილოეთ ოსეთის სცენარის გამეორების ალბათობაში, პროექტ “თეთრი ნაკადის” განხორციელების შეფერხე-ბაში. ავტორი ყურადღებას ამახვილებს, ასევე ვერო კავშირის, თურქეთის, სომხეთის, ბელორუსიის და სხვა დსთ-ს ქვეყნების პოზი-ციებზე, მათ ინტერესებზე კონფლიქტის გაგენასთან დაკავშირებით. 2008 წლის აგვისტოს მოვლენებმა მოახდინა დემონსტრირება, თუ რა შექანიზმების გამყენება შეუძლია რუსეთის ფედერაციას ყოფილი საბჭოთა კავშირის ქვეყნების ვეროპასთან ინტეგრაციის საქმეში ხელის შესაშლელად. ამასთანავე კონფლიქტმა თვალნათლივ გვაჩვენა, რა შედეგები შეიძლება მოჰყვეს 6 დღიან კრიზისის ისეთ რე-გიონში, როგორცაა შავი ზღვის რეგიონი. გაუგენა გაგრცელდა არა-მარტო მეზობელ ქვეყნებზე, არამედ კონფლიქტმა ზოგადად ვეროპის უსაფრთხოებასა და სტაბილურობაზე იმოქმედა.

Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 should be considered in the context of the general geopolitical and geoenergetic situation in the Black Sea – Caspian region. Roots and consequences of this conflict touch interests of many actors of the international relations, have deep connection with other events in the world, including Kosovo independence proclamation in February 2008.

The goal of this article is to analyze consequences of the Russian – Georgian conflict of August 2008 for the energy and security situation in the Black Sea – Caspian region and to elaborate recommendations how to minimize its negative influence. The main tasks are analysis of the roots, which led to the crisis, study of the main risks and challenges due to the Russian-Georgian conflict. In addition, separate positions of the third parties concerning the August crisis will be examined and forecasts of the possible problem solutions made.

The relevance of the topic is in the direct influence of this conflict to the national security of other states of the Black Sea region, its consequences for the energy cooperation in the region and development of the relations with the European Union.

Russian – Georgian crisis of August 2008 intensified academic discussion on “frozen” conflicts in the Black Sea region both among academic of the post-Soviet space, Europe and the USA. Some authors concentrated on the roots and consequences of the conflicts, others – on the role of the third parties in

the region, a number of authors analyze particular aspects of the conflicts (ethnic questions, history of development, military and political issues, etc.). Among the main works on this topic it worth to mention those of H. Perepeyltsya (2003), Z. Suslu (2006), H. Karasar (2008), Y. Yakis (2008), etc. In addition, it is necessary to mention ad-hoc analytical researching of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (2008), International Crisis Group, South Caucasian Center of Regional Security, etc. Special attention deserve authors who started to work out on the interconnection of the energy security in the region with the solution of the conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan, such as C. Svante (2009), N. Kassenova (2009) and T. Marketos (2009).

Many experts assume that Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 and latest gas crisis in the Ukrainian-Russian relations of the beginning of 2009 are interconnected events – parts of the general concept to destabilize situation in the region, not-allowing Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO, to spoil their image on the world arena and promotion of own alternative projects of the energy resources transportation by-passing two states' territories.

Problem of the influence of the Russian-Georgian confrontation to the energy security in the Black Sea region is necessary to consider in two dimensions: direct impact on the realization of the projects of the energy supply from the Caspian region via territory of Georgia (Odessa-Brody, Baku-Supsa, Baku-Ceyhan, White stream, etc.) and indirect influence on the realization of the Russian projects of the gas pipeline "North Stream" and oil pipeline Burgas – Alexandropolis. De-facto Russian Federation conducts planned disinformation on Nabucco project in favor of "South Stream", in particularly in November 2008 Russian Ambassador to the EU V. Chizhov said that in distinction of the "South Stream" there are no sources for filling Nabucco (Посол России..., 2008).

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union some former republics (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan) appeared with huge energy resources without real possibility to export them to the world markets due to the lack of infrastructure and because they were landlocked. The only way they had was transit via territory of Russia. Economic and infrastructural components of the problems were resolved by foreign investments. From a political perspective it was understandable that the development of these resources and their export to world markets was a huge factor in the overall development of the successor states, and that the export route choices for these energy reserves would go a long way in determining where these states would manage – in spite of being small states surrounded by great powers – to become fully sovereign and independent actors on the world scene (Svante, 2009). American

government has actively supported projects of the alternative gas and oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Construction of the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum was one of the most successful projects, which stimulated active cooperation between three states in many other infrastructural projects, and gave an impetus for the economic development of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Moreover, it has created an alternative variant for Central Asian energy resources transportation to Europe and gave impulse for Nabucco project.

Functioning of the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and signature of the Nabucco gas pipeline construction agreement for the transportation of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan gas via territory of Georgia and Turkey to Europe in 2006 has changed monopoly status of the Russian Federation as a main supplier of energy resources to Europe. Some experts stress that construction of the pipeline via Georgian territory bypassing Russia was a challenge to the geopolitical ambitions of the Russian Federation (Svante, 2009). De-facto Central Asian and Caspian states have only two variants for energy resources transportation – either via Russia or via Georgia.

In January-February 2009 many experts (Газовый конфликт, 2009) ran a parallel between events of August 2008 in Georgia and gas disputes of Ukraine and Russia, emphasizing that they constitute links in one and the same chain, aiming to keep Ukraine and Georgia from the further European and Euroatlantic integration, and it was demonstration to the European Union whose influence in the Black Sea region was stronger.

Some Russian experts also adhere to the same idea about interconnection of the Russian-Georgian crisis 2008 and Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict 2009, for example expert of the analytical center “Caucasus” V. Yakubyan (США начали, 2009), but they consider this issue from another side, stressing that these two events were provoked by the USA intending to prevent strengthening of the EU and Russian roles in the region.

Concerning security sphere, so the main problems are “melting” of the conflicts on the post-Soviet space, activization of the separatist sentiments, new configuration of the spheres of influence in the region, possibility to use territories of the third states for conducting military operation (The Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet problem).

*History of the Problem. Reasons for Escalation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.*

Beginning of the Russian-Georgian confrontation is possible to date from the mid of the 1990-s, when one can witness the constant exacerbation of relations, particularly because of:

Lack of neutrality and support of the separatists by the CIS peacekeeping

forces, which are composed only from the Russian military.

Long-term refusal to withdraw Russian military bases of the Soviet times from the territory of Georgia

Ongoing clashes on the borders between Georgia and separatist regions

Issuing of the Russian passports to the population of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

Illegal construction of the railway from the Russian Federation to Abkhazia

Introduction of the visa regime between Georgia and Russia

Several spy scandals

Rose Revolution in Georgia and support of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine

Euroatlantic aspirations of Georgia

Appointment of the Russian citizens – employees of the security agencies on the policy-making posts in the separatists regions

Economic sanctions and embargo on export to the Russian Federation of Georgian agricultural products and wines, as well as stop of the transport and post connection between two states in 2006

Construction of the alternative pipelines (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa, White Stream, Nabucco)

It is possible to give prominence to four factors, which influenced the Russian attitude towards the post-Soviet space (After August 2008, 2008): NATO enlargement to the East, development of the alternative routes of the energy transportation, “color” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine; Kosovo independence proclamation.

As for NATO enlargement, so on the eve of the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 Russian leadership on various occasions stated that if Ukraine and Georgia would join North Atlantic Alliance it would be considered as a direct threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, and any actions to prevent such enlargement would be taken (Россия, 2008). This thesis was also included into the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in July 2008 (Концепция, 2008).

Proclamation of the Kosovo independence in February 2008 provoked active movements for independence of the Georgian and Moldova regions, in particularly idea of the Kosovo precedent was actively used for the settlement of the “frozen” conflicts in the Black Sea region. Official Moscow stated against the recognition of the Kosovo independence, that is why it looked so irrational her decision to recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in September 2008. One of the main problems was the fact that mentioning uniqueness of the Kosovo case, Western states could not give an explanation what

was this uniqueness about. As a result, Black Sea separatist regions insisted on the similarity of cases.

Russian-Georgian crisis took place amid to the following events that could minimize the international attention and be favorable for the Russian Federation. First, it is rise of the world oil and gas prices, and as a result quick filling of the Russian stabilization fund, as well as big dependence of the European Union states from the Russian energy resources together with active support by Germany of the “Northern Stream” project. Next factor that should be mentioned is difficult negotiations on Iran nuclear programme with participation of France, the UK, the EU, the USA and Russia, and from time to time disagreements between the Western partners and the Russian Federation about leverages and level of cooperation with Iran. Therefore, interest, first of all from the USA side, in the no-crisis relations with the Russian Federation. No small part had the actual rejection to present MAP for Ukraine and Georgia at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, not least because of the Russian diplomatic efforts. Political instability in Georgia and Ukraine, peak of the presidential campaign in the USA and opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing just added accents.

All these factors in August 2008 ran the West into difficulties concerning impossibility to adopt quick and mandatory decisions for defining adequacy of the Russian army’s and Georgian government actions. As far back as on March 6, 2008 the Russian Federation withdrew from the CIS decision on economic sanctions against Abkhazia and South Ossetia and set a course for deepening cooperation with them. Moreover, starting from May 2008, the Russian Federation has been conducting military exercises on the Northern Caucasus in close vicinity to the Georgian border (Caucasus – 2008) and naval exercises in the Black Sea.

South Ossetia was chosen not by accident. Before 2008, the situation had been more strain in Abkhazia. However, in 2007 the decision to organize Winter Olympic Games 2014 in Sochi (Russia), which is just 100 km from Sukhumi (Abkhazia), has been adopted. Deterioration of the situation in this conflict region could lead to a withdrawal to hold Olympic Games in Sochi due to the impossibility to guarantee a necessary level of security. Apart from image, Russian Federation could lose big investments, which were directed to the infrastructure development, as well as opportunity to use resources of Abkhazia, including infrastructure, human resources and construction materials. Yet one reason for South Ossetia to be chosen was reliance on the support from the North Ossetia, which is a part of the Russian Federation.

In March 2008, President Saakashvili proposed the peace plan in conflict resolution in Abkhazia, which stipulated grant of wide autonomy and creation

of the Free Economic Zone, as well as veto power for vital decisions and constitutional changes, and a post of the vice-president. Nevertheless, this plan was rejected by Sukhumi. In July 2008, the government of South Ossetia also rejected to accept proposition of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany Mr. F. Steinmeier to widen the international presence in negotiation process. As a matter of fact all this was a slowdown of the negotiation process and resolution of the conflicts in Georgia.

In July 2008 the Russian Federation started the full-scale military exercises „Caucasus 2008“, which should be ended by the August 2, 2008, however troops were not returned to their home stations but stayed in North Ossetia. Beginning of the August 2008 characterized by the shootings on the border between Georgia and South Ossetia, origin of which hasn't been discovered, and as a result of which President of Georgia M. Saakashvili made a decision to bring troops to South Ossetia.

On August 8, 2008 Russia availed herself of the motive – security of the Russian citizens – brought troops to the territory of South Ossetia. However, by some evidence Russia brought her troops there yet on August 7, 2008 (Латынина, 2008), that afford ground for dispute who had been the first one to start military actions – Russia or Georgia. In several days Russian troops entered territory of Abkhazia.

The week of the military actions and mediation of the European Union headed by the President of France N. Sarkozy led to the signing of the Agreement of Six points, violated for several times, which led to the cease-fire and deployment of the European observers on the territory of Georgia and Russian military bases on the territory of two separatist regions, proclamation of their independence and recognition of these independences by the Russian Federation on August 26, 2008.

From the very beginning of the conflict, the Russian Federation accused Ukraine in the military support of Georgia, in particular in “illegal transfer of arms”, not providing any official evidences. This thesis was a provocation and an attempt to spoil the image of Ukraine at the international arms market, because Georgia has not been under any sanctions prohibited arms trade, and cooperation with Ukraine took place in the framework of the earlier signed contracts.

In fact, there are *three main versions of the conflict's reasons*:

Desire of the Russian Federation to prevent NATO enlargement to the East and to retain influence over the post-soviet space.

Attempt to spoil image of Georgia as a transit state for oil and gas supply from the Caspian region, and to undermine attempts of the alternative energy routes to Europe (oil pipeline Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan, Baku – Tbilisi – Supsa

and gas pipeline Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum and “White Stream” project). In this case, Russia de facto would be the only one to have control over the energy supply to Europe.

Desire of Georgia to attract attention of the international community, first of all of the NATO and the EU, to the problem of unresolved conflicts at its territory and inadequate actions of Russia, aiming quick NATO joining.

*Analysis of the main threats and risks resulted from the Russian-Georgian crisis of 2008.*

Today we can define threats and risks both for the whole Black Sea region and for separate states, especially for Ukraine. For the Black Sea region, it is stepping up of the situation in the separatist regions of Moldova and Azerbaijan, threat to the security of the transport routes, pipelines and temporary stop of energy supply from the Caspian basin. For Ukraine, this list is added by aggravation in the relation with the Russian Federation, exacerbation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet status problem, possibility to use South Ossetian scenario in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, etc.

The Russian – Georgian conflict clearly demonstrated level of the decision-making in Russia, namely the leading role of the Prime Minister V. Putin, and level of his personal position influence on the internal and external policy-making. De-facto during the whole military campaign the statements were made against the President of Georgia Mr. Saakashvili personally, whom Russian leadership negatively perceived after the Rose Revolution of 2003, but not against the Georgian state or its people. So in the beginning of September 2008 Mr. Medvedev states in the interview to the Italian TV channel RAI that for Russia “the current regime is bankrupt. President Mikhail Saakashvili no longer exists for us. He is a ‘political corpse’” (as cited in Barry, 2008).

The Russian-Georgian conflict has the following consequences for the energy security in the Black Sea region. Russian army operations, in particularly bombing of the oil terminal in Poti and Azerbaijan oil cisterns on the railway line Baku –Tbilisi – Kars, as well as bombing around the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline demonstrated vulnerability of the infrastructure and transportation routes. Moreover, the conflict had a psychological effect, when some investors rejected to participate in the projects for alternative energy resources transportation from the Caspian region, including slowdown of the Nabucco project realization. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the long-term perspective can redirect their export from Europe to China, and dependence of the European states from the Russian energy resources will increase.

It is necessary to mention that the United States and Georgia are going to advance security of the energy transit via territory of Georgia to the European markets about which is said in the Charter on strategic partnership USA – Georgia signed on January 9, 2009.

*Position of the third parties.*

Important factor is that members of the CIS and Shanghai group have not supported the Russian military actions against Georgia and have not recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the Final Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of the CSTO member-states on September 5, 2008, participants supported Russian military actions without enthusiasm, and rejected to recognize the former Georgian regions' independence. It was of special importance the reject of Belarus, as the main ally and satellite of Russia at the post-soviet space, to recognize independence of the Georgian regions. Furthermore, right from this moment we can witness open rapprochement of Minsk with Brussels.

Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis because of the overprice for gas in 2009 started not least because Russian Federation to guarantee support of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had signed with them in August-September 2008 agreements on supply of energy resources at the European prices, not taking into account their possible decrease in the end of the year (Russia and Uzbekistan..., 2008). One of the reasons for such an agreement was wish to prevent transportation of the Central Asian gas via the territory of Georgia and desire to minimize support of the Caucasian states from the side of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

It is necessary to mention that despite the official denunciation of the Russian actions from Ukraine and expressed support of Georgia, high percentage of the Ukrainian population, especially on the East and South of the country, positively reflected the Russian actions. First of all, it took place because of the high level of confidence to the news programmes of the Russian TV channels unlike Ukrainian ones. Additionally, internal political confrontation in Ukraine and activation of the pro-Russian parties contributed to this.

Ukraine, not taking direct part in the conflict and in its settlement, nevertheless faced serious threats and consequences of the Russian-Georgian conflict, and de-facto lost information war when Russia accused it, in particular concerning the "illegal" arms trade and existence of the "Ukrainian military mercenaries" in Georgia. August crisis demonstrated a big role of the information war and information filling as an instrument of the foreign policy. Unfortunately, today Ukraine loses in such "disputes". That is why it is necessary to view all sides of the informational substance of the foreign policy of Ukraine and reaction, especially in crises and disputes with other states. It is also necessary to elaborate mechanisms of the adequate and rapid informational reaction and foreign media presence for objective highlights, receiving of the information from the "first hands" by the citizens and political elites of the foreign states.

After the Russian-Georgian conflict, there were fears that the Russian Federation could repeat that scenario in Moldova. Though such an idea has a right for existence, it is impractical because on the Caucasus, the South Ossetian region has an immediate border with Russia, and this fact makes possible a military intervention on the side of the separatist region. Transnistria has borders only with Moldova and Ukraine. As Ukraine supports the territorial integrity of Moldova, it makes impossible passage of the Russian troops through its territory. However, there is still a possibility of the political influence on Moldova, threatening by the South Caucasian scenario. Thus, Moscow can bolster influence on Chisinau insisting on Kozak Plan or any other peace plan acceptance, which will allow Russian military contingent presence on the territory of Transnistria during the next 20 years. Nevertheless, this possibility is reduced after the Communist party lost Parliamentary elections 2009.

Turkey appeared in August 2008 in a difficult situation. On one hand, it is connected with Georgia by oil and gas pipelines projects, and is one of the main investors in the infrastructural projects and economy of Georgia. On the other hand, Turkey actively cooperates with the Russian Federation both in energy sphere (Blue Stream Project) and in naval sphere (anticipation of the NATO operation "Active Endeavors" expanding to the Black Sea region). Moreover, Russia promised to prohibit Russian tourists to visit Turkey in case of the strong support of Georgia, and this could significantly influence the state budget filling.

When in August 2008 Russian bombers attacked oil pipeline Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan, usually safe in the relation with Russia, Turkey reacted very drastic. Being a NATO member, Turkey allowed several naval ships of NATO states (in particularly Germany, Spain, the USA and Poland) to enter the Black Sea via Bosphorus and Dardanelles aiming humanitarian aid to the population of Georgia. In addition, Turkey helped Georgia with firefighting, which was caused by the Russian bombing of the Borjomi-Kharagauli Forest Reserve. In the mid of August, just after the events in South Ossetia, Prime Minister of Turkey Mr. Erdogan tried to be a mediator in the conflict and met with Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Putin. At the same time, Mr. Erdogan met President of Georgia Mr. Saakashvili, according to whom "fraternal Turkey" granted the biggest humanitarian aid to Georgia and promised to reconstruct Gori city (Туреччина, 2008).

Armenia, which is the main partner of the Russian Federation on Caucasus, appeared in the most difficult situation. De-facto its territory is isolated because of the problematic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Georgia is the only link that connects Armenian territory with other states. That is why

when Russian troops destroyed railway-bridge in Georgia, Armenia sent its materials and engineers to restore it, and in autumn 2008 rejected to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia so not to spoil relations with Georgia (Avoyan, 2008).

De-facto spoiled its image as a mediator after the events in Georgia; Russia boosted its “peaceful” initiatives towards other “frozen” conflicts in the Black Sea region. On November 2, 2008, the meeting of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Moscow was organized in Moscow, at which Declaration on peace ways of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was signed. On March 18, 2009, the meeting of the President of Moldova and the Head of the Transnistria was also organized in Moscow. Any compromises were not reached at this meeting but was decided to revive negotiation in “5+2” format. These two meeting demonstrated that the Russian Federation is not going to decrease its role in the settlement of the conflicts at the territory of the former USSR states, and relies on unilateral leadership in this process, not inviting to negotiations other participants, including the OSCE Minsk Group, Ukraine, etc. At the same time, it is necessary to underline the “show”-nature of these meetings, as in reality any concrete results were reached. Even the Moscow Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh just confirmed those principles, which were on repeated occasions pointed at different negotiations on this conflict. However, these two meetings were accompanied by a serious media campaign where the leading role of Russia, its success as a mediator and peacekeeper were stressed, having the goal – to polish image at the international arena.

It is noteworthy position of the European Union. Actually, it was a first time when Brussels step as a mediator and openly intervene in the process of the conflict settlement in the Black Sea region. Only in 2007, the EU paid attention to the region adopting the Black Sea Synergy, a document, which paid a little attention to the “frozen conflicts” considering confidence building measures enough to enhance cooperation in the region. However, events of August 2008 demonstrated that “melting” conflicts pose a threat not only to the security of Georgia and other Black Sea states but also a threat to the European security and stability. Active mediation efforts of the French President Mr. Sarkozy, presiding in the EU, demonstrated two important facts. For the first time, the EU stood together in expressing the position on a foreign policy issue towards the Black Sea region. And at the same time big concessions to Russia, inability to impose sanctions and de-facto disregard of provisions of the peace agreement from the Russian side proved dependence and caution of the EU in relationship with Moscow due to the fear that she will use energy factor as a lever of influence.

*Forecasts on further situation development.*

As for today, there are two possible variants of the event trends for South Ossetia:

South Ossetia will merge into the Russian Federation by uniting with North Ossetia;

Start of the situation destabilization in North Ossetia aiming to separate from Russia, to unite with South Ossetia and found a new independent state. This variant is less probable in the short-term perspective because of the strong power concentration in the Russian Federation, low level of the socio-economic development of the region and therefore inability to finance the development of the Ossetian state by itself.

The most realistic is a variant for the conflict settlement in Georgia when South Ossetia will join Russia uniting with North Ossetia, and Abkhazia will return to Georgia with great autonomy rights. This variant has a chance for success because:

South Ossetia ethnically is different from Georgia but identical to North Ossetia.

South Ossetian elite is totally under control of Moscow, and Russian Federation finance the "state" budget

South Ossetia always proclaimed its desire to join with Russia.

South Ossetia does not have developed infrastructure, own resources and economic perspectives for independent existence.

Abkhazia does not express its wish to join with Russia.

Because of close location of Abkhazia to Sochi, Russia will avoid destabilization in the region.

Previous years of negotiations showed that Abkhazian leadership leaned towards the idea of broad autonomy until Russia involved.

At the territory of Abkhazia ethnic Abkhaz are not the ethnic majority, and in case refugees return to Gali region, Georgian population will prevail.

Further recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by other states is an important question. As for today, only the Russian Federation, Venezuela and Nicaragua (partly) have recognized these two republics. Moreover, after the CSTO meeting in Moscow in September 2008, one cannot witness any work of Russia for promoting idea of recognition of these newly created states. It is an opinion that Russia does not insist on their recognition by the international community because in case this will happen, Russia can lose its levers of influence and monopolistic position and special relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Николай Злобин, 2008).

### *Conclusions*

Russian-Georgian conflict set the real parties to conflict, switched over negotiations from Georgia-South Ossetia and Georgia – Abkhazia to Georgia – Russia format. As a confirmation to this is a fact that the EU conducted all negotiations with Moscow, but not with governments of the unrecognized republics. In addition, deployment of the regular army of the Russian Federation, which did not have resolution of any international organization and was not as a peacekeeper, made Russia a direct part to the conflict, yet one time, confirmed its impossibility to be a mediator. Event of August 2008 demonstrated which mechanisms the Russian Federation is ready to use to prevent post-soviet states from the Euroatlantic integration. If in March-April 2008 Moscow confined to strong statements, so events of August 2008 dramatically demonstrated these “any means” by which it is ready to confront this process.

Events of August 2008 and their consequence should push Ukrainian government towards prevention of the “Georgian scenario” reoccurrence on its territory; first of all, it is necessary to activate check process of double citizenship among the Crimean population, especially among the former Russian military men, and to enhance Ukrainian legislation on termination of citizenship. Moreover, it is necessary to elaborate clear mechanism of control over the Russian Black Sea Fleet activities in the Crimea to prevent its reuse in military acts against third states. Yet one consequence for Ukraine was an attempt to spoil its image of the arms trader at the world market. That is why it is necessary to inform about Ukrainian-Georgian military-technical cooperation, arms trade, and fact-finding on illegal trade in Georgia before and during the Russian-Georgian crisis.

The European Union in its turn tries to play a more active role in the Black Sea region, including being a mediator; however, internal collisions and unwillingness to confront with the Russian Federation limit its activity. Not at least it was demonstrated by very quick return to negotiations on a new agreement between the EU and Russia, which had been suspended in August 2008 and inability to gain point on deployment of the EU observers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and strict respect of the “Six points” Agreement.

In addition, it is necessary to mention that August events demonstrated that struggle for routes of energy supply to Europe from Central Asia and Caspian region can be not only in economic sphere, but also in political and military one, what should be taken into account while planning alternative energy routes.

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## Ritual as a Sign and Means of Identity

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*The paper aims to show how it is possible to associate the concept of identity with “ancestral customs” and “cultural memory”. With that purpose the author tries to outline a particular version of collective remembering grounded in the use of ritual resources. With that end in view, the special literature together with the field ethnographic data collected by the author during the years 1976-89 throughout Georgia had been used in the paper. Purposely, the ritual process associated with the early-Christian tradition had been described not as a stereotyped activity, but as related events located within Georgian history. It has also been shown that the mentioned custom bore the function of the ethnic and cultural identification, as foreigners and aliens infiltrated from other countries who performed the custom, in that way were adopted and integrated into the Georgian Christian culture. An emphasize has been made on the importance of the performance of the ritual which became so inseparable and immanent among the inhabitants of Georgia, that in spite of the confessional turbulences of the later periods, it persisted in the environment of a new faith. The main task of the paper was organized around the question: whether it is possible to experience the feeling of identity and wholeness within the Georgian culture throughout the centuries by means of performing an established ancestral ritual. The analysis of the ethnographic data provided the author with clues to the identity, culture and self-understanding of an age-old Georgian society.*

### რიტუალი, როგორც იდენტობის ნიშანი და სამუალება

ნინო აბაკელია

ილია ჭავჭავაძის სახელობის უნივერსიტეტი

**ს**ტატიის მიზანია აჩვენოს, თუ როგორ შეიძლება დაკავშირდეს იდენტობის კონცეფცია “წინაპართაგან დაწესებულ წესებთან” და “კულტურულ მეხსიერებასთან”. მიზნებიდან გამომდინარე, ავ-

ტორი ცდილობს მოხაზოს კოლექტიური მეხსიერების ერთი კერძო ვერსია, რომელიც ემყარება რიტუალური რესურსების გამოყენებას. აღნიშნული ასპექტით მხედველობაში, სტატიაში მოხმობილია საველე ეთნოგრაფიული მასალა, შეკრებილი საქართველოს სხვადასხვა კუთხეში ავტორის მიერ 1976-89 წლებში. ადრე-ქრისტიანულ ტრადიციასთან ასოცირებული რიტუალური პროცესი აღწერილია არა როგორც სტერეოტიპული აქტივობა/ქმედება, არამედ როგორც ერთმანეთთან დაკავშირებული მოვლენები, რომლებიც ლოკალიზდება საქართველოს ისტორიის ფარგლებში. სტატიაში ასევე ნაჩვენებია ხსენებული ტრადიციის ეთნიკური და კულტურული იდენტიფიკაციის ფუნქცია, რომლის მიხედვით უცხოები და სხვა ქვეყნებიდან ინფილტრირებული მოსახლეობა აღნიშნული წესის შესრულებით ადაპტირდებოდა და ინტეგრირდებოდა ქართულ ქრისტიანულ კულტურაში. ემფაზის კეთდება რიტუალის შესრულების მნიშვნელობაზე, რომელიც იმდენად განუყრელი და იმანენტური გახდა საქართველოს მოსახლეობისთვის, რომ მოგვიანო პერიოდის კონფესიური აღრეულობის მიუხედავად (საქართველოს ზოგიერთ კუთხეში) შენარჩუნდა და შემორჩა ახალ კონფესიურ გარემოშიც. მთავარი ამოცანა სტატიისა ორგანიზებულ იქნა შეკითხვის გარშემო: შესაძლებელია თუ არა იდენტობისა და ერთიანობის განცდა ქართულ კულტურაში წინაპართაგან დადგენილი რიტუალის შესრულებით. ეთნოგრაფიული მასალის ანალიზი ავტორს გასაღებს აძლევს საქართველოს უძველესი მოსახლეობის იდენტობის, კულტურისა და თვით-შემეცნების შესაწავლისთვის. მთავარი ცნებები: ადრე-ქრისტიანული პრაქტიკა, კულტურული მეხსიერება, იდენტობა, აღდგომის დღესასწაული, საიდუმლო სერობა.

The concept of identity is generally associated with such terms as “ancestral customs”, “historical”, “collective and cultural memories.” As Jonathan Webber (2007) puts it: “Historical memory must define a special relationship with what belongs to one’s own experience of time” (p.74). According to Prof. Jonathan Sacks (2009. p.29) “History is information. Memory, by contrast, is part of identity” (as cited in Webber, 2007, p.76). Bellow I’ll try to outline a particular version of collective remembering grounded in the use of ritual resources, in particular, ancestor rituals.

The ritual processes described bellow are not stereotypical activities but related events located within Georgian history. Though it has many unique and special features still, they can provide general insights into processes of cultural memory formation.

The prominent ethnographers Niko Janashia (1960) and Solomon Zvanba (1982) had attested a very interesting ritual annually performed in Abkhazia. According to their descriptive ethnographic data, in the cattle of each Abkhazian the best cow was picked out and dedicated to St George which was specially marked by an incision on the right ear. In the wine storehouse of each Abkhazian household the biggest wine vessel (kind of amphora) was dug into the ground in the name of St George. Annually the wine vessel was filled with pure red wine and a prayer was recited over it. The ritual of sacrifice was performed in the following way: the sacrificial animal was brought to the door of the house, where the members of the family gathered and knelt facing east; with their hands crossed on breast; in deep silence they stayed motionless; the *pater familias* (the father of the family) was bare-headed. The head of the family (the ritual leader) touched the sacrificial animal on the ear and recited the following prayer: "St George of Ilori! (local sacred place-name - N.A.) I offer you the sacrificial animal likewise the ancestors. Do not leave us without your protection and give us health and longevity, protect us from every possible disaster and illness now and in the future, protect us against evil spirits and evil eyes. Don't leave us and our relatives who are absent now and those all, who we love alone without your grace!" Every member of the family replied to this with "Amen". Then the participants got on their feet and bowed their heads eastwards, though it must be mentioned that at that time they did not make the sign of cross over themselves even in the case they were baptized. The dedicated animal after that had been sacrificed and boiled in special cattle. Besides, ritual breads filled with cheese, called in Georgian khachapuri were baked and a small size waxen candle was made. After all that the head of the family (who was the chief prayer) would go to the wine storehouse to open the promised wine vessel. Boiled meat and baked khachapuri were taken to the wine storehouse and put near the praying amphora. The whole family knelt before the sacred ware facing the East. The head of the family lit the candle, fixed it to the amphora, burnt some frankincense on the live coal and when it smoked he repeated the prayer which had been recited before the sacrifice. The prayer was concluded with "Amen" that was repeated by the attendants of the ritual. After the prayer, the performer of the ritual used to cut the heart and the leaver (i.e. the most sacred parts) of the sacrificed animal and the ritual bread into small pieces and wetted them in wine and fried on the red-hot coal. After that he divided them according to the number of ritual attendants and distributed them among the prayers and poured the consecrated wine into the cup. Then everybody would stand up and bow eastwards and leave Marani i.e. the wine storehouse. They would take with them the sacrificial meat and khachapuri and

would sit at table and feast under the grace of the saint. The neighbors who had not got the custom to perform such ritual prayers were invited. To my mind it might be a later innovation, for this ritual was distinguished among others with its occult character, where outsiders were not admitted. The described custom, according to Solomon Zvanba (1982), had been performed by every true Abkhazian in spite of his faith. It is important to note that there had not been appointed a special day of the ritual (for the process of forgetting had started after the conversion of this region). But still according to the informants Easter morning was preferred. The Christians after the morning service used to partake into the ritual and as to the Muslims and pagans they could perform the rite straight in the morning. Those who could not manage to fulfill and partake into the ancestral custom could perform it in the Summer on one of the Sundays (but not in the Lenten fast). The above data can be filled with N. Janashia's (1960) information, according to which every Abkhazian had a special wine amphora kept in the name of the Lord in his wine storehouse, which was filled with excellent (preferably red) wine. The wine would not be used under any circumstances before it had not been offered in libation in the prayer ritual dedicated to the Lord. The consecrated wine ware could also be dedicated to St Mary. According to the same scholar, every habitat of Achandara (a village in Abkhazia) had a small size sacred vessel dedicated to the powerful anifsnykha (the wonder making icon of the Assumption of the Mother of God) in his wine storehouse which was used on the appointed Easter Sunday in the name of Dydripsh (the name of the sacred mountain where the ruins of the old sanctuary had been found); for that day every habitat had a dedicated cow (azatv i.e. a sacrificial animal). Thus, according to the above cited data, prayer amphorae were dedicated to the Lord, Blessed Virgin Mary and St George. In this village the ancestral custom had been performed annually on the Easter Day, which usually ended with communal meal. Superficially the described cultural fact attested by the scholars in Abkhazia might look quite exotic but making comparison with the ethnographic data that had been gathered throughout the whole Georgia during 1974 - 1989 the things turned out to be different.

As the format of the paper does not allow expatiating on the subject and as several papers had been dedicated to the reconstruction of the whole ritual (Abakelia. 1999; 2000; 2000a; 2001) here I'll take liberty of presenting the received assumptions in the form of summary. These papers actually revealed Early Christian practice in Georgian reality which might fill the lacunae in the early period of Christianity itself (as far as we have insufficient and scanty information about it). The early Christian tradition of the divine worship at houses can be traced in Georgia in the custom of "braking bread" over the sa-

cred wine-vessel, dug deep into the ground on the right side (i.e. on the sacred side) of the special building for storing wine, called in Georgian - maran-i. The religious ritual performed there (which had preserved the sequence of religious activities cited above) is considered to be analogous to the Greek anaphora (i.e. the central prayer in the Eucharistic liturgy).

In the term maran-i, to my mind, can be traced the Aramaic words maran-atha ( i.e. the recurring words in the Eucharistic prayer and the last words in the Bible – “come Lord to us”) which in the course of time might lose the incomprehensible -atha, and could transform into quite a local form – maran-i. In this case the name of the building implies in itself the essence and the meaning of the performed cult. The mentioned name implies the information about its bearer. (The name in such cases also comprises the predicate). The refrain of the prayer explains the meaning of the cult acts. Thus as I have assumed, since early-Christian times maran-i has been the meeting place with the Lord; it has been His representative place. Consequently the symbolism of maran-i and the concept of the Christian God are closely connected to each other. These ideas can also be traced in the mythology and sacred folk poetry associated with the wine store- house, which is cultic by its nature and can be interpreted according to the principle of sacred. They include the contents of the knowledge, which had been gathered, remade and codified in the public consciousness.

One of such well-known cultic songs attested in Eastern Georgia unfolds the following iconic picture:

“In the Ruby wine storehouse  
Where wine and ruby sparkle,  
There grows the poplar tree,  
It is young and its stem is branched,  
The nightingale sits on top of it,  
Opening its wings ready to flight” (Bardavelidze. 1957. p. 80)

The mythological image of the tree which was associated with the wine store-house was first analyzed and defined as one of the variants of the Tree of Life by Prof. V.Bardavelidze (ibid. pp.78-81).

On the current level of the knowledge, the condensed form of the cited verse can be interpreted according to the principle of sacred in the following way:

Some kind of spiritual landscape which emanates from the verse and which is specifically characteristic of icons belongs to the higher spheres of the reality than the every day life of humans.

Marani safely enclosed in different cases with trees, fence or building, constitutes a sacred territory in which the divine power is present. In short,

in this iconic constellation the cultic amphorae is the visible sign of the presence of the Lord in marani. The implicit sequence of its content is following: a). Red wine – ruby (precious stone comp. with the symbolism of the Apocalyptic mineralogy) – sacrifice- Jesus. b). Poplar tree – in this concrete case is associated with the Father’s principle, and the trunk - with the Son’s. c). As for the nightingale – it might be the local revelation of the Holy Spirit. The above said gives the opportunity to the supposition that in this icon the allegorical prefiguration of the Trinity is revealed (Abakelia. 2001.pp.7-12).

Thus “the bread of God” himself, who comes down from Heaven” and who is born in Bethlehem (i.e. in the House of Bread) has been worshipped in Georgia from the early Christian period in the House of Wine – maran-i, which in the course of time has transformed into the traditional norm and still continues its life alongside the Church. Marani had both: household and cultic functions. It served as a subsidiary farm-house while there various kinds of viticulture and wine-making implements were kept. It was cultic as various religious rituals were performed over the consecrated wine vessels dug in the right part of it (e.g. at childbirth, baptizing, wedding and so forth) during the year. These facts also were attested by the 17th century Italian Missioner Archangelo Lamberti(1939), according to whose information in the villages of Samegrelo where churches were destroyed or did not exist, wedding rituals were performed in Marani i.e. in the wine storehouse, which was considered to be one of the holy places, worshipped similarly as church. But as ethnographic data attests, even then when the wedding took place in a church, after the ceremony, married couple was met by the master of the house and led to Marani to be blessed over the consecrated wine vessel on the purpose to incorporate the bride into the new family. The place of the amphora where it is dug is consecrated and is the holy of holies for Georgians. It cannot be simply approached. Women and children generally are not admitted to it. A lot of miracles are associated with it. e.g. once the lit (brightened) with candles amphora ascended from the ground and then descended back in the presence of the master and nearby angels in white attires walked to and fro.

In the customs performed over amphora one of the main inventories is a clay vial, in which holy drink was poured and carried around (passed over) the participants of the ritual, from where they drank the wine and blessed the family. The ritual which was a statute throughout generations and was strictly preserved at Easter convocation had lost its initial meaning. And still there arises a question: what does the performed ritual reveal? Proceeding from the above said, all that has to be associated with the Christian sacramental mystic, Christian sacramental metaphor. The ritual performed over

the consecrated wine vessel implied the participation of a definite group of people (definite social unit - community, kin village, family), who offered a sacrificial animal, broke bread, prayed and made their communion., which actually was the Eucharistic Feast at Easter). Marani was considered to be the most sacred and beloved place for the performance of the ritual partaken by community, village, kin, family. In this respect, according to its functions (establishing contacts between messmates, and between them and the God, as well) it reminds the *kenacullum* of the first Christians. The clay vial, used in the ritual performed over the wine vessel could be compared with and defined as a Eucharistic symbol, the well known mythologized symbol of which is *Grail* or bowl (vial) in which according to the legend the blood of the Savoir had been gathered by Josef from Arimathaea during the Deposition from the Cross. The bread broken between the participants is called ganatekhi (broken bread) (widely used in Racha and Lechkumi (regions in the west Georgia) even nowadays), and the common meal - "puris gantexva" (i.e. "breaking of bread"), which is in full accordance with the New Testament common meal (comp. Luke 24. pp. 30, 35; Acts: 20.7, 11). According to some suppositions, the phrase "breaking of bread" directly connotes the Lord's Last Supper (Acts 2.42). Thus according to our investigations, in marani (the Wine House), which had the functions of *kenakulum*, by means of performed ritual the believers (participants) related themselves with the first liturgy i.e. with the last Supper of the Lord, when a new sacrament had been established by the Savoir which meant by means of bread and wine, communion with the blood and flash of the Christ. It must specially marked, that every Christian tradition had and has its main cult, by which it is distinguished from the other Christian traditions. For example, in Eastern Europe and in particular, in Russia to such cults belong the worship of the Lord's Grave (together with pilgrimages which accompany this cult), as for Georgia the most important cult for it was "the Last Supper of the Lord". In this paper a special accent has been made on the fact that the above described and analyzed ritual performed in the wine storehouse among other things also pointed to the ethnic belonging. The people resettled (and migrated) from foreign countries as a rule did not perform the local customs, did not observe and follow the rules and rituals. Though with some exceptions there were migrants who wanted to become full members (or at least nominal members) of the local culture and those who were persuaded to fulfill local customs because of the committed sin or some accident.

The Abkhazian ethnographic data is a vivid illustration of this thesis. According to the widespread beliefs, lies before the icon (and in particular before St George' icon) and some other kind of faults were strictly and severely punished by the saint. That's why the sinner as soon as he fell ill or met some

other kind of disaster admitted his guilt before the icon and in an effort to escape the crisis performed the so called “purifying sacrifice” or “rites of passage” over the consecrated wine vessel according to the local rules. After that he performed the ancestral custom annually together with the rest of the population. Consequently the newcomer (novice) was converted into “Abkhazian” what in fact meant to become “Georgian” while he/she (the newcomer) by means of this ritual communicated and shared with Georgian Christian tradition.

Finally it must be emphasized that in Abkhazia the trace of Christianity might be found not only in the number of old churches and monasteries, but also in the old ancestral cultic actions, which point to the early Christian ritual practice and is the main practice for Georgians. The described custom, despite the later confusion of confessions (conversion into Mohammedanism) remained the stable custom and this part of Georgia together with the other parts of it over the centuries had been constructing one whole culture or better to say the spiritual configuration of Christian culture.

And the last question is that: what sort of symbols can share identity? These ritual symbols might be the communal meal presided over the sacred wine vessel by the *Pater familias* as patron at a banquet, the ritual of breaking of bread, the cup of wine over which a blessing is spoken. And at last the whole ritual might be seen as rite of passage during which new individuals were incorporated into the new identity. Thus the above analyzed ritual expressing the central values and goals of the society might provide us with clues to the identity, culture and self-understanding of age-old Georgian society.

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## First Steps of Young Scientists

### Concept of Terrorism in International Relations

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**T**errorism is already recognized as a main threat to the international system in the XXI century, rightly compared with the Cold War problem in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After the notorious 9/11 events, the issue of terrorism has prevailed over such serious problems as proliferation, organized crime, etc. Thus study of terrorism is increasingly becoming one of the most challenging activities. Terrorism is an extremely complicated phenomenon, making its study quite difficult. The scholars need to count with a variety of details, often leading them to confusion. Thus a number of directions for study of terrorism had been singled out, including definition of the concept itself; history of terrorism; theoretical explanation of terrorism; and finally-the various forms of terrorism.

### ტერორიზმის ცნება საერთაშორისო ურთიერთობებში

სოფიო ბარბაკაძე  
საქართველოს უნივერსიტეტი

**ტ**ერორიზმის თემა 21-ე საუკუნის მსოფლიოში თავისი მნიშვნელობით პირველ ადგილზე დგას. ეს ის საკითხია, რომელიც თავისი აქტუალობით ცივი ომის დროს არსებულ საფრთხეს უტოლდება. 2001 წლის 11 სექტემბრის ცნობილი მოვლენების შემდეგ, ტერორიზმის თემა უკან ჩამოიჭრა ისეთი საკითხები, როგორებიცაა მასობრივი განადგურების იარაღის გავრცელება, ორგანიზებული დანაშაული, და სხვა პრობლემები. ტერორიზმი რთული და მრავალმხრივი მოვლენაა, რაც საკმაოდ აძნელებს მის მეცნიერულ შესწავლას. ტერორიზმის შესწავლის პროცესში განსაკუთრებული მნიშვნელობა ენიჭება ისეთ საკითხებს, როგორებიცაა მოცემული ცნების განსაზღვრება; ტერორიზმის ისტორია; ტერორიზმის წარმოშობის შესახებ არსებული თეორიები; და ბოლოს-ტერორიზმის სხვადასხვა ფორმა.

The problem of terrorism has already been identified as the main threat of the beginning 21<sup>st</sup> century. The problem has become so sheer, that many experts equalize it with the danger the Cold War was posing to the security and stability of the international system in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After the notorious 9/11 the problem of terrorism has overwhelmed the society leaving such serious questions as the proliferation and organized crime far behind. Terrorism has indeed become the main threat to international system in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, respectively, studying this global phenomenon is receiving more and more scholarly attention recently.

The concept of terrorism is quite complex and manifold, making its study quite complicated. This fact is partially explaining why most authors try to concentrate their attention only on some specific aspect of terrorism. Some of the most frequently studied aspects are as follows: defining the concept of terrorism; history of terrorism; theories explaining terrorism; various forms of terrorism.

### *Defining Terrorism*

The term "terrorism" has developed from the French "*terreur*" (terror) and has first been used in the period after the French Revolution in 1789.

The application of the term "terrorism" is quite controversial, as it can be easily used to designate the violence sponsored by the state, as well as the violence applied against the state. Although the consensus over this issue has not been yet reached, the definition of terrorism mostly agreed upon is as follows: terrorism is an act of using violence against the civilians or the threat to do so, having some sort of political, economic or social changes in mind (Martin, 2004).

Defining terrorism may be much more difficult than it seems from the first sight. "The statement, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," has become not only a cliché, but also one of the most difficult obstacles in coping with terrorism" (Ganor, 2008). Before we begin the task of defining terrorism, we should note, that all of the authors dealing with this issue admit the tremendous difficulty of the task. Moreover, some of the experts try to avoid difficulties by making their definitions as short as possible. As the expert of international relations, Martha Crenshaw (2002) puts it in her article *the Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism*: "Unfortunately, most of the researches dealing with the internal conflicts, avoid the broad definition of terror and terrorism, limiting themselves to simple definitions." Despite the main trend, a handful of authors are bold enough to devote most of their at-

tention to this specific issue. They try to sum up the existing definitions and make one of their own. One of such authors, Kurt Cronin (2002) defines terrorism as an act of violence, which targets not the people, who are killed or maimed, but the government, the society or a specific group in which the terrorists hope to plant terror or radicalism. The author also admits the fact that although the experts have written hundreds of pages to give an exact definition of terrorism the failure was inevitable- as "terrorism itself is linked to individual perception, thus each person is interpreting it in a different way" (Cronin, 2002).

Still, lets make an overview about the ways terrorism is defined with various authors. One of the important experts in the field, Rohan Gunaratna (2002) gives quite a short definition in his article "International Terrorism საქართველოს ტერორიზმი: როგორი პასუხი უნდა გაეცეს მას? "Although we dont have an universal definition of terrorism, everybody agrees that terrorism is a form of politically motivated violence, or its threat, often chosing non-combatants as its target".

In his book "Understanding International Conflicts" (1997) Joseph Nye gives the following definition of terrorism: "terrorism is the politically motivated action carried out by inter-state groups, as a rule chosing non-combatants as a target." Nye continues by acessing the difficulties connected with defining terrorism and than notes that "According to the Panel set up by the UN Secretary General in 2004- terrorism can be defined as any action directed against civilians and non-combatants, which hopes to achieve its political goals in this way" (Nye, 1997).

Boaz Ganor in his "Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?" defines terrorism in the following way: " terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims."

Raymond Duncan in the book "*World Politics in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*" (2006) proposes the definition of terrorism, which is almost identical to that of other authors: "terrorism is the form of politically motivated violence, directed against civilians. Terrorists and terrorist groups hope to change the political environment they oppose by force."

Joshua Goldstein also gives a short definition of terrorism in his book "International Relations". "Terrorism is the form of political violence which chooses civilians deliberately... Main aim of terrorism is to demoralize the society, what can be later used against the government or any other side of the conflict."

Martha Crenshaw (2002) gives the following definition of terrorism in her article "the Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism": "Terrorism is one of the

strategies to seize the power in the context of internal conflicts or revolutions, leading to considerable social and political changes if successful. This form of violence is often the main instrument of revolution..."

The article "Defining International Terrorism: Pragmatic Approach" by Thomas Badey (2003) cites definitions given by various authors. He particularly concentrates upon the definition of terrorism given by Professor Alex Schmidt, who in his turn rests upon over 50 authors. Badey reiterates Schmidt's definition, saying "Terrorism is a form of repeated violence which has as its aim to create disorder and anxiety in the society. It may be used both by governments and the (semi-)illegal groups, either for criminal or political goals. However unlike the assassination, the target of terrorism is not the actual victim of the attack. Although most often the direct target of terrorism is random, sometimes it may be symbolic; representing a specific social, political or any other group- in this case the terrorist attack carries a special message to the given group." According to the author, there is a special communication process (based on violence) between the terrorist organization, the victim and the indirect target (the society). The goal of terrorist attack is to manipulate the indirect target either by seeding panic, or by representing its group in the preferable light, depending whether the goal of terrorism is coercion or propaganda.

After discussing definitions of terrorism with different authors, we can single out three important criteria, by which any violent action can be qualified as terrorism: 1. the nature of the action; 2. the direct target; 3. the goals of the action- namely, nature of terrorism is always violent, thus any form of non-violent protest (peaceful demonstrations, strikes, etc.) should not be considered as terrorism. (Ganor, 2008). The direct target of terrorist attack, as it was already noted, is chosen indiscriminately, or sometimes symbolically- as a representative of a given group or society. According to Boaz Ganor (2008) goals of terrorism are always political i.e. the regime-change, changing authorities or the social-economic politics, etc. According to the author, the violent action having no political interests in mind should be considered as a criminal act, not terrorism. The author also notes that some authors name ideological and religious goals besides the political ones... however the concept of "political interests" is broad enough to include both the religious and the ideological concepts. Finally the author concludes, that the ideological or religious motivations lying behind the political interests do not make much difference in determining the concept of terrorism.

### *History of Terrorism*

The origins of terrorism are quite hard to determine, however one thing is clear: “, in some respects, that what is today known as terrorism predates by millennia the modern term used to describe it. This is not to say that the act of terrorism has remained static” (Burgess, 2003). According to the author, the problems connected with defining the term demonstrate how much terrorism has changed its form during the centuries- even if retaining some of its main characteristics.

Origins of terrorism go back to antique times. According to most scholars, the first recorded fact of terrorist attack took place in ancient Judea. “ Among the earliest such examples were the Sicari and the Zealots, Jewish groups active during the Roman occupation of the first century Middle East” (Burgess, 2003). As a rule, the assassinations organized by these groups took place in a crowded place to serve as a signal to the Romans and those who supported them- “ a tactic that would also be used by subsequent generations of what would become known as terrorists”(Burgess, 2003).

The ancient forms of terrorism also was common in India and the muslim world (shortly after Muhammed died). According to Mark Burgess (2003) in the 11th century the Shia muslim sect, named Ismailis/Assasines ruthlessly punished those political and religious figures who refused to accept a new, purified version of Islam. “The Assassins’ deeds were carried out at religious sites on holy days – a tactic intended to publicize their cause and incite others to it. Like many religiously inspired terrorists today, they also viewed their deaths on such operations as sacrificial and a guarantor that they would enter paradise.”(Burgess, 2003). According to James Wilson (2004) Ismailis should be considered as first terrorists for two reasons: “ They did not seek simply to change rulers through murder but to replace a social system by changing an allegedly corrupt Sunni regime into a supposedly ideal Shiite one.” (Wilson, 2004). At the same time, according to the author, the only weapon Assassins used during the attack was a dagger, “that made their capture and execution, often after gruesome torture, inevitable.” While surviving was considered to be a great shame for the attacker.

One ancient form of terrorism was developed in India from the 7th to the 19th centuries. “Sacrifice was also a central element of the killings carried out by the Thugees ... who ritually strangled their victims (usually travelers chosen at random) as an offering to the Hindu goddess of terror and destruction, Kali. In this case, the intent was to terrify the victim (a vital consideration in the Thugee ritual) rather than influence any external audience.”(Burgess, 2003). The Thugees must have murdered approximately

1 million people during centuries. Unlike the later terrorists, they did not pursue any political goals, however like the Assassins, the "Thugees when caught, looked forward to their execution as a quick route to paradise." (Wilson, 2004).

Another predecessor of modern terrorism is considered to be the tyrannicide- or the assassination of the tyrant. "Tyrannicide has traditionally been distinguished from political assassination in terms of the difference between public and private life. Tyrannicide was a self-sacrificing act for public benefit (and so morally esteemed)" (George, 1988). The examples of classical tyrannicide include murder of the tyrant of Athens by Harmodios and Aristogeiton in 514 B.C. According to David George (1988) "The two tyrannicides were revered not only as the liberators of Athens from Peisistratid tyranny but also as the founders of Athenian democracy. As a result, they became the object of a popular, official hero-cult". Another widely known fact of tyrannicide was the murder of Julius the Caesar in Rome (44 B.C.) by Marcus Brutus and Cassius, in the honour of whom the Romans had erected a memorial. In his article "Distinguishing Classical tyrannicide from Modern terrorism" David George (1988) discusses tyrannicide and terrorism as two interconnected but separate phenomena. As the author notes, at some moment in history the classical tyrannicide is finishing and the terrorism begins, however its quite hard to draw a distinct line between the two concepts as most of the historical facts have features of both tyrannicide and terrorism. For example such terrorist attacks as "such as that of Karl Sand on Kotzebue (1819), the attempt on the British Cabinet by the Cato Street conspirators (1820), or Orsini's attack on Napoleon III (1858), were represented and (mis)interpreted in terms of that classical genre of political murder, tyrannicide." (George, 1988) Even Napoleon III during his speech on the National Assembly, qualified the attack against him as tyrannicide. According to the author "In part, this was because terrorists and their supporters sought to justify assassination attempts through appealing to the acknowledged legitimacy of tyrannicide".

The idea of tyrannicide, as an act of sacrifice for the purpose of social benefits was later well-used by terrorists for justification of their goals. Although today the target of terrorism include civilians together with the political figures the arguments stay the same. This is the main subject of the article by James Wilson "What Makes a Terrorist?" (2004), where the author writes: "Terrorism, however motivated, baffles people, because they cannot imagine doing these things themselves. This bafflement often leads us to assume that terrorists are either mentally deranged or products of a hostile environment."

Although today terrorism is associated with the non-governmental organizations, initially terrorism as a term designated the violence committed by the state. The word “terrorism” originated from the French *terreur* (fear) during the years after the French revolution in 1789. The new government installed tried to keep its power by the “mechanism of fear” - i.e. having its own population in constant fear of persecution. Thus in the 18-th century “terrorism” was the violence committed exclusively by a state. “Robespierre’s practice of using revolutionary tribunals as a means of publicizing a prisoner’s fate for broader effect within the population (apart from questions of legal guilt or innocence) can be seen as a nascent example of the much more highly developed, blatant manipulation of media attention by terrorist groups” (Cronin, 2002).

In the period between the French and the Russian revolutions terrorism gradually ceased to be the instrument of states and was more widely introduced in the strategies employed by the inter-state groups. In this period terrorism mainly concentrated on assassinations of public authorities. “Yet it was not until toward the end of the nineteenth century that this novel political phenomenon was correctly labeled and to some extent recognized for what it was” (George, 1988). Even then, it was the Russian revolutionaries who named themselves “terrorists” and described their violent methods as “terrorism”.

The 19<sup>th</sup> century terrorism on the American continent took quite a different shape from the Europe. While the European terrorism targeted the prominent figures, the American terrorism in the face of Ku Klux Klan directed its aggression against the whole middle and low class. Ku Klux Klan was established by the veterans of the Confederation after the Civil War (1865). The ideological background on the organization included the ideas of “the white supremacy”, anti-Semitism, racism and anti-Catholicism. In the beginning Ku Klux Klan directed its aggression against the Afro-Americans, their supporting whites and the federal government. Soon the list of targets was enriched by the minorities economically challenging the middle and low-class members of the Klan.

After the end of the World War II, when the decolonization process gained the speed, the newly-emerged nationalist movements entered the scene. Here we can take as examples the Basque ETA, the Irish IRA, Fatah, the Islamic Jihad etc. In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, both superpowers encouraged dissemination of the ideological terrorism throughout the world including Columbia, Bolivia, West Germany, Nepal, etc.

A new phase in terrorism began from 1964 with the emergence of Palestine Liberation Organization. As the Palestinian people have the respect in

the whole Muslim world, their terrorist activities against Israel are seen by other Muslim nations as an example (Frayman, 1999). The aggression against Israel is described in the PLO proclamation declaring “the right of the Palestinian Arab people to its sacred homeland Palestine and affirming the inevitability of the battle to liberate the usurped part from it, and its determination to bring out its effective revolutionary entity and the mobilization of the capabilities and potentialities and its material, military and spiritual forces” (History of PLO). This proclamation in itself was equal to declaring the holy war. In 1975-1978 the organization planned two attacks against Israel resulting in 50 Israeli casualties. However after the Gulf War, (under the USA pressure) the PLO has made major steps to improve relations with Israel (Nye, 1997).

The new page in history of terrorism was opened by Osama Bin Laden-declared the terrorism number one by the USA. Bin Laden began his career with fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1980s. Later he created a pro-Islamic terrorist network, Al-Qaeda. He soon contacted other terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East and thus created a global network. The main goal of the organization was to oust United States from the Middle East and arrange a coup in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden and his network have organized such attacks as the explosion in the World Trade Center in 1993 in New York, the attack on the National Guards’ training center in Saudi Arabia (1995); attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998). Bin Laden together with Sheikh Haled Mohammed has planned and organized the 9/11 attacks. Despite the massive war-on-terror Bin Laden still remains undetained (Biography of Osama Bin Laden).

The United States reacted on the 9/11 events by the “War-on-Terror” which began in a week after the strikes. On 18<sup>th</sup> of September the US Congress validated the use of force against terrorists, and the large-scale anti-terrorist operation began. The campaign covered the immense territories of Europe, Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. According to Raymond Duncan (2006) the War on Terror can be divided into four phases. On the first stage the world sided with the US in its war against Talib government- suspected in supporting the 9/11 attacks. On the second stage the world alliance has began to collapse. The United States and its allies began to disagree on the strategic and tactic issues. According to the author the disagreement increased after US declared its decision to strike Iraq as well. This was accompanied by US failure to intervene in the conflict between Israel and Palestine- thus dissatisfying its Muslim allies. On the third stage of the anti-terrorist campaign (January 2002) President George W. Bush articulated the concept of “axis of evil”, having such states as Iran, North Korea and Iraq in mind. According to the pres-

ident, these were the countries that supported and sheltered international terrorism. (Schism between US and its allies kept to increase). On the fourth and the final stage of the campaign US has once again opened itself for cooperation and tried to ratify aggression against Iraq in the Security Council. However in March 2003 US assault against Iraq began while four members of the Council- including Germany, France, China and Russia remained against the war. USA successfully occupied most of the Iraqi territory in a month (Duncan, 2006). It should be noted, that after mobilizing the US forces in Iraq the situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate.

Thus results of War on Terror are still open to question. All what can be said at the moment is that the threat of terrorism has long been underestimated. Perhaps the most dangerous about terrorism is the fact that it already has become a sort of ideology for some societies, believing the violence to be the only way of preserving their traditional values against the overwhelming forces of globalization.

### *Theories on Terror*

The success in confronting terrorism largely depends on studying the nature and the causes of terrorism. This issue is attracting interest of many experts who try to create a theoretical framework explaining terrorism. The main theories applied to terrorism in international relations include the Structural, The Psychological and the Rational Choice theories. There also exist a number of other, less widely accepted theories such as the Communications Theory, Conspiracy Theory, etc.

According to the *Structural Theory* terrorism is caused by the specific social, political, economic and cultural environment existing in various societies. *The Psychological Theory* on the other hand, tries to discover the factors which induce an ordinary citizen to turn into terrorist. The latter theory is also interested in the internal dynamics of the terrorist groups and the interaction of the three elements of the act of terror: the terrorists, the direct and the indirect target (the audience). And finally the *Theory of Rational Choice* investigates the cost-benefit analysis of a person entering a terrorist organization (Ross, 1993).

Jeffrey Jan Ross (1993) in his article "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model" indicates 10 structural causes of terrorism: (the importance of the factors here are presented in the growing order) 1. Geographic location; 2. Type of the political system; 3. Level of modernization; 4. Social, cultural and historical environment; 5. Organizational structure and uneven process of development in various segments of society;

6. Existence of other forms of instability; 7. Support; 8. Failed attempts to prevent occurrence of terror; 9. Availability of weapons and explosives; 10. Feelings of protest against injustice.

According to the *Psychological Theory* terrorism is a product of the pessimism and protest in the society, formed by a number of international, regional or interstate political, economic and social factors. According to Martha Crenshaw (2000) The Psychological perspective unites such psychological theories as the *Frustration and Aggression Theory*- arguing that any frustration will be transferred in aggression, and materialization of the aggression will finally reduce the level of frustration; *the Theory of Relative Deprivation*- when a person compares his own opportunities and needs with that of others. If he sees a difference between the two, he may protest against injustice in a violent form.

The origins of terrorism is also often explained from the perspective of the *Rational Choice Theory*, resting mainly on the cost-benefit analysis. The theory makes a difference between the individual and group rationality and claims the latter to be a superior form of rationality; Namely: during the rational analysis a person makes a choice between his own benefits and the benefits of the society- most often choosing the second option. In connection to terrorism, the rational choice theory can explain the rationality of a suicide bomber- which is views his death as a benefit for the society he belongs to.

The Rational Choice Theory is well discussed by Martha Crenshaw (1981) in her article "Causes of Terrorism": "Significant campaigns of terrorism depend on rational political choice... terrorism is the result of an organization's decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government. The argument that terrorist behavior should be analyzed as "rational" is based on the assumption that terrorist organizations possess internally consistent sets of values, beliefs, and images of the environment." Thus from the perspectives of the organization violence is a approved method of fulfilling its aims.

*The Communications Theory*- connects the spread of terrorist activities to the advancement of communication technologies; namely its is the mass-media which makes terrorism such a powerful instrument against a state. Mass telecommunications also promotes terrorism in the regions where it has not previously existed but where there are relevant economic, social and political factors. Communication technologies can promote terrorism for 4 reasons:

Communications can be easily used for propaganda

Information can be delivered in such a form that will present terrorism in a preferable light

While discussing strategies and tactics of various terrorist organizations, the mass-media unwillingly transfers valuable information to other groups which have some reason to be dissatisfied and are willing to begin applying violent methods.

Describing the details of a successful terror attack in one part of the world may be copied by other groups in another part of the world for their own reasons. (Yazedjian, 2002).

The oldest theory concerned with the origins of terrorism is the “conspiracy theory”, which gained popularity in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. According to this theory terrorism was the manifestation of the global conspiracy of communists. The adherents of the given theory interpreted every attack in any part of the world as a demonstration of the communist threat.

Together with growing concerns around terrorism, the number of works trying to set up a theoretical framework of terrorism is increasing as well. This in its part, makes a great contribution to discovering new and more efficient methods of confronting terror. Unfortunately, most of the theories deal with only some aspect of terrorism, since its hard if not impossible to find one universal framework dealing with this manifold phenomenon taken as a whole.

#### *The Four Waves of Terrorism*

After considering various theories about the origins of terrorism, we should go on with defining various forms of terrorism. Most of the experts single out four types of terrorism- these are the left-wing, the right-wing, the ethnonationalist and the religious terrorism. According to Kurth Cronin (2002) “All four types have enjoyed periods of relative prominence in the modern era, with left-wing terrorism intertwined with the Communist movement, right-wing terrorism drawing its inspiration from Fascism” then the author comments on the remaining two types saying: “the bulk of ethnonationalist/separatist terrorism accompanying the wave of decolonization especially in the immediate post-World War I1 years. Currently, “sacred” terrorism is becoming more significant. Although groups in all categories continue to exist today, left-wing and right-wing terrorist groups were more numerous in earlier decades.” Here we should note that some of the experts merge the left- and right-wing terrorism in a bigger categorie: the ideological/anarchist terrorism.

Kurth Cronin (2002) pays a special interest to the differences between the left- and right-wing terrorism and argues: “left-wing terrorist organiza-

tions, driven by liberal or idealist political concepts, tend to prefer revolutionary, antiauthoritarian, antimaterialistic agendas” The author also stresses the difference between the violent methods the two prefer most: “left-wing organizations often engage in brutal criminal-type behavior such as kidnapping, murder, bombing, and arson, often directed at elite targets that symbolize authority” (Cronin 2002). However, as the author notes, the left-wing terrorist have a difficulty in agreeing on their long-term goals. While the right-wing terrorism “can be ruthless, but in their most recent manifestations they have tended to be less cohesive and more impetuous in their violence than leftist terrorist groups. Their targets are often chosen according to race but also ethnicity, religion, or immigrant status, and in recent decades at least, have been more opportunistic than calculated” (Cronin 2002).

James Wilson (2004) in his article “What Makes a Man Terrorist?” singles out different forms of terrorism and discusses those social, economic and political factors which result in rise of terrorism in this or that part of the world. Wilson makes clear the ideological differences between the right and the left-wing terrorists. While the right-wing terrorists set the past as an ideal and try to restore it, the leftists see materialization of their ideals in the future.

After discussing the differences between the right-wing and left-wing terrorist groups, Kurth Cronin considers the features of the “third wave”- or the ethnonationalist or the separatist terrorist organizations.

“Ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists are the most conventional, usually having a clear political or territorial aim that is rational and potentially negotiable, if not always justifiable in any given case” (Cronin 2002) As these groups always find a wide support in the society whose territorial claims they represent, fighting the ethnonationalist form of terrorism is full of obstacles, often leading to lengthy periods ethnic violence.

The fourth, religious form of terrorism is univocally recognized as the most dangerous form of terrorism by the international experts. As one of the authors puts it: “religion gives its true believers an account of the good life and a way of recognizing evil” then he continues: “if you believe that evil in the form of wrong beliefs and mistaken customs weakens or corrupts a life ordained by God, you are under a profound obligation to combat that evil. If you enjoy the companionship of like-minded believers, combating that evil can require that you commit violent, even suicidal, acts.” (Wilson 2004) This is the reason why the religious extremist so often confront national governments- any structure which is not formed on the religious principles is recognized by them as illegal. Extremists view any step towards modernization as a direct blow to the traditional values and religious teachings their ancestors have long obeyed. Religious terrorism unites two important elements: (the

apocalyptic) hope for the future and the desire to revenge for their past- not only implying but directly demanding violence to be used for the sacred goal of “restoring justice”.

Table 1: Location of Islamic Terrorism



Retrieved from photo-bucket website 12 March, 2008

[http://i217.photobucket.com/albums/cc272/full\\_images/Map-global-jihad.jpg](http://i217.photobucket.com/albums/cc272/full_images/Map-global-jihad.jpg)

Audrey Kurth Cronin (2002) in his article “Behind the curve: Globalization and International Terrorism” pays a special interest to the religious terrorism, signing out five factors making this form of terrorism number one threat to the existence of the international system:

1. “Religious terrorists often feel engaged in a Manichaeian struggle of good against evil, implying an open-ended set of human targets: Anyone who is not a member of their religion or religious sect may be “evil” and thus fair game.” (Cronin 2002) Although indiscriminate attacks are also widely used by other forms of terrorism, here it finds a special application, as all individuals outside the group can be viewed as infidels or apostates, going against the will of God and therefore deserving the physical punishment.

2. Religious terrorism views itself as a manifestation of the Divine will, this in itself leads to a number of such problems as: “The whims of the deity may be less than obvious to those who are not members of the religion, so the actions of violent religious organizations can be especially unpredictable” (Cronin 2002). Moreover, such religious implications guarantees the “highest approval” for the terrorists, enabling them to disregard the opinions and negative sentiments generated even in the society to which they themselves belong.

3. “religious terrorists consider themselves to be unconstrained by secular values or laws. Indeed the very target of the attacks may be the law-based secular society that is embodied in most modern states” (Cronin 2002). In

more general terms, the goal of religious terrorism is to topple the Post-Westphalian state system, this ambition makes it far more dangerous than to say, the ethnonationalist terrorism which aims at creating a new unit inside the existing international system.

4. Religious terrorists are completely alienated from the secular society. "They are not trying to correct the system, making it more just, more perfect, and more egalitarian. Rather they are trying to replace it... images of destruction are seen as a necessity-even a purifying regimen." (Cronin 2002)

5. Finally, religious terrorism has a vast network of supporters in the face of Muslim nongovernmental organizations which raise funds to finance expensive training campaigns. However, there is a difficulty in distinguishing these organizations from truly philanthropic groups. "there is the real risk of igniting the very holy war that the terrorists may be seeking in the first instance" (Cronin 2002).

Matthew Morgan (2004) in his article "The Origins of the New Terrorism" also discusses the issue of the "fourth wave", of the religious terrorism. The author rests upon the decisions of the National Commission on Terrorism and says: "fanaticism rather than political interests is more often the motivation now, and that terrorists are more unrestrained than ever before in their methods... Rather than focusing on conventional goals of political or religious movements, today's terrorists seek destruction and chaos as ends in themselves" The author continues the argument by quoting S. K. Malik's *The Quranic Concept of War* : "Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is in the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the ends meet and merge."

Thus we can conclude, that terrorism is a manifold and quite complicated phenomenon, dating back to ancient times. After considering history of terrorism it can be concluded that terrorism is not an external force threatening the existence of the international system, but an internal part of the international system itself which finds its roots in the malfunctions of the system. The rise and development of terrorism was parallel to the process of development of the international system, and all its changes were fully conditioned by the changing environment in the international arena. This fact in itself makes fighting terrorism in the contemporary world quite worrisome and urges us to find new ways and new perspectives for studying the issue. The fact that even defining the concept of terrorism is controversial, in itself demonstrates the complexity of the given issue. The same can be concluded after considering all the various theories trying to explain origins of terrorism. Although each theory can be true in one case, their universal application can

be disputed. The existence of “the four waves” of terrorism makes the issue hard to deal with even more. Here should be noted, that although the four waves can exist simultaneously they still represent different steps of development of the given phenomenon. All of these makes it hard for the scholar to generalize the concept of terrorism and try to study its universal features, leading to difficulties in fighting terrorism in practice. The various forms of terrorism and the reasons leading to its occurrence makes it hard for the governments and the international society to take preventive measures to guarantee international peace and development.

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## **War, Factor of War and Humanitarian Law**

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**W**ar is the biggest enemy of humankind. None of the catastrophes can inflict more damage on humanity than does the war. Although war is condemned by the UN law, there are no strategic mechanisms to prevent its occurrence over time. The given article does not concentrate on any concrete war. Its main goal is to discuss the issue of preventing war. Why do states go for war? What are the reasons of war? How strong is the mechanism of peaceful solution? Where is the line between just and unjust war? Is today the world peace possible? How secure is the world today? The given article condemns all forms of war, however it admits that war is still inevitable in some instances and thus it concentrates on the humanitarian law- what was achieved, what is its current state and what may be done in the future in this respect. In a world where the great powers control everything, the factor of brute force still is on the agenda. The given article discusses the potential of the humanitarian law as a means of peaceful resolution of conflicts in future. In the process of writing the article, our country came face to face before the brutalities of war. So it would be impossible to avoid discussing this episode as well. Although fully unbiased evaluation of this event will require some time, the article will try to cover main facts and discuss the role of international relations and more specifically the humanitarian law played in the 5-day war between Russia and Georgia (August 2008).

## ომი, ომის ფაქტორი და ჰუმანიტარული სამართალი

მაია ასათიანი

საქართველოს უნივერსიტეტი

**ო**მი კაცობრიობისათვის ყველაზე დიდი და საშინელი მტერია. ვერანაირი უბედურება ვერ შეედრება იმ დანაკლისს, რაც ომს მოაქვს მსოფლიოსათვის. ომი დაგმობილია გაეროს წესდებით, მაგრამ სამწუხაროდ, არ არის შემუშავებული მისი თავიდან აცილების სტრატეგიული მექანიზმები. წინამდებარე ნაშრომი არ შემოიფარგლება რომელიმე კონკრეტული ომით. იგი ისტორიული მაგალითების საფუძველზე წარმოაჩენს ომის აღმოფხვრის საკითხს. რატომ მიდიან სახელმწიფოები ომამდე? რა არის მისი გამომწვევი მიზეზი? რამდენად ძლიერია მშვიდობიანი გზით კონფლიქტის მოგვარების მექანიზმი? სად გადის ზღვარი სამართლიან და უსამართლო ომს შორის? არის თუ არა დღესდღეობით მშვიდობა რეალური? და რამდენად უსაფრთხოა მსოფლიო? ნაშრომში დაგმობილია ომის ყველანაირი გამოხატულება, მაგრამ ამასთანავე, განხილულია დღესდღეობით ჯერ კიდევ მისი არსებობა და ამიტომაც, თემის მთავარი მიზანია ჰუმანიტარული სამართლის წარმოჩენა - რა გაკეთდა, როგორია რეალობა და რისი გაკეთებაა აუცილებელი. მსოფლიოში, სადაც “ძლიერნი ამა ქვეყნისანი” ფლობენ მართვის სადავეებს, რაღა თქმა უნდა, ძალა გადაწყვეტს ყველაფერს. წინამდებარე თემის მიზანია ჰუმანიტარული სამართლის წინ წამოწევა, როგორც მომავალში საერთაშორისო კონფლიქტების ცივილიზებული გზებით მოგვარების საწინდარისა. თემაზე მუშაობის პერიოდში ჩვენს ქვეყანას დიდი განსაცდელი დაატყდა თავს - მოხდა ომის სისასტიკის აშკარა გამოვლინება. შეუძლებელია გვერდი აუუაროთ იმ მოვლენებს, რასაც ადგილი ჰქონდა საქართველოში. დიდი დრო იქნება საჭირო ამ მოვლენათა ობიექტური შეფასება-ანალიზისათვის, მაგრამ დანართის სახით, თემის სათაურიდან გამომდინარე, შევეცდები გადმოვცე, რა როლი ითამაშა ამ მოვლენებში საერთაშორისო ურთიერთობებმა და კერძოდ, ჰუმანიტარულმა სამართალმა.

## *Introduction*

The problem of war and peace remains the greatest problem of humankind from the antique times up to date. The world peace is the prerequisite for the economic and social progress of worldwide. Thus the world peace is one of the basic rights of each human being. Without peace there can be no welfare and development achieved. The issue of protecting world peace however, is closely linked to such problems as arms control and proliferation.

According to some calculations, the world has witnessed more than 14531 wars from 3600 B.C. to these days, with the casualties reaching 3.6 billion. During all these time, there have been only 292 peaceful years in the world. According to some scholars, today there are from 40 to 100 wars going on in the world (Robert, 1961).

Therefore its most important to study reasons of war and the results it may bring to the modern world. Unfortunately the war stays the main problem of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However there has also been a considerable number of instances when the conflicts were solved in accordance with the humanitarian law and the society should know more about this.

The war and the law...Is it really possible to solve the conflict between the states without the material losses and the war victims? Can law prevent wars breaking out? What benefits can the humanitarian law bring in everyday life or during the war? Are the Cicero's words: "law is silent during the war" still true?

The article will also cover the main facts and some of the most serious the problems humanitarian law.

War as a means of solving international conflicts is condemned by the UN charter. The concept of war is defined as a sequence of battles over some period, occurring among armed forces of two or more states (or between one state; even inside one concrete armed force) and resulting over 1000 deaths per year. Any war is preceded by conflicts and the political tensions. (www.un.org)

The article will use both qualitative and qualitative methods of research. Namely among the qualitative methods here will be used, the comparative analysis of the main theories about war; the analytic induction will be applied to discover main factors resulting in outbreak of war. The final part of the article sums up the information already discussed and works out a comprehensive answer to the questions given above.

### *Ethics of War and Peace Theories*

Ethics of war and peace is influenced by three traditional theories, these are: the Realism, the Pacifism and the Doctrine of Just War. According to the Just war Doctrine there are situations when a state can rightfully go to war. A war may sometimes (not always) be approved. This is radically different from the Realist world view, according to which states' motivation for war is rooted in their security considerations and their battle for power. According to realists, moral has nothing to do in the harsh reality of world politics where only the strongest can survive. A state has to concentrate upon its security and economic development, not moral ideals. Pacifists do not do not share the skepticism of Realists about the morality. And unlike the Just War Doctrine, which does not rule out outbreak of war, the Pacifists condemn any occurrence of war, as there always exists a peaceful alternative to violence.

### *Factor of War I World War*

War has always resulted in changing international environment. For example approximately 15 million people had died in the World War I. Apart from humans; this major conflict had resulted in braking up of the three European empires- Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Before World War I, the global balance of power was centered in Europe, however after the conflict the new great powers- US and Japan had entered the world scene.

The scholars studying the World War I have traditionally dealt with the three levels of the analysis- the systemic, the domestic and the individual levels.

On the systemic level there have been two main factors influencing on rising tensions, namely the growing power of Germany and the existence of the system of alliances.

On the domestic level there were such important events taking place as the internal crisis in the Austria-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires, as well as the domestic political climate in Germany.

On the individual level we may argue, that as the emperor of Austria-Hungary France Joseph was quite old, the state was governed by the minister of foreign affairs. The heir of the throne was Prince Ferdinand, killed in Sarajevo. The ruler of Russia Nicolas II was considered to be an isolated autocrat, having only domestic influence being himself under great influence of his wife. The main figure of those times was Wilhelm II, whose emotional character had drawn Germany so close to the dangerous political steps.

## *World War II*

World War II has prevailed over all conflicts known to history both with its viciousness and the damage inflicted to all parties. The casualties during the conflict are still indefinite, ranging from 35 to 50 million with different authors. Unlike the World War I, the alliance had occupied the territories of Germany and Japan, reforming its society. Although the world still stayed bipolar, the main actors have changed. The new superpowers which came out on the world scene were the United States and Russia. Europe ceased to be the center of global political power.

The World War II is sometimes also called the 'Hitler's War'. What Hitler in fact needed was a fast victory, not a protracted conflict in the tradition of the World War I.

If we begin the structural level analysis of the WW II, we will conclude that individuals played a crucial role in the beginning of the conflict. Namely the Racist ideology of Hitler occurred to be unsuccessful. He believed in superiority of the Arian race and did not accept the American pluralism as a source of great power.

The WWII was conditioned by some factors on the system level as well. The international relations of the period were greatly influenced by increased role of ideologies in societies- leading ideologies being Fascism and Communism. There have been three important changes on the domestic level as well: First, the Western democracies were under pressure of class struggle and ideological disputes so that coordinating the foreign policies became almost impossible.

Second, the Great Depression had a great influence on domestic politics as well as the class struggle.

Third and one of the key factors was the isolationist politics of the United States, conducted after the end of WW I. The isolationism did not finish until Japan attacked the US port of Pearl Harbor.

### *Humanitarian Law*

#### *Historical Background*

Due to the instability of the modern world the main idea of the international cooperation is avoiding armed conflicts and preserving international peace and security. Another aim set is protecting civilians in any situation, including the times of conflict. The latter is the main principle of humanitarian law.

The easiest and the most universal definition of humanitarian law is as follows: love your neighbor as much as you love yourself, and don't treat others in the way you don't want to be treated yourself.

The task of humanitarian law is to help humanity survive. It strives to convince the international society that living in the civilized world is possible and cooperation is key component for finding peaceful means of coexistence.

### *List of Conventions*

#### *Sources of International Humanitarian Law*

The main sources of the humanitarian law are the 4 Geneva Conventions on protection of victims of war signed on August 12, 1949.

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention)  
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention)

Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention)

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)

Additionally, two protocols were added to the conventions on June 8, 1977:

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 2)

The Geneva conventions have become widely observed international documents. Today 175 states (prevailing majority of the world states) have accepted its principles.

The Hague Convention about the rules and customs of land warfare (October 18, 1907) and the Hague Charter attached. The convention was preceded by a number of such documents as Liberia Code, Sankt Petersburg Declaration, Brussels Declaration (1874), Oxford Manual (1880), and the convention worked out by the I Peace Conference in Hague (1899).

### *Conclusion*

War is a complicated phenomenon, thus its causes may vary greatly. For some people war is a destiny for others it is a matter of choice.

As other means of conflict resolution remain imperfect, states still have some opportunities to go in for war.

Generally talking about the humanitarian law, we can conclude that any question regarding it can be traced to two main problems: 1) coupling the humanitarian considerations with the military necessities and 2) the will of states to preserve their sovereignty.

The Cold War has long finished, but the international politics is still haunted by the question- what will replace the 50 year-long crisis? And was the end of Cold War generally the end of any war? These questions remain controversy for the experts of international relations.

Resting on the materials discussed during the article we may conclude that the end of Cold War actually heralded increasing probability of wars worldwide. As the world has moved from bipolar to multi polar system the minor wars with the potential of growing into massive confrontation cannot be avoided.

As we said, conventional and minor wars are inevitable for future. However even the limited scale nuclear or a conventional war will pose a great danger to humanity. Thus the only way out is to agree that there exist better ways out of conflict than going to war.

### *War of XXI Century*

The events which took place in Caucasus at the verge of XXI Century changed the concept and form of war utterly. If earlier wars were being won on battlefield, today the main element of war is the information warfare. As the main topic of the article is war, it would be unacceptable not to mention the 5-day war between Russia and Georgia which took place in August 2008, during which Russia demonstrated itself in all components of war. Today the prevailing anti-Georgian sentiments in Moscow are not a secret to anyone.

The question frequently heard today is- who was the initiator of the conflict. Even the form of the question reveals the fact that unfortunately the concept of the Caucasian conflict remains unclear to the Western analytical centers up to now. Thus its most important to help the international community, the disoriented Russian society and the Georgian citizens understand the reality about the processes taking place in Caucasus region.

Russia has used different methods to erase Georgia from the political

and cultural map of the world through time. Securing Caucasus as its geo-political backyard is the main aim of Russia from 1801 to date. This is even voiced by the current ideologist of Kremlin- Alexander Dugin (Dugin 1999).

The last campaign against Georgia began in 1991, after the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia declared the Russian forces on the Georgian territory as occupational. The West at this time was busy freeing Eastern Europe and the Baltic States from Russian domination, so nobody had either time or energy to assist Georgia. In 1992-1993 the Russian forces ousted the President and the parliament of Georgia and established its control over Abkhazia and the region of South Ossetia. The new president Edward Shevardnadze gave the occupational forces the peacekeeping status, at the same time he agreed on Georgia entering the CIS.

Russia began preparing for the August War long time before. The Russian forces were sent to Abkhazia in July- with the pretext of reconstructing the railway. Meanwhile the military training of the 58th army (with code name Caucasus 2008) began in proximity of the Georgian border. (24 hours, 2008)

All these facts have to receive an adequate legal evaluation.

Although conflicts among neighbors are not ruled out over time, turning this into bloodshed is utterly unacceptable. Historically Georgians and Abkhazians (Georgians and Ossetians) have never been enemies. It's time to call everything by its name, and to define the actual parties of the conflict- Georgia vs. Russia.

According to the resolution issued by the Parliament Assembly of Council of Europe on 2 October 2008 both Russia and Georgia have acted against principles of the Council and did not accomplish their duties to find peaceful solution to the conflict. Thus both parties are responsible for violation of the Humanitarian Law. 'Bombing Tskhinvali by the Georgian side escalated the conflict even further- into the all-out and mass-scale war'. Using heavy artillery and cassette bombs created a serious threat to the lives of civilians, and can be evaluated as disproportionate use of force by Georgia on its own territory'. However it can be inferred that Georgia was protecting its territorial integrity by doing so. According to the resolution the Russian counterattack was also disproportionate. 'The Russian counterattack together with its actions in Central and Western Georgia and Abkhazia obviously did not correspond to the principle of proportionality, the Humanitarian Law and the principles of the Council of Europe. And may be evaluated as violation of responsibilities of Russia as a member state'- the resolution concludes. According to the assembly using violence by both sides can be defined as a war-crime. At the same time, the Assembly supports territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and calls on Russia to withdraw recognition of both

regions. The Council of Europe has also addressed other states not to recognize the given separatist regions. It has also expressed concerns about the facts of ethnic cleansing in the Georgian villages of the Tskhinvali region. Georgia has addressed the Court of Justice demanding 'temporary measures' to be taken (to cease the bombing, to return Russian forces to their dislocations of August 6, to deliver humanitarian aid, to return the population to their homes etc.) what was confirmed by the Court.

Russian aggression resulted in immense losses on the Georgian side. Apart from the lives lost, tens of thousands of Georgian citizens became subject to ethnic cleansing. The local Georgians were ousted from their homes, their property was damaged. The local population was forced either to take citizenship of Ossetian or Russian republics or leave their homes. Georgian towns were bombed inflicting immense psychological trauma on the peaceful population. All this went against the principles of IV Geneva convention (protecting civilians during armed conflicts) (Report by S. Subar, 2008). According to Washington Post Eduard Kokoity had arranged a peaceful corridor for those who chose to leave, South Ossetia would never allow these people to return back home again. This in itself is one more instance of war-crime.

On August 26, 2008 Dmitri Medvedev signed a document recognizing independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia used as a legal basis the right of self-determination of nations discussed in the UN Resolution 2625 (XXV). However the given resolution can do little good in this case. The part of the resolution where the right of self-determination is discussed stresses concrete cases when it can be rightly applied, namely to end colonialism as soon as possible, expressing unanimous consent of all states. The last paragraph of the resolution determines in which context this principle cannot be used- any state should refrain from any action violating territorial integrity of another. In other words, the sole purpose of the resolution was to organize the process of disintegrating colonial empires. It cannot be applied to interstate relations.

The nature of Russian peacekeeping on the Georgian territory should also be discussed. Namely: the Sochi (Dagomisi) agreements signed in 1992 are violated since they ruled out possibility of Russian military intervention in the conflict. Also the rules of conduct of the armed forces and military observers in the conflict region are violated; according to them the peacekeepers should have prevented any uncontrolled military endeavor of the conflicting parties.

Russia has never received the UN peacekeeping mandate to legalize its military presence in South Ossetia ; not to say in the rest of Georgian territory including Senaki, Poti, Gori, Zugdidi, Sachkhere, etc. ([www.grani.ru](http://www.grani.ru))

It should be obvious. What we have in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the Russo-Georgian confrontation, not ethno-conflicts.

Resting on the unstable supply of energy from Russia, Caucasus gains importance both for the West and for the East. Today the world 'has enough time and energy' for Georgia. This resulted in opening a new page in Russo-Georgian relations. The current Georgian government has returned to status of occupational forces to the Russian militaries. It has also voiced its determination to leave CIS.

What should be done in future? If Russia is really going to reestablish the Soviet Union, then the West will have to protect the post Cold War global structure and the newly established post-communist states. Open occupation of Georgia would have resulted in a new Cold War and harsh economic sanctions from the West. Even Russia would be under threat on the regional level, as the Caucasus remains instable and the constituency of Russian army today increasingly includes Chechens and other ethnic minorities. Even less important steps from the Russian side require adequate reaction. The Central European states deeply concerned with the Georgian crisis quickly gave consent on installing the Anti Ballistic System on their territories (a thing Putin has so fiercely opposed). Closer relations between Georgia and NATO reveal how Russia pushed Georgia to tightening its ties with the West. At the same time, the West can inflict great economic losses on Russia if it declares the Russian passports issued for citizens of South Ossetia invalid; also tough economic sanctions may be imposed of the Russian Federation. In this case Kremlin will have to rule a poor and instable province.

Thus Russia gained nothing by violating the international norms. Much has changed after the Cold War- including the nature of warfare, where the role of mass-media and the international society has increased immensely. Such actions as bombing a hospital (protected under the international law), opening fire at non-combatants (the reporters), and not providing security for civilians on the occupied territory- will not go unnoticed. Such unacceptable methods of warfare as destroying the local infrastructure (explosion of the railroad), inflicting damage on the unique nature located kilometers away from the conflict zone were used for the sole aim- to punish Georgia for its Western orientation. Even the fascists refrained from destroying the nature listed in the Red Book. The latter is an instance of 'ecologic terrorism' committed by one state against another. One of the main targets of Russia included the pipeline owned by the British Petroleum (BP) thus the conflict in Georgia had an international character- namely Russia confronted rest of the world by attacking Georgia.

The fact that one of the largest states- Russia remains so inconsistent

and unpredictable should serve as an impetus for a new level of development in international and humanitarian law. Indeed, what can the international community do against a member who does not obey the common rules- the state which confronts the core principles of the international system and the international law, the state which is utterly deprived of logic of conduct. While recognizing Kosovo remains a catastrophe, recognition of Abkhazia or South Ossetia is quite normal from the perspective of Kremlin authorities. Russia had to protect its citizens in South Ossetia, but it had to kill them ruthlessly during notorious Nord Ost. This is the strange logic of Kremlin, principles of which remain mysterious for the rest of the world.

From the lessons of history it may be inferred that for its survival the international system requires constant perfection. After failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War I, the new and more powerful organization the United Nations was formed. Today the Russian aggression demonstrates the weaknesses of the UN and the international law. Thus it would be logical to predict upcoming reforms. Either Russia will win and the world will return to anarchy, or the civilized world will protect its right to exist by further developing international law. Today the international society stands before a choice: where it prefers to live in a world organized according to international norms or in middle ages.

As the rest of the world has much more economic, political and military resources than Russia, it is logical to think the winner will be the former. And the international law in future will have stronger mechanisms of punishing any state which will dare to go against all, even against its own self.

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## **Energy Sovereignty and Security**

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**I**n 21 century Energy security tuned to be a source of global wellbeing and security. Nowadays Human beings are using much more energy resources than ever. On the one hand it ensures global economic developments on the other it challenges energy consumer's national security. So, natural resources are either source of geopolitical challenges or opportunities for countries. For producers gas and oil became not the source of "short energy war" as it once happened in 1970s, but the tool for well-coordinated, long-term political goals. That's why for producers' energy security became source of gaining high, expensive economic and political value on International level. As energy producers perceived their legal and natural right to consider energy resources part of their sovereignty consumers were left only with getting supply at "reasonable price ". Despite differences consumers and producers turned to share one common character - energy security became part of their natural security. But still there is difference as producers more politicized the subject than consumers (for example Russia). It is obvious European failure to establish common energy policy and effective competitive Single Energy Market may lead to energy dependence on single supplier and creation of Gas OPEC with strong market division and intention to monopolize. The abovementioned threats can be responded with strong anti-trust law and diversification of suppliers. anti-trust law (competition law) should disband production and distribution by the same company which will lead to healthy competition. Besides it is necessary to diversify energy resources and eliminate Isolation of Iran. Otherwise Europe's dependence on Russian energy will acquire growing character and intensify International environment.

## ენერგო უსაფრთხოება და სუვერენიტეტი

თამარ კეთილაძე  
საქართველოს უნივერსიტეტი

**X**XI საუკუნეში ენერგეტიკა გლობალური კეთილდღეობისა და უსაფრთხოების გარანტიად იქცა. დღეს კაცობრიობა გაცილებით მეტ ენერგორესურსებს იყენებს ვიდრე ოდესმე. ერთის მხრივ ეს უზრუნველყოფს მსოფლიო ეკონომიკურ განვითარებას, მეორეს მხრივ კი საფრთხეს უქმნის ენერგომომხმარებელი ქვეყნის ეროვნულ უსაფრთხოებას. ასე, რომ ბუნებრივი რესურსები თანამედროვე სამყაროში სახელმწიფოთა გეოპოლიტიკური საფრთხის ან წარმატების წყაროა. დღეს უკვე მწარმოებელთათვის გაზი და ნავთობი 1970-იანი წლების მსგავსად არა „მოკლე-ვადიანი ენერგომის“ წყაროს წარმოადგენს, არამედ კარგად ორგანიზებული, გრძელვადიანი პოლიტიკური მიზნების მიღწევის იარაღია. სწორედ ამიტომ მწარმოებელთათვის ენერგოუსაფრთხოება საერთაშორისო არენაზე მაღალი ეკონომიკურ-პოლიტიკური ღირებულების მოპოვების საშუალებად იქცა. მას შემდეგ რაც, ენერგომწარმოებლებმა ბუნებრივი და იურიდიული უფლებების გათვალისწინებით ბუნებრივი რესურსები ეროვნული სუვერენიტეტის განუყოფელ ნაწილად აქციეს-მომხმარებლები იძულებულნი გახდნენ ენერგორესურსები „მისაღებ ფასად“ მიეღოთ. დიდი სხვაობის მიუხედავად ენერგომწარმოებელ და ენერგომომხმარებელ ქვეყნებს საერთო მახასიათებელიც გააჩნიათ-ენერგოუსაფრთხოება ეროვნული უსაფრთხოების განუყოფელი ნაწილია. თუმცა, სხვაობაც არის- ენერგომომხმარებლებისგან განსხვავებით ენერგომწარმოებელი ქვეყნები საკითხის მეტ პოლიტიზირებას ახდენენ (მაგ. რუსეთი). ცხადია, ევროპის მარცხი ერთიანი ენერგოპოლიტიკისა და ეფექტური კონკურენტუნარიანი საერთო ენერგობაზრის შემუშავების საქმეში ხელს შეუწყობს მხოლოდ ერთ ენერგომწარმოებელზე ენერგოდამოკიდებულების ზრდასა და გაზის ოპეკის ჩამოყალიბებას – ძლიერი საბაზრო დივიზიითა და მონოპოლიის სურვილით. ზემოაღნიშნულ საფრთხესთან გასამკლავებლად აუცილებელია ანტი-მონოპოლიური კანონმდებლობის შემუშავება და ენერგოწყაროთა დივერსიფიკაცია. ანტი-მონოპოლიურმა კანონმდებლობამ უნდა მოახდინოს ერთი და იგივე კომპანიის საღისტრიბუციო ქსელის განცალკევება მომარაგებისა და წარმოებისგან, რაც თავისთავად ხელს შეუწყობს ჯანსაღ კონკურენციას. გარდა ამისა აუცილებელია ენერგოწყაროთა დივერსიფიკაცია და ირანის იზოლაციიდან გამოყვანა. წინააღმდეგ შემთხვევაში, ევროპის ენერგოდამოკიდებულება რუსეთზე მზარდ ხასიათს შეიძენს და დაძაბავს საერთაშორისო გარემოს.

## *Introduction*

The energy literature and numerous statements indicate that the concept of energy security is elusive and ambiguous. The following is a general definition of energy security: "reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable price". However according to current economic and political transformations the approach does not fully correspond to XXI century. The concept of energy security becomes self-serving nowadays due to the existence of energy "have" and "have no" countries. It has gained double implication as the meaning of the term is analyzed in two different ways by energy consumer and energy producer countries. On the one hand consumer considers energy security to be a "reliable and adequate supply of energy at a reasonable price". The above mentioned implies getting uninterrupted energy resources at low price. As for a producer, "reasonable price" is related to a "high, expensive economic and political value". Europe as an energy consumer and Russia as an energy producer may serve as the best example for discussing two above said approaches. The concept is often viewed from national dimension as the modern world converted energy security into an inseparable part of national security. Producers view energy security as a part of national security with far more political point than consumers. Although both, consumers and producers share a common thing - diversification of sources.

### *Objectives:*

To identify different approaches towards energy security by consumer and producer (Russian and European);

To define the basis of each - Russian and European energy strategy;

To summarize current situation in the field of energy (in Russia and Europe);

To formulate the solution for energy insecurity;

### *Energy Consumer- EU*

Europe's energy policy seems to be poorly built while comparing with Russia. It is directed to completing the internal energy market rather than perceiving external energy market threats.

The lack of overlap between the internal and the external challenges led to increasing energy dependence on external energy sources (Russia).

Since 1973 the first time the world witnessed oil disruption impact on the world economy, European countries started thinking about energy insecurity as devastating tool over the world's wellbeing. The first step from Europeans in this field became the Energy Charter signed by 51 countries, mostly by consumers. It represents a political commitment to cooperation in the energy sector, based on the following objectives and principles: (Energy Charter):

Availability of open and efficient energy markets in order to secure and diversify energy supply;

Encouraging the investment flow;

Non-discrimination among participants;

Trade in energy, energy products and energy related equipment, based on the WTO rules;

Freedom of energy transit;

International dispute settlement;

Improved legal transparency;

Yet, what really matters in the document is the absence of the world's biggest producers such as Russia and states of Central Asia.

In 2000 and later 2006 European Commission adopted Green Paper designed to create a new energy policy environment. Documents recognize (Green Paper 2006) a new energy era", identify the "urgent need" for investment in the face of rising import dependency, calls for "common European response" but the documents have recommendatory character without obligatory format and with unclear common energy policy perspective. Both documents diagnosed the problem of security of supply, but neither delivered a step change in policy (Helm, 2007)

The January package 2007- Communication from the Commission to the Council of Ministers was the next step in the evolving approach to energy policy. The weakest part of the document became its external perspective. It reflects a failure to rethink what an external energy policy might look like, especially in the Russian case. The document advocates "speaking with one voice". But for International agreements the document states that "the EC and its member states should be a key driver" not the Commission alone. Again member states and not the Commission keep their competence in energy sector. (Helm, 2007)

When the package deals with a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia it states: "Enhancing relations with Russia through the negotiation of a new robust, comprehensive framework agreement... this should emphasize the mutual long-term benefits to both Russia and the EU and be based on market principles and those of the Energy Charter Treaty and Transit Protocol". It's interesting how the new robust, comprehensive framework agreement can be carried on the bases of Energy Charter and Transit Protocol when Russia refuses to implement either of them till today.

*European Council Action Plan (2007-2009)*

The document contains 5 priorities: 1) Internal market for Gas and Electricity; 2) Security of supply; 3) *International Energy Policy*; 4) Energy efficiency and renewable energies; 5) Energy Technologies;

The most interesting issue the document includes concerning energy security is an *international energy policy priority* which again offers member states „to speed up the development of a common approach to external energy policy” instead of creating common external energy policy (European Council Action Plan 2007-2009)

So called “supranational entity” – the European Union including its common Institutions, policies, market, currency etc is not able to agree on common energy policy till today. Energy policy still remains under the national competence of its member states. For European consumers energy security is viewed from “getting reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable price” but perceiving the concept from this frame only leads to energy dependence. (The issue will be discussed). Dealing with the problem from national security frame cannot be regarded as the wrong point, as it has already been mentioned -XXI century converted energy security into an inseparable part of national security, although if energy security becomes a part of national security both “inner” and “outer” threats should be taken into consideration. But till now EU papers cannot combine these two components in one official, obligatory format. European countries work together on domestic issues, such as: completing European electricity and gas market, new strategic European energy technology plan etc., yet, the issue remains open regarding energy security (externally).

In January 2006 Shell published the report called “The Shell Global Scenario to 2025” which underlined the declining interest in energy cooperation in the context of rising nationalism. The report stated: “loss of sense of common purpose in approaching energy security.” (Shell Global Scenario to 2025) Indeed Member states have pursued a multitude of often-conflicting external energy policies that has served to increase the vulnerability of EU energy dependence. In this regard, Wider Black Sea region should be mentioned. Developing the East-West Energy Corridor plays vital role in energy diversification. On paper all EU member states recognize importance of energy diversification but in practice member states pursue contradictory energy policies.

Today EU is supplied by three main sources: Russia, Algeria and Norway. According to BP statistics 2006 the first place is given to Russia (50% of natural gas and 30% of oil is imported from Russia). It’s no more secret Russia has deep ties with Central Asian countries especially with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Russia has secured long term contracts with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan for purchasing and re-exporting their energy sources by her (Russian) pipeline networks. This relationship was consolidated by the agreements made during President Putin’s trilateral meeting

with the states' leaders in May 2007 granting Russia increased control over Kazakh and Turkmen energy exports to Europe (Deal would upgrade Prikaspiiski natural gas pipeline) (Sergei Blagov) So, no surprise, that EU energy market contains quite big amount of Central Asian energy sources which will increase in coming years as the world energy demand is going up. According to "BP statistical Review of World Energy" in 2006 oil imports from Russia and Central Asia reached 5 million barrels per day and 132 billion cubic meters of natural gas import. Rising demand indicates that Europe's dependence on Russian energy will continue to grow. Knowing about Caspian high energy potential EU activated its relation with the region, trying to receive Caspian energy resources without Russian assistance. Projects have been designed (Nabucco, Trans-Caspian and White Stream pipelines) and were forwarded to the parties for their review. Member states preferred Russian offers: Blue Stream II, South Stream and North Stream etc. Member states lost the sense of common purpose in energy security and blocked chances for energy diversification.

For example: NABUCCO pipeline (with 25-50bcm transportation capacity) which intends to take Central Asian energy resources to Austria through Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary has potential to pipe Iranian gas in it (from South Pars field). Some experts are even predicting Iraq's possible participation. But January 25, 2008 agreement between OMV and GAZPROM undercut NABUCCO project. On January 25 Austria's state-dominated OMV energy company and GAZPROM signed an agreement to turn Baumgarten gas transmission center near Vienna into a joint venture. (Vladimir Socor, 2008) Owned 100% by OMV until now, and ranked as one of the largest gas transmission center in continental Europe, Baumgarten was designed terminus of the EU's NABUCCO pipeline project. Turning Baumgarten into a joint venture with GAZPROM the agreement deprives NABUCCO of its final outlet and pre-empt the market in GAZPROM'S favor. Before OMV and GAZPROM agreement Hungary preferred to cooperate with GAZPROM to extend the existing Russian-Turkish Blue Stream gas pipeline into EU territory through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria (Judy Dempsey, 2007).

In December 18, 2006 GAZPROM extended already existing contract with Bulgarian company Bulgargas. The new agreement insures to increase the volume of transit via Bulgaria. In return, the Bulgarian government has committed itself to cooperate on gas pipeline projects, and has given its consent to the extension and use of its underground gas storage facilities. As a result, GAZPROM will be able to use Bulgaria's infrastructure in connection with the planned construction of the southern pipeline designed to compete with NABUCCO project (GAZPROM in Europe: Faster Extension in 2006).

In May 5, 2006 Gazpromexport signed agreement with Romanian company Transgaz ((GAZPROM in Europe: Faster Extension in 2006). Under the agreement, the company will operate and invest in gas transmission infrastructure in Romania together with GAZPROM which will enable GAZPROM to use the infrastructure to increase the volume of gas supply to Turkey and to carry out the southern gas pipeline project.

Trans-Caspian pipeline which was designed to transport Turkmen gas via Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to Europe was influenced by Blue Stream pipeline construction supplying Turkey with energy resources. Till today the project is blocked.

In 2006 GAZPROM has signed a deal with Italian company ENI to build a 900 km gas pipeline that will run from Russia to Europe via Bulgaria. The deal is a major step towards building the South Stream pipeline, which would take 30 billion m<sup>3</sup>/yr of Russian gas to Europe. The pipeline will be split in Bulgaria into a northern route, going to Austria via Romania and Hungary, and a southern route that crosses the Balkan Peninsula to Italy. GAZPROM and ENI will each hold 50% in the venture. The pipeline will come on-stream in 2013. The South Stream project is expected to strengthen Russia's position as Europe's energy supplier and compete with NABUCCO pipeline- the way to diversify energy sources away from reliance on Russia.

Abovementioned bilateral agreements clearly reflect multitude of often-conflicting external energy policies of member states. Offered suggestions to build direct access to Caspian energy sources bypassing Russia seems far reaching for European countries. It's obvious energy consumers perceive energy security as „getting reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable price” but this perception is formulated not from diversification of energy sources (diversification of suppliers) but from the rules of market economy with weak political implications- to get uninterrupted energy resources at low price in order to operate national economy in appropriate way. Dealing with energy security problem from this point leads to energy dependence. Once, world sustained devastating impact of energy dependence in 1970s, when Middle East countries embargoed oil delivery to countries supporting Israel during the Gulf War.

Europeans discuss “energy interdependence” quite often, as if West has certain tools of “energy response” to Russia. In fact, this rhetoric bothers the Kremlin very little. Although Russia receives big amount of its revenue from the West, it is quite obvious that “interdependence” may work to the point where the resource importers know how to covert it into a real political strength. In order to covert it in real political strength a producer should be “small” and a bit “silly” enough to let the consumer of XXI century (while

growing demand) use political tool over its own natural resources. Russia is “big” and “wise” enough not to let anybody to use any influence over her. Russia is quite well informed that Energy producers have natural and legal right to consider energy resources as part of their national sovereignty.

Besides, on the World energy market the EU needs to compete with China (India too) which has loudly begun to demand Russian oil and gas supplies. So, considering the evidence, talking about “energy interdependence” is too far from reality.

#### *Energy Producer - Russia*

The growing misunderstanding in the energy policy is based on failure to recognize the emergence of political competitions at International level. There are two management models: “modernization” and “mineral-wealth” management models that are competing with each other. On the one hand, the Western model of “Modernization” aims at removing political barriers that limit access to raw material, to oil and gas resources where FDI is seen as the best tool to denationalize energy resources and integrate in world market (less popular among energy producers). On the other hand “mineral wealth” management model formulates its own set of references for “globalization”: The model aims at the participation in the international economy, but on the condition that the state’s long-term political, strategic and economic national interests are served. This model is the appropriate for most of energy producers especially for Russia. The model existence in XXI century can be easily seen with current Russian-Georgia conflict. At first sight, the conflict is based on territorial dispute, but if we go deep to the issue we can easily find the seeds of regional energy strategy. As “mineral-wealth” model serves the state’s (producer) long-term political, strategic and economic national interests, Georgia’s incline to west, its potential NATO membership and perhaps even the membership of EU (under doubt) puts Regional power’s – Russia’s - political, strategic and economic national interest under the risk. Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in NATO will cause western military presence in the region which may turn into a long-term political and strategic threat for Russia and probably activate projected pipelines circumventing Russian territory threatening country’s (Russia) national economic interest. (Loosing monopoly over Central Asian countries’ energy resources). Knowing this, Russia perceives energy security as “selling energy resources to consumer at high political and economic price”. Russian formulated its energy policy under five tactics:

*Locking in demand (divide and conquer) (undercutting competitions)*

Russia is attempting to lock in demand by signing long-term bilateral and multilateral contracts with European countries. Moscow prefers to deal with the EU member states separately rather than as a group so that Russia can compete with EU alternative ways circumventing Russian territory.

#### *Locking in Supply*

Russia's second strategy is to lock in supply by consolidating its control over strategic energy infrastructure, most notably pipelines, throughout Europe and Central Asia. Russia is using outright ownership and joint ventures to control supply, sale, and distribution of natural gas and is buying up major energy infrastructure, such as pipelines, refineries, electric grids, and ports.

In 2004, GAZPROM had invested \$2.6 billion in 23 major joint ventures, including buying a 50 percent stake in Slovrusgaz in Slovakia, 48 percent of Europol Gaz in Poland, and 30.6 percent of Eesti Gaas in Estonia (Judy Dempsey, 2004).

On May 2007, at the summit in Turkmenistan three countries Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to build the Prekaspiski gas pipeline to carry gas from Turkmenistan to Russia via Kazakhstan (Ariel Cohen, 2004). With this agreement Russia tries to lock supply opportunity to Europe, as EU before the agreement planned Trans-Caspian pipeline intending to circumvent Russian-control routes from Caspian basin.

#### *External Consolidation*

Russia is also consolidating control of oil and gas supplies throughout Central Asia, particularly signing long-term exploration and supply agreements with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to preempt independent export arrangements with the West.

#### *Internal Energy Strategy Completion- Elimination of Existing Gap Between "Business" and "Politics"*

Through the marginalization of the oligarchs Russia regained control over the political landscape. Using a combination of tax laws, licensing and wielding control over GAZPROM Russian internal energy strategy finalized with success. GAZPROM turned to be successfully chosen instrument regaining Russian "membership of the global board of Directors."

#### *Power in Action*

Russian-Georgian war demonstrated that Russia is quite prepared to use force in pursuit of its interest. By means of this action Russia once again reminded the world that post-Soviet political crisis is over. Russia's relative ability to take military action in a cluster of energy-important countries around its borders is, (without any inclination that Russia will use force abroad, the only target can be its "near abroad") at present, much greater than ever.

In practical term, the World is not only shaped by globalization and dem-

ocratic values but by classic power politics (Realpolitik)

#### Challenges for European Countries

Europe can face the following threats: 1) Increasing energy dependence and Russian dominance on European energy market; 2) Russian application of energy sources as "political leverage"; 3) Russian market strategy (partnership with potential competitors) – Gas Exporting Countries Forum;

#### *Russian application of energy sources as "political leverage"*

Who knows how Russia will use its fundamental and newly gained competitive advantage. There are risks that cannot be easily ignored. During recent years, a particularly disturbing factor had been Russia's increased use of energy as a tool for achieving foreign policy goals. For example:

Permanent political tension with Ukraine and energy supply cutoff in 2006 motivated by Ukraine's Western orientation

Similar tense situation with Georgia in 2006

Shutdown of oil supply to Lithuania after Lithuanian Mazeikiu Nafta refinery was sold to a Polish company rather than to Russian bidders;

Refusal to build the initially planned second line of Yamal-Europe gas pipeline through Poland, substituting it with Nord Stream gas pipeline via the Baltic Sea, which turns out to be at least five times more expensive in capital cost and about one-and-a-half times more expensive in terms of the gas transportation staff;

#### *Gas Exporting Countries Forum*

Possible Russia-Iran cooperation in Gas OPEC threatens appearance of new collective strength on International arena. Current Russian -Iran intensive ties underline existence of strategic cooperation based on their long term foreign policy goals. Their "friendship" is driven by two primary motivations: energy and security (against US). Worldwide Russia and Iran rank the first and the second in term of gas reserves. So, in future they can not only secure their income from gas export and raise their status on the global gas market, but can also raise their impact on International politics. Kremlin support (believing in Iran's good intention) of Tehran's nuclear program once again reminded the World about growing importance of their cooperation. Russia and Iran can divide energy power (gas) among each other if Gas exporting countries Forum turns into OPEC like organization, where according to length of their reserves Russia will take first place and Iran the second one. Besides, as Iran has less financial potential-comparing with Russia- to activate energy production at full scale- Iran may let Russian rich investors (or company like GAZPROM) to operate in unexplored fields, drastically increasing Russian "energy management". This threat is now underway as on July 21, 2008 Russian gas monopoly GAZPROM signed Memorandum on cooperation in oil and gas

production and transportation with the National Iranian Company with whom many European companies refused to work. So this official cooperation gives chance to Russian company GAZPROM to strengthen its positions over Iran's energy resources. This new Russian investment was put in Iranian Pars field one of the biggest gas fields in the world, which is expected to produce more than 750 million cubic meters of natural gas a day by 2014 (Kostis Geropoulos, 2008).

Finally, like OPEC, Gas OPEC can manipulate with prices and production volume. OPEC even today manipulates with production volume - as Russian market has lost 18 percent of its value since Russian invasion in Georgia (RTC,2008). OPEC cuts its production (not very high) in order to increase the price of oil. These two events can't be regarded as coincidence- most of energy producers still try to work together (Current Russia-Venezuela military training in Caribbean Sea)( Russian Strategic Bombers in Venezuela for Training,2008).

*The means to respond to external energy challenges*

Double liberalization or protectionism

Diverse European energy market - access to alternative sources of energy

( De-Russification of Central Asian energy resources; Renegotiation of relation with Iran)

Common Energy Policy (Prevent member states from reaching individual deals undercutting the viability of EU plans to bring alternative suppliers of energy to Europe)

*Double liberalization or protectionism*

Over-arching liberalized market structure needs to be built both in EU and Russia. While Western investors' rights to control an asset are limited by 49% shareholding rule in Russia, in Europe Russian gas company GAZPROM creates joint ventures with 50% share (e.g. GAZPROM & OMV joint venture). Europe should either manage to liberalize Russian energy market which is not possible in nearest future as till now Russia consistently refuses to sign up to any kind of binding agreements such as the Energy Charter or protect their market from foreign dominance (strengthening anti-trust law and esp. "Ownership unbundling") -not letting vertically integrated joint ventures (esp. national & foreign) to have full scale capacity of production and distribution simultaneously. The double activation by the same venture negatively effects competition. Market fragmentation along national borders, high degree of vertical integration and high market concentration are the roots of the lack of a healthy market competition (Memorandum of 3<sup>rd</sup> energy package). It's obvious vertically integrated network operators have no incentive for develop-

ing the network in the overall interests of the market and hence for facilitating new entry on supply levels. On the contrary, they have an inherent interest to limit new investment and strong competition.

In addition, it is important to pay attention to the existence of long-term energy contracts. Long-term contracts can be both good and bad. On the one hand, they offer purchasers guaranteed supply, and better management of the risks related to adverse price movement. But it is vitally important that the benefits of this security are not outweighed by the negative impact on effective competition. Unhealthy competition leads to one-party dominance. So, Insufficient unbundling of network and supply activities decrease competition. Effective separation of supply and production activities from the network is a key for better-functioning energy market and security of supply.

#### *Alternative energy sources*

Diversification of energy suppliers minimizes absence of market competition, protects EU against potential dominance from single external supplier and improves security of supply. For Alternative scenario Caspian energy resources (not Russia, as she is already one of the biggest energy suppliers for EU), mostly from Central Asian countries could serve as perfect example. Plus to Central Asian countries Iran with the largest gas reserves after Russia can be huge energy supplier for Europe.

#### *Common Energy Policy*

EU member states have to recognize that their parallel "energy protectionism" fails to provide effective energy security for the Union. Bilateral deals with only one energy supplier led to growing dependence on one, single source, which will affect not only one country but the Union as a whole. For example Germany has made step which put the country heavily dependent on Russian gas without having the corresponding power to require its Russian partner to take steps such as liberalizing its own markets. If Russian gas shortages occur it will create stress not only on Germans energy market but such shortages could cause widespread economic disruption across the Union (considering Germans high contribution to the EU budget). With the establishment of Common Energy policy European countries will together diversify energy sources and spread liberalized market rules over external energy suppliers in order to insure security of supply.

### *Conclusion*

Natural resources became either geopolitical challenges or opportunities for countries in XXI century. Energy security became self-serving depending on energy producers' and consumers' different interests. For producers gas and oil became not the source of "short energy war" as it once happened in 1970s, but the tool for well-coordinated, long-term political goals. That's why for producers' energy security became source of gaining high, expensive economic and political value on International level. As energy producers perceived their legal and natural right to consider energy resources part of their sovereignty consumers were left only with getting supply at "reasonable price" - uninterrupted energy resources at less fluctuated price. Despite differences consumers and producers turned to share one common character - energy security became part of their natural security. But still there is difference as producers more politicized the subject than consumers. Producers recognized existence of both internal and external threats, but consumers could not follow the same path. It could be explained by consumers' different nationality. Talking with "one voice" still remains a problem for European countries which can be regarded as the weak link in their energy strategy, while for producers like Russia mixture of inner and outer threats became less difficult (considering current political turmoil in Middle East and increase on demand).

European failure to establish common energy policy and effective competitive Single Market for energy in Europe may lead to energy dependence on single supplier with "political leverage" and creation of Gas OPEC with strong market division and intention to monopolize. The abovementioned threats can be responded with strong anti-trust law (a bit protectionism is needed) and diversification of suppliers. As double liberalization is far from reality (Russia will never agree with Transit protocol and never liberalize market, at least in nearest future) anti-trust law (competition law) should become strict enough to disband production and distribution by the same company which will lead to healthy competition, Second way to somehow decrease dependence on Russia should be Caspian hydrocarbons and elimination of Iran Isolation. Otherwise Russia influence over Central Asian resources may repeat over Iran by means of Gas OPEC. Moscow makes plenty of noise about selling its gas to China and Japan instead of Europe. But it will be some time before Russia can build planned infrastructure to do that. In addition, Europe can also find third way - renewable energies especially nuclear energy which so perfectly works in France. So energy insecurity can be dealt only with mixture of energy tools (diversification of suppliers, unbundling and renewable energies).

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